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I. ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
A. Scope of the Fourth Amendment
1. Reasonable expectation of privacy
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution' prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. In Katz v.
United States,2 the Supreme Court explained that the existence of a
fourth amendment violation depends in large part on whether or not
the person affected entertained a legitimate expectation of privacy.
3
Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, set forth the appropriate test: it
must appear "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'."4 However, the fourth
amendment is not merely an embodiment of "the right to privacy."5 In
terms of fourth amendment jurisprudence, the invasion of a privacy
I. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. I1d. at 351-52.
4. Id. at 360, 361-62.
5. Id. at 350-51.
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interest must be accompanied by governmental action in the form of a
search or seizure. Thus, the amendment's proscription does not apply
to private action,6 and it is not applicable when the governmental activ-
ity at issue does not involve a search or a seizure.7
Recently, in Rakas v. Illinois,8 the Supreme Court applied even more
rigorously the principle that the rights secured by the fourth amend-
ment are personal ones.9 The Court rejected the notion that shorthand
phrases such as "legitimately on the premises"'" or "target" theory of
standing' encapsulate the core of fourth amendment protections. In-
stead, the Court insisted that the analysis must focus on the substantive
rights of the particular criminal defendant claiming a fourth amend-
ment violation, that is, on the defendant's privacy interests in the par-
ticular area searched and property seized.' 2 The petitioners in Rakas
were passengers in a car that had been stopped and searched; incrimi-
6. Id. ("right to be let alone by other people. . . left largely to the law of the individual
States"); United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 939 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978)
(evidence admissible when obtained by private search of abandoned motel room); United
States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir. 1978) (absent FBI approval, use of pen
register by telephone company lacks requisite state involvement).
7. Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1979) (no search or seizure when
illegal alien voluntarily spoke to INS agents who knocked on her door); United States v.
Olander, 584 F.2d 876, 888 (9th Cir. 1978) (boarding a boat to serve civil process is neither a
search nor a seizure); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 492-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 896 (1978) (use of transponder to monitor location of rented airplane held not a
search). See also United States v. Jernigan, 582 F.2d 1211, 1212-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 991 (1978) (agents' or informants' consent to recording of conversation renders
fourth amendment claim moot); United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978) (co-owner's consent to search of photos validates invasion of
appellant's privacy); United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 962 (9th Cir. 1978) (sound record-
ing made by agent who is a party to conversation or one made with the consent of one of the
parties to the conversation not a violation of the fourth amendment).
8. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
9. The Court reiterated that, being personal rights, they may not be vicariously asserted.
Id. at 133-34 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). However, the
Court specifically refused to characterize the initial inquiry in terms of standing, preferring
an analytical approach based on "the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 139. It is therefore unneccessary to determine whether or not a
particular search was violative of another's rights. Id. at 150.
10. The Court in Rakas explained that the phrase "legitimately on the premises," origi-
nally coined in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), was intended to reflect the notion
that a person could have a reasonable expectation of privacy (and hence a legally sufficient
interest under the fourth amendment) in a place he was using that was not his own home.
Id. at 140-42. The insufficiency of its use as an analytical tool was evident from the disparate
results in cases in which it had been literally applied. Id. at 145-46 n.13.
11. The Rakas petitioners had argued that any defendant at whom a search was directed
should have standing to contest the use of evidence seized as a result of that search; this rule
was urged in an attempt to broaden the Jones rule of standing. .d. at 132-33.
12. Id. at 140-48.
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nating evidence was found in the locked glove compartment and under
the front seat of the car, which neither passenger owned. The petition-
ers argued, however, that the evidence seized should have been ex-
cluded from the trial. The Court held that the petitioners failed to
show that the areas searched were ones in which "a passenger qua pas-
senger. . . would. . . normally have a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy."1
3
a. Abandonedproperty
In Hester v. United States, 4 the Supreme Court held that the exami-
nation of the contents of abandoned bottles did not constitute a seizure
cognizable under the fourth amendment. 5 The Court explained that
"the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the peo-
ple in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the
open fields."' 6 Forty years later, the Court in Katz disavowed fourth
amendment interpretations based solely upon location; however, the
open fields doctrine was at least tacitly approved when the Katz Court
stated "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.""7 Thus, lower courts have reasoned that, while the open fields
doctrine may have no independent vitality post-Katz, "open fields are
not areas in which one traditionally might reasonably expect pri-
vacy." 18
In United States v. Basile,'9 the Ninth Circuit relied on the post-Katz
"open fields" doctrine to find that the appellants did not have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in an old truck, apparently abandoned, set
on blocks "probably" 100 yards from the appellant's residence. 20 After
discussing the facts, the court stated: "The trial court's conclusion that
the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
the panel truck is amply supported by the evidence."' 2' Oddly, this con-
clusion was based in part upon a literal open fields approach rather
than upon a Katz analysis. The court distinguished Watt enburg v.
13. Id. at 148-49.
14. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
15. Id. at 58.
16. Id. at 59.
17. 389 U.S. at 351.
18. United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
19. 569 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 436 U.S. 920 (1978).
20. Id. at 1055.
21. Id. at 1056.
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United States,22 which had held that a stockpile of Christmas trees was
protected from governmental intrusion because the stockpile was
within the curtilage of a lodge operated by the defendant.23 However,
the basis for distinguishing the cases seems to be the relative distances
involved (in Basile 100 yards; in Wattenburg twenty to thirty-five feet),
rather than an expectation of privacy test. The stockpile of trees in
Wattenburg was "about five feet from a parking area used by personnel
and patrons of the lodge" 24 (hardly a strong basis for a privacy argu-
ment),25 while the truck in Basile was abandoned, if at all, in a rela-
tively isolated area adjacent to the defendant's home.26
b. Electronic tracking devices
Generally, the use of an electronic tracking device that merely aids
visual surveillance does not violate a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 27 However, because tracking cannot be accomplished until af-
ter the device is installed, the Ninth Circuit has used a two-step analy-
sis to determine if a fourth amendment violation has occurred.28 First,
it must be shown that no violation was presented by the installation
itself. Second, if the installation was proper, it must appear that the
continued surveillance by the device did not violate a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.
In United States v. Dubrofsky,29 the court applied that analysis to a
situation in which a lawful customs search revealed that a package
from Thailand contained heroin in its hollowed-out walls. Drug en-
forcement agents placed a tracking device in the package that not only
facilitated surveillance of its location but also transmitted a different
signal when the package had been opened. The court first found that it
was "reasonable to suspect that a crated package like the one in contro-
versy contain[ed] contraband." 3° This justified the initial installation.
31
22. 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968).
23. 569 F.2d at 1056.
24. Id.
25. 388 F.2d at 857 (reasonable expectation of privacy alternate holding).
26. 569 F.2d at 1055. See also id. at 1058 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (majority opinion
cannot be reconciled with Wattenburg).
27. See generaly Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 86
YALE L.J. 1461, 1461-69 (1977).
28. United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978). Accord, United
States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States v. Hufford,
539 F.2d 32, 33-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
29. 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978).
30. Id. at 211.
31. Id. See United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
1979]
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Next, the court acknowledged that, while a device indicating no more
than "here I am" is included within permissible techniques of surveil-
lance,32 a device indicating that a package has been opened presents a
different problem.3 3 The court concluded that it was a slight intrusion,
one analogous to the permissible use of binoculars designed for night.
However, had the beeper related much more than the information that
the package had been opened, it might well have been considered
equivalent to a wiretap.34
2. Investigatory stops and reasonable suspicion
"The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, in-
cluding seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional
arrest."35 However, the amendment only proscribes searches and
seizures that are unreasonable. 36 Because the intrusion occasioned by
an investigatory stop is less severe than that in an arrest, the standard
by which reasonableness is judged has been defined as a "founded or
reasonable suspicion '37 rather than probable cause. Even if the local
Ct. 2162 (1979) (inspection by customs officials of shipment arriving from South America
held lawful since they suspected it contained contraband). By statute, customs officials are
permitted to open international mail to inspect its contents if they have "reasonable cause to
suspect" the presence of contraband. The standard is milder than probable cause. United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 612-13 (1977).
32. "Permissible techniques of surveillance include more than the five senses of officers
and their unaided physical abilities. Binoculars, dogs that track and sniff out contraband,
searchlights, fluorescent powders, automobiles and airplanes, burglar alarms, radar devices,
and bait money. . . [are all permissible] in the usual case." 581 F.2d at 211.
See also United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896
(1978) (transponder attached to rented plane did not violate reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy any more than a beeper to aid surveillance of an automobile on public roads); United
States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2162 (1979)
(beeper and fluorescent powder placed in package by narcotics agents pursuant to lawful
customs search not violative of defendant's constitutional rights).
The Ninth Citcuit has also indicated that a contraband dealer "cannot expect Fourth
Amendment rights to protect his privacy in the same manner as one who deals in legitimate
merchandise." Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed that the use of a pen regis-
ter which produces a written record of all telephone numbers dialed from a given telephone
is not subject to fourth amendment proscriptions. United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d
1383, 1389 (9th Cir. 1978); Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir.
1977).
33. 581 F.2d at 211-12.
34. Id.
35. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
37. The "founded suspicion" test enunciated by the Ninth Circuit has been found to be
indistinguishable from the "reasonable suspicion" test of the United States Supreme Court.
United States v. Contreras-Diaz, 575 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855
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police are involved, the federal standard for judging the legality of the
stop is used.38
The Ninth Circuit has found a reasonable suspicion justifying inves-
tigatory stops in the following factual settings: (1) when the suspect
saw the patrol car, he backed up to a retaining wall over which he
appeared to throw an object;39 (2) after suspects requested birth certifi-
cates of deceased persons, they were followed and found to be driving a
truck with license plates registered to another vehicle;40 (3) when a sus-
pect was found driving an old car, the right rear tire of which had no
tread in violation of the vehicle code;4 1 (4) after being directed by a
radio bulletin to investigate a possible burglary, police found suspects
stooping over "suspiciously" at the rear of the car;42 (5) at a border
patrol checkpoint for brief questioning;43 (6) after a car exceeding the
speed limit was stopped, some passengers gave contradictory explana-
tions regarding their destination and others, unable to speak English,
resembled "'illegal aliens' with whom. . .[the officer] had previously
come in contact."'
Even if the stop is justified and the person is so "seized," the fourth
amendment requires that the detention be" 'strictly tied to and justified
by' " the circumstances that legitimized the initial stop.45 In United
(1978) (citing United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476, 477-78 (9th Cir. 1976)). "In
order for such a stop to be valid it must be based on a 'reasonable suspicion' that illegal
activity had occurred or was occurring." United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 792 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049 (1979).
The United States Supreme Court has defined a "reasonable suspicion" as those" 'specific
and articulable facts'" to which an officer can point together with" 'rational inferences from
those facts'" which "'reasonably warrant' a belief that his safety or that of others is in
danger'." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
38. United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049
(1979); United States v. Grajeda, 570 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Colom,
No. 77-1040, slip op. at 1186 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978). But see United States v. Contreras-
Diaz, 575 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855 (1978) (because state officer
involved, initial inquiry on basis of California law subject to subsequent application of fed-
eral standards).
39. United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049 (1979).
40. United States v. Kennedy, 573 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978).
41. United States v. Grajeda, 570 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1978).
42. United States v. Coliom, No. 77-1040 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978).
43. United States v. Rubalcava-Montoya, 597 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1978).
44. United States v. Contreras-Diaz, 575 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
855 (1978). See also United States v. Soloman, 528 F.2d 88, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1975) (validity of
stop upheld based on driver's inability to open hood of car and lack of knowledge of the
coolant recovery system).
45. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 18-19 (1968) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
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States v. Kennedy,46 the Ninth Circuit found that the discrepancy in
vehicle license information together with the receipt of birth certificates
of deceased persons justified the initial stop but not the extended in-
quiry into the suspect's arrest history or possession of weapons.47
3. Arrests and probable cause
An arrest, unlike an investigatory stop, requires "probable cause.
'48
Probable cause to arrest demands a comparison between the arresting
officer's own knowledge and an objective standard. At the moment of
the arrest, the officer must have been aware of facts and circumstances
based on "'reasonably trustworthy information. . . sufficient to war-
rant a prudent man in believing that the. . . [suspect] had committed
or was committing an offense'. ' 49 As in United States v. Collom,50
however, a founded suspicion to detain may also ripen into probable
cause to arrest.:"
The Ninth Circuit has upheld findings of probable cause to arrest
when supported by (1) evidence obtained from co-conspirators or in-
formants together with the officer's independent observations, 52 (2) in-
formation gathered with the aid of electronic surveillance devices,
5 3
and (3) direct observation by an officer or reasonable inferences drawn
from circumstances surrounding an offense.54 However, until United
46. 573 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978).
47. Id. at 659. See also United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973) (jaywalking
does not provide reason to suspect incidence of other crimes). Cf. United States v. Con-
treras-Diaz, 575 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855 (1978) (totality of circum-
stances formed basis for rational suspicion of possible criminal activity).
48. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). If probable cause is established, the
arrest is almost certainly valid regardless of whether the arresting officer had a warrant. See
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (arrest supported by probable cause never invali-
dated solely because of failure to secure warrant).
49. United States v. Baker, 567 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
50. No. 77-1040 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978).
51. -d. slip op. at 1864-65 (radio bulletin directing officers to investigate plus additional
information from suspect's explanation of activities sufficient to arrest).
52. United States v. Blalock, 578 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Moreno,
569 F.2d 1049, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th
Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1245 (1979) (court found probable cause necessary to justify
arrests of illegal aliens based on informant's information coupled with conduct observed at
petitioner's residence).
53. United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896
(1978); United States v. Valentin, 569 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1978).
54. United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 521 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926 (1978)
(get-away car in bank robbery registered to person residing near bank; officers saw suspect
leave residence and hastily return when patrol car spotted); United States v. Baker, 567 F.2d
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States v. Prescott,55 the question of whether probable cause to arrest
could be sufficient justification for a warrantless entry into a private
residence had not been answered by the Ninth Circuit. 6 The court had
avoided the question by finding that "exigent circumstances" 57 existed
or that the building at issue was actually a place of business.5 8
In Prescott, the court joined the District of Columbia 59 and Second
Circuits6" in holding that, absent exigent circumstances, officers having
probable cause must first obtain a warrant before entering a dwelling to
effect an arrest.6 Three months later in United States v. Johnson,62
however, the Ninth Circuit upheld a warrantless arrest inside a sus-
pect's apartment. The court held that, even though there were no exi-
gent circumstances and there was ample time to obtain an arrest
warrant, probable cause existed for the arrest; therefore, appellant's
constitutional rights had not been violated.63 The distinction between
the cases, which the court did not mention, is that in Prescott the of-
ficers literally kicked down the door, while in Johnson the agents
924, 926 (9th Cir. 1978) (suspects inextricably enmeshed with other in sale and delivery of
contraband in which undercover agent participated).
55. 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978).
56. The Supreme Court has never resolved the issue, but has expressly reserved this
"grave constitutional question" on several occasions. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,
499-500 (1958). See also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 n.6 (1976) (warrantless
arrest based on probable cause valid; subsequent search of car with consent also valid).
57. "Exigent circumstances" refers to that situation in which the constitutional warrant
requirement with its consequent delay must yield to an urgent need for immediate police
action. Immediate action is called for when the suspect is armed or might escape or when
there is risk of destruction of evidence or risk of danger to officers or third persons. See
United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2162 (1979)
(contraband in imminent danger of destruction constituted an exigent circumstance justify-
ing warrantless entry into private dwelling); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978) (possible alerting phone call from arrested cohort
increased hazard of risks noted above); United States v. Valentin, 569 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th
Cir. 1978) (transmitters in contraband having been discovered, the risk of destruction of
evidence and suspect escape increased).
58. United States v. Blalock, 578 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1978) (warrantless arrest lawful
when consummated in business establishment during business hours). See United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)) (sus-
pect "not in an area where [she] had any expectation of privacy").
59. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
60. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1978).
61. United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary
Draft of ProposedAmendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, February 1978, Rule
41 at 70-72, and Advisory Committee Note at 73-76).
62. No. 77-3808 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1978).
63. Id., slip op. at 4121.
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knocked, used fictitious names, and were admitted voluntarily after the
suspect opened the door and found the agents with their guns drawn.
Within the same three month period, the Ninth Circuit again
avoided the issue of a warrantless arrest in a private residence by find-
ing, in United States v. Botero,6 4 that the arrest actually took place in
the doorway of the suspect's apartment. 5 Citing United States v.
Santana,66 the court found that, because the arrest could have taken
place when the suspect opened the door, the agents could have fol-
lowed the suspect into the apartment to effect the arrest. Therefore, his
retreat could not divert the arrest.
67
Finally, the validity of an arrest warrant supported only by a crimi-
nal complaint filed by the prosecutor rather than by probable cause
went undecided in Myers v. Rhay.68 The court held that "the proper
time to challenge the probable cause underlying an arrest is prior to the
prosecution of the case, while the illegal detention is in progress.
' 69
B. The Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy70 providing
fourth amendment protections against illegal searches and seizures by
prohibiting the use of illegally obtained evidence by the prosecution in
a criminal trial.7 ' The purpose of the exclusionary rule is "to deter
future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures;
' 72
it is not designed to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the
illegal search.73 Therefore, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
exclusionary rule should be applied only in those areas in which "its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served," 74 L e., when
64. 589 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2162 (1979).
65. Id. at 432.
66. 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (doorway of a private residence held to be a public place).
67. United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2162
(1979).
68. 577 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978).
69. Id. at 507. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Ierardi v. Gunter, 528 F.2d 929
(1st Cir. 1976).
70. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (exclusionary rule first enunicated, that
fourth amendment rights were to be protected by suppressing illegally obtained evidence in
federal prosecutions).
71. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (due process clause of fourteenth amendment
requires that evidence obtained in unconstitutional searches and seizures is inadmissible in
state courts, as well as federal courts, for use by the prosecution in criminal trials).
72. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
73. 414 U.S. at 347.
74. Id. at 348. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (exclusion of a
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future unlawful police conduct will thereby be deterred. Following this
standard for application of the exclusionary rule, the Ninth Circuit de-
clined to apply the exclusionary rule in 1978 in cases in which it
thought the rule's deterrent purpose would not be furthered.7" It also
refused to apply the exclusionary rule when the fourth amendment vio-
lation played only a minimal role in discovery of evidence.76
Application of the exclusionary rule is further limited by the require-
witness's testimony requires a more direct connection with the illegal search than exclusion
of physical evidence); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) ("[D]espite the broad deter-
rent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduc-
tion of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons."); United States v.
Romero, 585 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1978) ("In deriving the outer perimeters of the exclu-
sionary rule, courts have. . . balance[d] the deterrence value of excluding a particular class
of evidence against the policies in favor of admitting all evidence relevant to the fact-finding
process.").
75. See United States v. Romero, 585 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1978) (where preparation of
federal search warrant was not based upon evidence obtained by invalid state warrant, fed-
eral warrant was valid, and deterrent value of applying exclusionary rule was inapplicable);
United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1978) (Ninth Circuit declined to apply
exclusionary rule, remanding case to district court for determination of the issue of whether
proceeding under state warrant inconsistent with FED. R. CGlM. P. 41 was intentional, thus
requiring application of the exclusionary rule); United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827, 834-
35 (9th Cir. 1978) (little or no remedial effect would be achieved by excluding evidence
gathered in military interrogation by military investigator in contravention of military regu-
lations requiring presence of counsel); United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978) (exclusionary rule not applied because: (1) minimal
interaction between U.S. and Peruvian officials did not support the defendant's contention
that the Peruvian drug investigation was a "joint" operation with U.S., thus Peruvian au-
thorities' conduct not attributable to U.S. officials; (2) subsequent confession was voluntary,
not the fruit of coerced Peruvian confession; and (3) physical evidence was not the fruit of
prior coerced confession); United States v. Walker, 569 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 976 (1978) (deterrence function of rule would not be served by retroactive applica-
tion of United States v. Fannon, 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977), rehearing en banc denied, 569
F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1978)) (fourth amendment reasonableness standards mandated for air-
lines searches, where evidence was obtained by airline employee acting in good faith).
The Ninth Circuit also declined to apply the exclusionary rule in several cases involving
foreign searches. See United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978) (fourth
amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable where circumstances of foreign search were not
"extreme" or no joint venture between the foreign officials and U.S. officials existed). But
see United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1978) (substantial participation in the
arrest process by both U.S. and Mexican officials supported a finding of joint venture, thus
requiring suppression of a confession made in absence of Miranda warnings).
In addition, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the exclusionary rule in a civil case. See
Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1979) (since exclusionary rule traditionally
applies only when criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions might be imposed, it is not applica-
ble to deportation proceedings).
76. See United States v. Brock, 571 F.2d 480, 484 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[I]f the illegally ob-
tained leads were so insubstantial that their role in the discovery of the evidence sought to be
suppressed 'must be considered de minimis,' then suppression is inappropriate.") (quoting
United States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971)).
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ment that the person asserting the illegality of the search or seizure
have standing to do so. 77 In Brown v. United States,7" the Supreme
Court summarized the three requirements for standing, at least one of
which must be met by the defendant for the standing requirement to be
satisfied: defendant must (1) have been on the premises at the time of
the search or seizure, (2) allege a proprietary or possessory interest in
the premises, or (3) be charged with an offense that includes possession
of the seized evidence as an essential element of the offense charged.79
However, in the recent case of Rakas v. Illinois,8" the Supreme Court
held that meeting one of these requirements, by being "legitimately on
the premises" at the time of the search, does not in and of itself estab-
lish the defendant's right to challenge the legality of the search or
seizure."' In its analysis, the Court rejected the "target theory,)
82
which allows a court to examine the issue of standing by determining
whether the search was directed at the defendant, without deciding
whether that particular defendant's fourth amendment rights were vio-
lated.83 Affirming its previous holding that fourth amendment rights
are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously,"4 the Court held that a
defendant's own reasonable expectation of privacy must have been vio-
lated by the search or seizure in order for the defendant to have stand-
77.. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (only a "person aggrieved" may move for suppression of
illegally seized evidence).
78. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
79. Id. at 229. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1965) (defendant with pos-
sessory interest in the premises searched has standing to challenge the legality of the search);
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264-67 (1960) (when defendant was charged with a
crime which included as an essential element possession of the evidence seized, "person
aggrieved" standing requirement satisfied; court also found that defendant's being "legiti-
mately on the premises" at the time of the search satisfied the "person aggrieved" standing
requirement).
80. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
81. Id. at 132-38.
82. The "target theory" states that the person at whom the search is directed may contest
the validity of the search, even though his fourth amendment rights may not have been
violated. Id. at 132-33. It thus considers the standing question (Was this defendant a target
of the allegedly illegal search?) separately from the substantive question of whether defend-
ant's fourth amendment rights were violated (Did this defendant have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy that was violated by the search/seizure?). Id. at 139. See United States v.
Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1281 (9th Cir. 1977) (Ninth Circuit rejected "target theory" as a basis
for standing).
83. 439 U.S. at 139.
84. Id. at 137-38 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (evidence
obtained by illegal electronic surveillance could only be suppressed against a defendant
whose premises were illegally monitored; it could not be suppressed against co-defendants
or co-conspirators whose fourth amendment rights were not violated)).
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ing to challenge the admissibility of the evidence thus acquired.85 It
concluded that, while a defendant's legitimate presence on the premises
at the time of the search and seizure may be relevant to establishing
defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, it is not controlling in
determining defendant's standing to challenge the evidence.86 Apply-
ing this analysis, the Court found that the facts in Rakas did not sup-
port the defendants' capacity to challenge the legality of the evidence.
As passengers, the defendants were legitimately in the vehicle searched.
However, they had neither a property or possessory interest in the auto-
mobile nor a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas of the auto-
mobile searched (locked glove compartment and beneath front seat).
Therefore, since the court concluded that their fourth amendment
rights had not been violated, the defendants were unable to challenge
the legality of the evidence used against them. 7
The Ninth Circuit had already adopted a similar approach to stand-
ing issues in the 1977 case of United States v. Cella.88 In Cella, the
court rejected the "target theory," requiring that a defendant's fourth
amendment rights must have been violated by the search or seizure in
order for him to have standing.89 Decisions by the Ninth Circuit in
1978 involving issues of standing are consistent with this view.9°
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is an extension of the ex-
clusionary rule. It requires suppression of evidence obtained by means
of unconstitutionally acquired evidence.91 In 1978, the Ninth Circuit
85. 439 U.S. at 139. The Court stated that "the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the
extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment rather than on any
theoretically separate but invariably intertwined concept of standing." Id.
86. Id. at 148. The Court rejected defendants' argument that being "legitimately on the
premises" (set forth in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960)) conferred standing.
It stated that this standard was "too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment
rights." Id. at 142.
87. Id. at 149-50.
88. 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1977).
89. Id. at 1281. In rejecting the "target theory," the court stated, "the rights protected by
the Fourth Amendment are personal rights, and may be enforced by exclusion of evidence
secured by means of an unlawful search and seizure only by one whose own protection and
privacy was infringed by the search and seizure." Id.
90. See United States v. Sturgis, 578 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1978) (when appellant claimed
no proprietary interest in items seized or premises searched, he had no normal possessory
standing, while lacking automatic standing since possession of stolen money is not an essen-
tial element of charge of armed bank robbery); United States v. Rubalcava-Montoya, 597
F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1978) (although not present during transportation of illegal aliens, defend-
ant had standing because he owned the vehicle searched).
91. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) (statements made by defend-
ant at time of his arrest and narcotics taken from third party as a result of these statements
were fruits of unlawful state action and should have been excluded from evidence).
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applied the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in two situations: (1)
to suppress evidence or testimony resulting from exploitation of physi-
cal evidence obtained in an illegal search 92 and (2) to suppress evidence
acquired through exploitation of statements made in the absence of Mi-
randa warnings. 9
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply and evi-
dence is admissible if. (1) the evidence could have been procured
through lawful, independent means;94 (2) the connection between the
evidence introduced at trial and the initial search and seizure is so at-
tenuated as to "dissipate the taint" of the original illegality;95 or (3) the
original search and seizure did not violate the fourth amendment.96
92. See United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1978) (where search for evidence of
marijuana possession exceeded the scope of the warrant in that evidence of cocaine posses-
sion was also sought and seized, all evidence was suppressed); United States v. Rubalcava-
Montoya, 597 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1978) (testimony of illegal aliens who were discovered in
illegal search conducted without probable cause or consent was suppressed as "fruit" of the
illegal search, where government did not establish that the testimony was so attenuated from
the illegal search as to be untainted).
93. See United States v. Kennedy, 573 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978) (where probable cause for
search warrant was established by questioning that occurred during "custodial interroga-
tion" but without Miranda warnings, the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant was
the "fruit" of a Miranda violation, and must be suppressed). Cf. Myers v. Rhay, 577 F.2d
504, 508-09 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978) (where state prisoner was afforded a
full and fair state hearing at which to challenge confession as fruit of illegal arrest, habeas
corpus was properly denied); United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1062-65 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978) (subsequent confession to U.S. officials not fruit of coerced
confession to Peruvian officials; physical evidence obtained prior to coerced confession
could not be fruit of it).
94. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Cf. United States v.
Romero, 585 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1978) (court's determination that federal warrant was
untainted was based on a finding that the warrant was in fact based on independent un-
tainted information gathered prior to execution of illegal state warrant; "inevitable discov-
ery" rule not applied).
95. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963). See United States v. Ceccolini,
435 U.S. 268 (1978) (less attenuation needed for live witness testimony to be admissible than
for tangible evidence); United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 936-37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 935 (1978) (taint of original illegal search dissipated so that defendant's subsequent
admissions were admissible where there were: (1) repeated Miranda warnings, (2) lapse of
one week between search and admissions, and (3) defendant initiated interview).
96. See United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 939 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 439 U.S. 935
(1978) (no fourth amendment violation when evidence was discovered by innkeeper after
defendant had abandoned motel room); United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 212 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978) (no fourth amendment violation where co-owner of
evidence consented to search); United States v. Walker, 569 F.2d 502-04 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978) (no fourth amendment violation when airline employee con-
ducted search prior to ruling that employees are thereby performing a federal function and
that such searches must therefore be made in conformity with the fourth amendment).
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In United States v. Ceccolini,97 the Supreme Court distinguished be-
tween applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine when the
"fruit" is potentially tainted testimony as compared to tangible evi-
dence.98 In Ceccolini, a witness who was willing to testify about de-
fendant's illegal gambling operations was discovered as a direct result
of an illegal search. The Court held that the witness' testimony was
admissible, even though it was the "fruit" of an illegal search. Reason-
ing that "the cost of excluding live-witness testimony often will be
greater" 99 than the cost of excluding tangible evidence, the Court re-
quired "a closer, more direct link between the illegality and that kind
of testimony."o
Voluntary acts or admissions occurring after the illegal search or
seizure can also provide the independent and lawful means necessary
to admit evidence against a "fruit of the poisonous tree" argument. 10
The determination of whether a subsequent confession is the "fruit" of
a prior illegal confession depends on whether the second confession
was made voluntarily.' 2 In United States v. Schmidt, 0 3 the Ninth Cir-
cuit denied petitioner's claim that admissions made to federal agents
were the "fruits" of a prior coerced confession to Peruvian police. In so
doing, it held the following factors to be determinative of the voluntari-
ness of the subsequent confession: (1) petitioner had not lost his will to
resist, as evidenced by signing a "forced signature" on his confession;"
97. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
98. Id. at 278.
99. Id.
100. Id. In its opinion, the Court stated that "the exclusionary rule should be invoked
with much greater reluctance where the claim is based on a causal relationship between a
constitutional violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar claim is
advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object." Id. at 280.
101. See Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1979) (no violation where peti-
tioners voluntarily went to INS office and made statements that were not induced by im-
proper action of immigration officers); United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (9th
Cir. 1978) (petitioner consented to search of vehicle's trunk after unlawful search); United
States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 936-37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978) (although
original search may have been illegal, statements made by defendant were admissible when:
(1) defendant initiated the interview, (2) there were repeated Miranda warnings, and (3)
there was a lapse of one week between the illegal search and defendant's admissions); Hoon-
silapa v. INS, 575 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir.), modfled, 586 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1978) (peti-
tioner's wife and attorney, attempting to adjust his legal status, voluntarily submitted his
visa petition, thereby rendering invalid the claim that visa petition was product of illegal
arrest and search); United States v. Brock, 571 F.2d 480, 483 (9th Cir. 1978) (assuming initial
search was illegal, petitioner's subsequent voluntary appearance and admissions to F.B.I.
cured any defects in evidence).
102. United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1063.
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(2) he admitted not fearing the federal agents; 0 5 and (3) he had taken
at least one course in criminal law and was well aware of his Miranda
rights.'
0 6
The Ninth Circuit suppressed evidence solely on statutory grounds in
United States v. Santora.°7 Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,108 courts may not authorize
break-ins for the purpose of planting bugging devices. Therefore, a
search warrant issued on the basis of information obtained through a
wiretap initiated in violation of the Act and the incidental fruits of the
warrant were suppressed.'0 9
C. Search Warrants and Probable Cause
The fourth amendment sets forth the conditions under which a war-
rant may issue."10 In applying these fourth amendment protections, the
Supreme Court has articulated the requirements that must be met
before a search warrant will pass constitutional muster. First, the affi-
davit presented to the magistrate in support of the warrant must allege
facts sufficient to enable the magistrate to determine that probable
cause for the search or arrest exists."' Second, the items to be seized
and the place to be searched must be described with particularity, and
in such a way as to indicate that criminal activity is likely to have oc-
curred." 2 Third, the person issuing the warrant must be a neutral and
detached magistrate, capable of determining whether probable cause
for the requested arrest or search exists." 3 The Court has stated that,
in evaluating compliance with these requirements, the affidavit should
be read as a whole, using a common sense approach."1
4
105. Id at n.5.
106. Id at n.6.
107. 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978), opinion vacated and remanded in light ofDalia v. United
States, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979), 99 S. Ct. 2155 (1979).
108. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
109. 583 F.2d at 468.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
111. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102, 107-12 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
112. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,485 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717,
732 (1961); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948). Cf. United States v.
Moreno, 569 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972 (1978) (only probability,
not certainty, of finding described items at a particular location need be shown).
113. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
114. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 577 (1971) (citing United States v. Ventresca,
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1. Inferences and common knowledge
In United States v. Fried, 5 the Ninth Circuit stressed that "great
deference" is owed the decision of the magistrate who determines that
probable cause exists.' 1 6 The magistrate is entitled to "infer" informa-
tion to substantiate elements of the offense charged and to use "com-
mon knowledge" to support the conclusion in the affidavit that the
evidence to be seized will have a nexus with the criminal activity
charged. In Fried, for example, the court determined that the magis-
trate could infer that, because debentures were stolen in New York and
because at least one was found in San Francisco, it was probable that
the debentures had been transported in interstate commerce by one or
more of the suspects. Furthermore, the magistrate could rely upon
common knowledge that debentures are customarily traded in amounts
of $1,000 or more in order to find that some debentures were possessed
in violation of a statute requiring that the property in question be worth
more than $5,000. 117
In 1978, it was common for the Ninth Circuit to uphold findings of
probable cause based upon inferences. In United States v. Martinez,11
the court upheld a search warrant for appellant's house. Although
most of the information in the affidavit was based upon appellant's al-
leged gambling activities at a bar, appellant had received at least two
telephone calls at his residence. During the calls, he was alleged to
have given out wagering information. Therefore, it was permissible for
the magistrate to infer that gambling records permitting appellant to
answer telephone inquiries were kept at the house. 9
380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965)); United States v. Bowers, 534 F.2d 186, 192 n.5 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976).
115. 576 F.2d 787 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
116. Id at 791 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969); United States v.
Bowers, 534 F.2d 186, 188-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976)).
117. 576 F.2d at 791.
118. 588 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1978).
119. Id at 1234. See United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1978) (court
allowed magistrate to make appropriate inferences regarding the use of the chemical
piperdine in the illicit manufacture of PCP); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 212-
13 (9th Cir. 1978) (court upheld issuance of warrant to search suspect's home in Boulder
Creek after his arrest in Santa Cruz for importation of heroin, after court determined that it
is a normal inference that heroin importers keep heroin and related paraphernalia at their
homes); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896
(1978) (court held it was reasonable to infer defendant had probably been carrying contra-
band and probably had it in his motel room). See also United States v. Spearman, 532 F.2d
132, 133 (9th Cir. 1976) (court held that a search warrant may be upheld when the nexus
between the items to be seized and the place to be searched rests not upon direct observa-
19791
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United States v. Solario12 ° is a rare example of a Ninth Circuit re-
fusal to infer probable cause in 1978. In So/arlo, one of four search
warrants had been issued. One of the four authorized a search of peti-
tioner's parents' home in order to recover a revolver allegedly in the
possession of petitioner's brother. Upon searching the home, the of-
ficers found an unregistered semi-automatic rifle that petitioner admit-
ted was his. On appeal, the court granted the motion to suppress. The
only factors supporting the warrant were that a reliable informant (1)
had seen petitioner's brother with a revolver between four and one-half
and sixteen and one-half months ago, (2) had heard the brother say he
owned several handguns, (3) had seen the brother with a handgun in
the parents' home three times during 1976, and (4) had bought narcot-
ics from the brother, with some of the purchases occurring in the par-
ent's home. The court concluded that the primary information was
stale and the rest of the information was insufficient to cure the stale-
ness. 121
2. Information from informants and co-conspirators
Where the inference of probable cause is to be drawn solely from
information furnished by an unnamed informant rather than from di-
rect observation of the affiant, the reliability of the informant and his
information must be established. In Aguilar v. Texasl1 2 and Spinelli v.
United States, 23 the Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test which
requires (1) that the affidavit set forth the underlying circumstances
necessary to enable the magistrate to evaluate independently the in-
formant's conclusions, 24 and (2) that the affidavit contain sufficient
facts to enable the magistrate to conclude that the unnamed informant
is credible or that his information is reliable. 2 '
The Ninth Circuit recently applied this test in United States v. Mc-
Crea,2 6 which involved the sighting of what appeared to be parts of a
machine gun by two social workers who were visiting the home of a
tion, but upon the combination of the type of crime, the nature of items sought, and normal
inferences regarding the places where a criminal would hide contraband).
120. 577 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1978).
121. Id. at 555-56. See United States v. Sherwin, 572 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 909 (1978) (to determine if affidavit is sufficient to support a warrant the
magistrate must look only to the information on the face of the document).
122. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
123. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
124. Id. at 413.
125. Id.
126. 583 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
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welfare recipient. The welfare recipient, the former wife of appellant,
told them her husband stored his guns in the basement and was going
to Montana soon on a shooting spree. On the basis of this information,
an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms obtained a
warrant to search the home. Appellant argued that the affidavit was
insufficient under Aguilar because the social workers were "not credible
and reliable informants," for they lacked knowledge about firearms.
127
Their conclusions about the machine gun were said to be "mere beliefs
or suspicions and insufficient to constitute probable cause."' 128 The
court distinguished Aguilar, 1 29 stating that "[t]hese were not profes-
sional informants, but known private citizens giving good faith obser-
vations upon which it was reasonable to rely."' 130 Thus, there was
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.'
3'
In United States v. Moreno, 3 2 the court, relying upon its previous
statements in United States v. Smith, 133 held that information provided
by a co-conspirator who was under arrest and whose reliability had not
been proven could still be a basis for probable cause when that infor-
mation was detailed and corroborated by observation. 134 In Moreno,
the informant's statements concerning the appearance and behavior of
his heroin "connection" were corroborated by agents who monitored a
telephone call between the informant and his "connection," and who
subsequently observed a "buy." The court held that the Aguilar-
Spinelli test had been satisfied because the affidavit in support of the
warrant to search the "connection's " residence set out the informant's
statements, the agent's corroborating observations, and the statements
of an agent whose experience in investigating narcotics led him to con-
clude that more heroin would be found at the residence.
1 35
Finally, it is well established in the Ninth Circuit that the second
prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test "can . . .be met by circumstantial
127. Id. at 1085.
128. Id.
129. In Aguilar, the unidentified informant was not shown to have spoken on the basis of
personal knowledge or to have relied upon specific facts or circumstances. 378 U.S. at 113-
14.
130. 583 F.2d at 1085.
131. See Rutherford v. Cupp, 508 F.2d 122, 123 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 933
(1975) (per curiam) (informant was a neighbor of defendant and had no apparent ulterior
motive).
132. 569 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972 (1978).
133. 503 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975).
134. 569 F.2d at 1051.
135. Id. at 1052.
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evidence on the trustworthiness of the tip."' 36 When fear for their
safety required that informants' names be withheld, the court, in United
States v. Louderman,137 upheld the validity of a search warrant based
on two factors: (1) the informants' reliability was demonstrated by
their history of supplying informative leads that had resulted in numer-
ous arrests, and (2) the information they supplied was corroborated
through various means of investigation.
38
3. Items and premises described with particularity
As a "fundamental protection . . . intended to prevent general
searches,"' 139 an affidavit must particularly describe the items to be
seized and the premises to be searched.' 40 While a warrant's descrip-
tion of the items to be seized may be sufficiently specific to withstand a
claim of overbreadth, the actual execution of the warrant may not. The
execution may fail for technical reasons14 ' or because the search ex-
ceeded the scope authorized by the warrant. 142
136. United States v. Garrett, 565 F.2d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 435 U.S.
974 (1978) (citing United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) & Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959)).
137. 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1978).
138. Id at 1389 (The F.B.I. was advised that the telephone company, through the use of a
pen register, had obtained evidence of wire fraud; "corroboration through various means of
independent investigation" consisted of the subpoenaed results of the pen register investiga-
tion.). See also United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1006 (1978) (where affidavit was based largely on statement of informant who saw and han-
dled stolen debenture in hotel room and subsequently delivered it to agent, reliability of
informant could be inferred from informant's detailed description of criminal activity).
139. United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir. 1978). See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) ("the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a
general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings"). Cf. United States v. Rettig, 589
F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978) (when agents concealed from issuing magistrate the scope of
their intended search and used warrant for general exploratory search, all evidence was
suppressed).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See United States v. Louderman, 573 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.
1978) (court held that the items described were sufficiently related to the investigation of
wire fraud).
141. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) (1), which provides in part: "The warrant shall be
served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant,
and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime."
"Daytime" is defined as "the hours from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. according to local time."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h). Cf. United States v. Kim, 577 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1978) (although the
record indicated a dispute as to five minute period, warrant was not prematurely executed).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978) (court found
agents intentionally exceeded scope of warrant authorizing search for marijuana). But see,
e.g., United States v. McCrea, 583 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (court
upheld seizure of pipe bomb as within the scope of warrant directing search for machine gun
and parts).
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In United States v. Dubrofsky, 43 an agent was informed by tele-
phone that a warrant had been issued, but the caller did not disclose to
him the identity of the specific items authorized to be seized. The court
upheld the execution of the warrant only on the "peculiar facts" of the
case. These facts included the agent's testimony that he had partici-
pated in at least ten searches of a similar nature and had assumed that
the warrant authorized no greater or lesser search than he had routinely
conducted in the other cases.'" Relying primarily on hindsight, the
court found that appellant's rights had not been jeopardized and, con-
sequently, the execution of the warrant could be upheld.
4. Misrepresentations and omissions
In the area of particularity, the court must also determine whether
misrepresentations or omissions in the affidavit render it insufficient
under fourth amendment standards. The Supreme Court in Franks v.
Delaware45 recently held that, in order to obtain a hearing on the ve-
racity of an affiant, the challenger must allege that any omissions or
misrepresentations were made recklessly or with intent to deceive the
court. 146 Even when sufficient allegations have been made, if the alleg-
edly false portions of the affidavit are set aside and, without them, the
affidavit remains sufficient, no hearing will be permitted.'47 Only when
the sufficiency of the affidavit depends upon the allegedly reckless or
deliberate misstatements will a hearing be granted.148 An affidavit con-
taining omissions or misstatements resulting from negligence, but
which otherwise establishes probable cause, will be sufficient to support
the warrant.1
49
In United States v. Rettig,'10 the Ninth Circuit was confronted with a
bad faith omission that, unlike that in Franks, did not undercut the
factual sufficiency of the affidavit but, rather, operated to deprive the
magistrate of the ability to properly supervise the scope of the
search.'' On April 2, 1975, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency
143. 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978).
144. Id at 213.
145. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
146. The allegations may not be merely conclusory; they must be fully supported. Id. at
171.
147. Id. at 171-72.
148. Id. at 172.
149. Id at 171.
150. 589 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1978).
151. Id at 423. Cf. United States v. Romero, 585 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1978) (government's
failure to inform federal magistrate that evidence sought under federal warrant had been
suppressed by state court did not impair magistrate's finding of probable cause); United
19791
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had sought an arrest warrant for defendant Rettig and a warrant to
search his home from a federal magistrate. The agents alleged many
details of a complicated conspiracy to import cocaine. Although the
magistrate issued the arrest warrant, he declined to issue the search
warrant because he found that the information in support was stale.
The next day, Rettig was arrested in his home while attempting to de-
stroy approximately one pound of marijuana. Following the arrest, a
new search warrant was sought, this time from a state court magistrate.
The affidavit purported simply to seek evidence linked to marijuana.
No intention to search for evidence of cocaine importation was re-
vealed, and the affidavit contained no mention of the federal court's
denial of a warrant on the previous day. The state magistrate granted
the warrant. The ensuing search was calculated to seek evidence relat-
ing to the cocaine conspiracy. Although the issuing magistrate had au-
thorized a search for personal papers indicating occupancy of the
premises, the quantity and nature of the personal papers and effects
seized clearly exceeded the limited objectives stated in the warrant. 1s2
The court found that, while the basis for the warrant to search for
marijuana was sufficient, the actual search exceeded the scope of the
warrant.15 3 The determination of whether the scope of a search ex-
ceeds the warrant's authorization was said to rest upon both the pur-
pose disclosed to the magistrate for the issuance of the warrant and the
manner of the execution of the search. 15 In Rettig, the court found it
impossible to determine which of the items actually seized would have
been discovered had the search not exceeded the scope of the warrant.
Therefore, all items seized were suppressed.15
5
In finding that the agents had deliberately concealed facts from the
issuing magistrate, the court stated:
States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 494 & n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978)
(although illegal entry and improper observation formed the basis for part of the affidavit,
the remaining facts were sufficient to support issuance of the warrant); United States v.
Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 213 & n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978) (inaccurate
statement that items sought to be seized were stolen was not intentional, negligent, or mate-
rial).
152. 589 F.2d at 423.
153. Id.
154. Id; VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 1975). Cf United States v.
Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978) (where agent was ignorant of warrant's limitations,
but conducted search reasonably and in apparent good faith, exceeding warrant's scope was
not fatal).
155. 589 F.2d at 423. Although it is permissible to seize items not described in the war-
rant, the search must have been confined to the terms of the warrant and must have been
conducted in good faith. Id.
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A judicial officer cannot perform the function of issuing a warrant partic-
ularly describing the places to be searched and the things to be seized, and
of supervising the proper return of such process, where the police fail to
disclose an intent to conduct a search the purposes and dimensions of
which are beyond that set forth in the affidavits.1
56
D. Electronic Surveillance
Soon after the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States,1
57
Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.'58
The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended Katz
to serve as a guide to courts in determining when a person has a justifi-
able expectation of privacy in his communications under the Act.'5 9
Title III of the Act prohibits the interception 60 of wire or oral commu-
nications, except within narrowly defined circumstances.
1 6 1
In United States v. McIntyre,162 the issues revolved around the prose-
cution of a former chief of police who had "bugged" the office of his
assistant chief of police in violation of Title III of the Crime Control
Act. Applying an analysis based upon the Katz approach, the Ninth
Circuit held that the assistant chief of police had a reasonable expecta-
tion that conversations in his office would not be overheard.'63 Further-
more, the McIntyre court held that, because the bugging involved in
that case was part of a criminal investigation, rather than part of an
internal affairs investigation, Title III controlled.'
64
Title III prohibits only the "willful" interception of communica-
156. Id.
157. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
158. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Crime Control Act].
159. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2112, 2178.
160. The concept of interception is defined in the Crime Control Act § 2510(4) as "the
aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device."
161. See Crime Control Act § 2511(2), supra note 158.
162. 582 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1978).
163. Cf. United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989
(1975) (under certain circumstances, employer may search employee's work area for lost
property or to supervise work); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (em-
ployee's reasonable expectation of privacy may be diminished by established regulatory
scheme or specific office practice).
164. The court noted that Title III of the Crime Control Act was particularly written to
apply to criminal investigations. 582 F.2d at 1224. Cf. United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d
1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975) (holding that some searches of employees
by employers in a noncriminal context are justifiable).
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tions. 16  In Mclnyre, the defendants contended that their bugging of
the office of an assistant chief of police was not "willful" within the
meaning of the statute because they had a good faith belief that their
conduct was legitimate. The court of appeals acknowledged that the
meaning of willful had not been uniformly applied in federal criminal
statutes and that an examination of each statute was necessary to deter-
mine the legislative intent in the use of the word. Relying on United
States v. Murdock,'66 the court interpreted a willful act as one done
with a "bad purpose" or "evil motive." Consequently, the officers' be-
lief that their conduct was legal was merely a defense of ignorance of
the law.1 67 The court held that a police officer acts with "bad purpose"
and, hence, willfully under Title III, when he "engages in electronic
surveillance (1) without a court order, and (2) in the absence of the
kind of emergency described in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)."'16 s Because the
defendants in Mclntyre had failed to obtain a court order or to estab-
lish the existence of an emergency, their act was "willful" under Title
III.
Under the Crime Control Act, authorized wiretaps are permitted,
69
but applications for such authorization must comply with the standards
of specificity and necessity enumerated in the Act.' 70 While the Act
sets forth the standard to be used,' 7 ' interpretations have varied.'72 In
United States v. Spagnuolo,173 the Ninth Circuit enunciated guidelines
by which to judge the sufficiency of affidavits submitted to support ap-
plications for wiretaps. "[Tlhe affidavit, read in its entirety, must give a
factual basis sufficient to show that ordinary investigative procedures
165. Crime Control Act § 251 1(1)(a)-(b), supra note 158.
166. 290 U.S. 389 (1933). See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968]
U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2181 (citing Murdock).
167. 582 F.2d at 1224-25.
168. Id. at 1225.
169. Crime Control Act § 2517, supra note 158.
170. Id. § 2518.
171. The Crime Control Act § 2518, supra note 158, states in pertinent part:
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire
or oral communication. . . shall include the following information
(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if
tried or to be too dangerous ....
172. Compare United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1975) with United States
v. Kerrigan, 514 F.2d 35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
173. 549 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1977) (affidavit sufficient where it included account of nine
month investigation, infiltration, and F.B.I. surveillance of gambling organization, even
though government unable to identify all participants).
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have failed or will fail in the particular case at hand."' 174 This entails
finding that the affidavit reveals a good faith effort made to identify
those violating the law, and that the affidavit shows that normal investi-
gative techniques, employed for a reasonable period of time, have
failed to build the case.' 75 Moreover, any showing that the employ-
ment of normal investigatory techniques would be either too dangerous
or unlikely to succeed must meet only a slight standard of reasonable-
ness with regard to the factual history of the investigation.
76
Pursuant to the Spagnuolo analysis, the Ninth Circuit recently up-
held the sufficiency of affidavits in United States v. Kim.'" In Kim, the
court found the affidavits sufficient when it was shown that the Hawai-
ian police had conducted a four month investigation into gambling op-
erations revealing the use of a central telephone location, that the
location had been moved three times, and that alternatives to wiretap-
ping had been tried to no avail. The court stated that, while the Gov-
ernment must show more than mere difficulty in solving a case, 178 the
procedures used need not have been a complete failure. It must only be
shown that the effectiveness of the methods used has been exhausted. 1
79
The Ninth Circuit has also used the Spagnuolo standards of reasona-
bleness in determining compliance with the minimization requirements
of section 2518(5) of the Crime Control Act. 8° In Kim, the defendant
argued that there had been a violation of the minimization standards in
that the wiretap had intercepted a casual conversation about bridge.
174. Id. at 710.
175. Id.
176. Id at 710-11.
177. 577 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1978).
178. Id at 477 (citing United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1975)). -
179. Id at 477 (citing United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1977)). See
United States v. Martinez, 571 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1978) (No. 77-2643; unpublished opinion)
(affidavits sufficient when six month investigation and infiltration of gambling ring by F.B.I.
failed to disclose names of suspects outside Los Angeles area, and when only remaining
investigative step would have been grant of immunity to major participant). Cf United
States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978), opinion vacated in light of Dalia v. United
States, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979), 99 S. Ct. 2155 (1979) (where affidavit was sufficient to support
initial intercept order relating to certain suspects, "incorporation by reference" of statements
in first affidavit into request for second wiretap failed to show how investigative techniques
had not succeeded with regard to second group of suspects).
180. The Crime Control Act § 2518(5), supra note 158, states in part:
No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the interception of any
wire or oral communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the ob-
jective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days. . .. Every order
and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall
be executed as soon as practicable, [and] shall be conducted in such a way as to mini-
mize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under
this chapter. ...
1979]
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The court held, however, that because the bridge conversation included
a discussion of bet cancellations, the interception did not violate the
minimization requirements of the Act.18 '
Section 2515 of the Crime Control Act codifies the "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree" doctrine in the area of electronic surveillance. That sec-
tion requires exclusion of the content of any intercepted wire
communication or any evidence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of
that information would be in violation of this chapter.""" 2 In United
States v. Santora,"8 3 the Ninth Circuit confronted an issue that has
sharply divided the circuits: whether Title III of the Crime Control Act
empowers district courts to authorize break-ins for the purpose of in-
stalling listening devices 84 and, hence, whether evidence thus acquired
would be fruit of the poisonous tree. Title III, itself, contains no provi-
sion empowering courts to authorize break-ins. While the Santora
court agreed with several circuits that Congress was aware of the entry
problem involved in planting a bugging device, it was unwilling to as-
sume that Congress "chose to grant authority to permit either break-ins
or technical trespasses to install bugging devices by implications de-
rived from its silence."'185 Consequently, the court held that neither
181. 577 F.2d at 483. See also United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1977) (officers must limit interference with communication outside
scope of wiretap order, once pattern of innocent calls develops, recording of such calls
should terminate).
182. Crime Control Act § 2515, supra note 158. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S.
413 (1977) (suppression of evidence not warranted where law enforcement officials failed to
comply with identification and notice requirements but had satisfied all other requirements
of Act). Cf. United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1977) (suppression required
where conversations intercepted under invalid wiretap formed essence of probable cause in
affidavits for two subsequent affidavits).
183. 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978), opinion vacated and remanded in light ofDalia v. United
States, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979), 99 S. Ct. 2155 (1979).
184. The Second and Third Circuits have held that Title III implicitly authorizes break-
ins without specific judicial approval. United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2231 (1978); United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978), aft'd,
99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979). See discussion of Dalia at text accompanying note 187 infra. The
Fourth Circuit has held that Title III implicitly authorizes break-ins, but only with judicial
approval. Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977). The Eighth Circuit,
while not finding implicit authority in Title III, has upheld judicially approved break-ins on
a different theory. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1045 (1976) (exigent circumstances permitted break-in where requirement that an announce-
ment precede the entry would warn suspect to avoid making incriminating statements). The
Sixth Circuit has held that neither Title III nor any other statute empowers courts to author-
ize break-ins. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978). The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit has held that there is no implicit authority in Title III to order break-ins.
United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
185. 583 F.2d at 461.
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Title III nor any other statute empowers district courts to authorize
break-ins to plant bugging devices. Therefore, under Santora, the evi-
dence obtained via a court-authorized break-in must be excluded.1
8 6
However, a 1979 Supreme Court decision, Dalia v. United States,
87
has come to a contrary conclusion. In Dalia, the Court held that
neither the fourth amendment nor the Crime Control Act precludes the
use of covert entry for the installation of eavesdropping devices.
In United States v. Louderman,8 8 the court reiterated the principles
of Hodge v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company'89 by
holding that it would continue to recognize a distinction between a pen
register, which merely records the numbers dialed, and a bugging,
which intrudes upon the content of the communication. 90 In
Louderman, the court found no fourth amendment violation in the use
of a pen register by a telephone company, especially when the com-
pany's intrusion was unaccompanied by governmental participation.' 9'
E. Warrantless Searches
1. Search incident to arrest
Law enforcement officers may conduct limited searches incident to
lawful arrests' 92 in order to prevent the destruction of evidence and to
186. Id. at 465. The court specifically noted that Congress had relied upon Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Berger
struck down a New York surveillance statute which permitted seizure of conversations with-
out sufficiently narrow warrant procedures. Implicit in Berger was a holding that the fourth
amendment protects conversations without regard to physical trespasses. Katz, decided six
months later, expressly held that fourth amendment protections extend to conversations in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
187. 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979).
188. 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1978).
189. 555 F.2d 254, 256-57 (9th Cir. 1977).
190. 576 F.2d at 1389.
191. See Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976) ("the
right of privacy protected by the wiretap statutes goes to the message content rather than the
fact that a call was placed"). Cf. United States v. Jemigan, 582 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978) (consent to monitoring of phone call by one party without the
knowledge of the other not a violation of fourth amendment rights).
When electronic beepers, trackers, or transponders do little more than aid visual surveil-
lance, no fourth amendment issue is presented. See, e.g., United States v. Dubrofsky, 581
F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 896 (1978).
192. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (after arrest for driving
without a license, limited patdown search of arrestee's person upheld) ("It is well settled that
a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment."). In Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), the Court employed
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ensure the safety of arresting officers.' 93 Such searches will be upheld
even though no evidence is in fact found and even though the officer
does not actually fear for his safety.
19 4
The permissible scope of incidental searches is limited to the arres-
tee's person and the area within his immediate control.' 95 This area
has been described by the Supreme Court as encompassing "the area
from within which. . . [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence."' 96 The Ninth Circuit interpreted this lan-
guage broadly in 1978, sustaining the search of a purse found lying on
the front seat of an arrestee's vehicle after the arrestee had been re-
moved from the auto and placed in custody.
197
Searches are considered to be incident to arrest provided they are
"substantially contemporaneous" with the arrest.'98 In United States v.
Chadwick,'9 however, the Supreme Court distinguished two situations
in which a search may involve "personal property. . . immediately as-
the incidental search rationale to justify a limited search even though the suspect was merely
"detained" and not under actual arrest. While noting that a full search would not have been
justified, the Court nonetheless held that "[l]imited searches of defendant's person, con-
ducted incident to a stationhouse detention, with probable cause, and in the face of the
ready destructibility of evidence [are] valid under the principle of Chimel v. Caif/ornia." Id.
at 295-96.
193. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (search of locked footlocker con-
ducted more than one hour after arrest of owner held not to be incident to arrest); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973) (search of defendant's person immediately after
his arrest for a traffic offense was incident thereto).
194. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) ("Since it is the fact of custodial arrest
which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not
indicate any subjective fear of the petitioner or that he did not himself suspect that the
petitioner was armed."); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
195. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
196. Id. See United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434
U.S. 1063 (1978) (search and seizure of bag containing heroin, found on car floor after de-
fendant had left auto and while he was being handcuffed, held valid as incident to arrest);
United States v. Gonzales-Rodriguez, 513 F.2d 928, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1975) (search of camper
for weapons held valid even though only way driver could have retrieved weapon from its
hiding place was to get out of drivers seat, open door of camper and enter vehicle); United
States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974) (search of defendant's home after his arrest in
front yard held not incident to arrest).
197. United States v. Moreno, 569 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972 (1978).
198. United States v. Chatman, 573 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (search of
defendant's pants prior to arrest for narcotics possession valid as "substantially contempora-
neous with the arrest"); United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 1974), cer. denied,
420 U.S. 992 (1975) (search of defendant's person and auto conducted before actual arrest
but at a time when he was "not free to leave" held incident to arrest); United States v.
Murray, 492 F.2d 178, 188-89 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 942 (1974) (search of
garment bag being carried by defendant which took place before formal arrest held valid
because officer had probable cause to detain suspect).
199. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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sociated with the person of the arrestee." 2°  If the search involves any
other type of property, and if the arresting officers have taken exclusive
control of such property, then the search will not be upheld as incident
to arrest.20 1 A more lenient standard, however, is applied to searches of
the arrestee himself and to searches of property immediately associated
with him.20 2 In United States v. Oaxaca,2°3 for example, the arrestee's
shoes were seized while he has in custody, six weeks after his arrest.
The Ninth Circuit attached "no great significance" to the fact that the
delay was so much longer than the ten hour delay in United States v.
Edwards2° and concluded that it would have been a "useless and
meaningless formality" to require a warrant.20 5
2. Emergency or exigent circumstances
The validity of a warrantless entry on private property20 6 is recog-
nized if immediate action is necessary to preserve evidence,20 7 to pro-
200. Id. at 15. The Court in Chadwick struck down the stationhouse search of a locked
footlocker originally seized from the open trunk of defendant's vehicle following his arrest.
201. Id.
202. See generally United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805 (1974) (seizure of defend-
ant's shirt and pants ten hours after arrest held valid) (the seizure was "no more than taking
from respondent the effects in his immediate possession that constituted evidence of crime"
(emphasis added)).
203. 569 F.2d 518 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926 (1978).
204. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
205. 569 F.2d at 524. See United States v. Collom, No. 77-1040 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978)
(search of arrestee's wallet upheld as incidental although it took place at stationhouse "some
time" following arrest).
206. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), the Court underscored the im-
portance of the warrant requirement in protecting property owners' reasonable expectations
of privacy: "The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is. . .a grave concern,
not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and
freedom from surveillance." Id. at 14. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 505 (1978)
(innocent fire victim still has reasonable expectation of privacy in whatever remains of his
property); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of [the
fourth amendment]. . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbi-
trary invasions by government officials.").
207. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973). In Cupp, the police took fingernail scrapings
from a person without a warrant. The Court upheld this action because of "the existence of
probable cause, the very limited intrusion undertaken incident to the station house deten-
tion, and the ready destructibility of the evidence." Id. at 296 (emphasis added). See Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (discovery of murder did not, by itself, create an exigent
circumstance because "[t]here was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed or
removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant."); United States v. Santana,
427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (warrantless entry into house reasonable because once defendant saw
the police there was "a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of the
evidence."); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (warrantless taking of
blood sample upheld where delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatened the destruction
of the evidence).
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tect law enforcement officers or third persons, 208 or to prevent the
escape of suspects. 20 9 Exigencies sufficient to justify warrantless action
generally occur whenever the "inevitable delay incident to obtaining a
warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action" by the
authorities.210  The trial court's findings in this area will not be dis-
turbed unless "clearly erroneous."
'211
The Supreme Court in 1978 decided two cases concerning exigent
circumstances. In the first of these cases, Michigan v. Tyler,21 2 investi-
gators collected evidence from the scene of a fire immediately after the
fire was extinguished. Three weeks later the inspectors returned to ob-
tain additional evidence. In upholding the initial entries and striking
down those that occurred weeks later, the Court observed that "[a]
burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions
to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable', ' 213 but "once in the build-
208. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) ("[W]hen the police come upon the
scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if. . .a
killer is still on the premises.") (" 'The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious
injury is justification for what would otherwise be illegal absent an exigency or emer-
gency'.") (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (opinion of
Burger, J.)); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
836 (1978) ("Where the crime on which arrest is based is a crime of violence . . . the in-
creased danger to the community and to the arresting officers justifies the avoidance of delay
involved in obtaining a warrant."); United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976) ("[T]o delay the entry until the warrant was obtained
...increased the likelihood that innocent persons would be harmed. . . ."); United States
v. Hobson, 519 F.2d 765, 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975) (warrantless search
of house upheld where some weapons in plain view and house is reported to contain people
"who know how to use [the weapons] and have expressed an intent to do so.").
209. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 836 (1979) ("[i]n some cases we have treated the suspect's knowledge that he is at risk of
immediate apprehension as an exigent circumstance justifying immediate action."); United
States v. Valentin, 569 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1978) (warrantless entry into house reason-
able because "it was likely that the occupant might attempt to escape."). Cf. Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (exigent circumstances not present because "[n]o sus-
pect was fleeing or likely to take flight").
210. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 836 (1979). See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413
U.S. 496, 505 (1973) ("Where there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally
must be 'now or never' to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action
without prior judicial evaluation. . . ."). The balancing test referred to in the text must be
decided on the basis of the totality of circumstances. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d at
1354. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509 ("A burning building clearly presents an
exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable'.").
211. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 836 (1979).
212. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
213. Id. at 509.
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ing, [officials] may [only] remain there for a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional entries to investigate
the cause of the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures
governing administrative searches." '214 In Mincey v. Arizona,21 5 how-
ever, the Court declined to hold that the discovery of a homicide cre-
ates circumstances sufficiently demanding to allow police investigators
to enter and search the scene of the crime, beyond an immediate search
for victims, without a warrant.
2 16
The courts have noted that one alternative to a warrantless dwelling
search is to post a guard nearby until a warrant can be obtained.2" 7 In
United States v. Flickinger,218 the Ninth Circuit explicitly recognized
this possibility, although cautioning that "[s]uch measures, while ap-
propriate in some cases, may carry their own unacceptable dangers, i.e.,
a heightened risk of weapons play and danger to third parties. 21 9
"Hot pursuit" is a recognized exigency wherein a police officer in the
process of apprehending a suspect may lawfully enter premises without
a warrant, when delay might result in destruction of evidence or danger
to the officer.220 In United States v. Oaxaca221 a hot pursuit entry into a
214. Id. at 511. The Court based its decision on findings that
[p]rompt determination of the fire's origin may be necessary to prevent its recurrence
... .Immediate investigation may also be necessary to preserve evidence from inten-
tional or accidental destruction. And, of course, the sooner the officials complete their
duties, the less will be their subsequent interference with the privacy and the recovery
efforts of the victims.
.d. at 510.
215. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
216. Id. at 394.
217. E.g., id. (police guard at apartment minimized possibility of evidence being lost,
destroyed or removed during time required to obtain search warrant); United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1976) ("[t]he failure to seek a warrant was harmless because it
would have been proper to keep the Santana residence under surveillance while the warrant
was being sought") (Stevens, J., concurring). Cf. United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 35
(9th Cir. 1974) (agents had house surrounded and could have kept it this way until a warrant
was obtained, "but such a siege would not have been reasonable or adequate").
218. 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1979).
219. Id. at 1356. See also United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1975)
(in rejecting a police guard requirement the court must consider "the legitimate interests of
the neighbors whose surroundings should not be impressed with a state of siege, [and] inno-
cent persons who might be injured accidentally as a consequence of a large number of
armed and mobile men").
220. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (suspect standing in doorway ran
inside house to avoid arrest) ("[A] suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in
motion in a public place. . . by the expedient of escaping to a private place. . . ."); War-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (delay in pursuit of armed felon and delay in search of
premises where felon located unnecessary, where to do so would gravely endanger lives of
officers or others).
221. 569 F.2d 518 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926 (1978).
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garage was upheld because police officers believed an armed robbery
suspect was inside and heard a "very loud noise" coming from in-
side.222
3. Investigative detention
In Terry v. Ohio2 23 the Supreme Court held that law enforcement
officers may detain a person without a warrant, probable cause or con-
sent if the officers have a reasonable suspicion224 "that criminal activity
is afoot."22 An investigatory stop is deemed to have occurred "when
the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen. 226
222. Id. at 521-22. See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) ("The police were
informed that an armed robbery had taken place, and that the suspect had entered [a certain
house] less than five minutes before they reached it. They acted reasonably when they en-
tered the house and began to search .... ").
223. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk of persons who appeared to be planning a robbery
upheld).
224. "Reasonable suspicion" required that "the police officer. . . point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant [the] intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The facts need not provide
"probable cause" to believe the suspect guilty of a crime. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975).
"Reasonable suspicion" and "founded suspicion" are indistinguishable standards. United
States v. Contreras-Diaz, 575 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855 (1978);
United States v. Collom, No. 77-1040, slip op. at 1866 n.4.
225. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 578
F.2d 224 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 849 (1978) (2:15 a.m. stop of truck
reasonable after driver left van at gas station and joined accomplices in truck); United States
v. Walker, 576 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (reasonable stop of arrestee's compan-
ion; she did not respond to "stop" command, hid large bag in bushes, and reached into
purse); United States v. Collom, No. 77-1040, slip op. at 1866 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978) (inves-
tigatory stop appropriate; officers, directed to scene of possible burglary, saw suspects stoop-
ing down at rear of car, then retreating quickly when officers approached).
In balancing the need for intrusion against the degree of inconvenience, the Ninth Circuit
determines reasonableness by looking at all the circumstances. Some of the factors consid-
ered are:
"[tihe seriousness of the offense, the degree of likelihood that the person detained may
have witnessed or been involved in the offense, the proximity in time and space from
the scene of the crime, the urgency of the occasion, the nature of the detention and its
extent, the means and procedures employed by the officer, the presence of any circum-
stances suggesting harrassment or a deliberate effort to avoid the necessity of securing a
warrant ....
United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453, 455-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1010 (1975)
(quoting Arnold v. United States, 382 F.2d 4, 7 (9th Cir. 1967)).
226. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). See United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89,
90 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) ("Once the police officers required appellee to come to the
police car, he was 'seized'. .. ").
Detention at gun point does not automatically transfer the stop into an arrest. United
States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978).
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Any such detention must be reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances justifying its inception.227 In United States v. Contreras-
Diaz,2 28 however, police lawfully stopped defendant's vehicle while
speeding but detained the passengers longer than was necessary to
write the traffic citation. The detention was extended in order to give
border patrol agents time to arrive. Observing that the passengers
spoke no English, had no identification, physically resembled aliens,
and gave conflicting stories as to their destination, the Ninth Circuit
sustained the stop.
229
An officer who has detained a suspect may lawfully conduct a weap-
ons search when "justified in believing that the individual whose suspi-
cious behavior he is investigating . . . is armed and presently
dangerous. '230 The search must be no more intrusive than necessary to
discover weapons that could be used to harm the officer.23' In 1977,
this concern for the officer's safety prompted the Supreme Court to
hold that the police, after stopping a vehicle for a traffic violation, may
order the driver out of his auto so that his movements may be better
observed.232
The specific articulable facts upon which the officer must base his
"reasonable suspicion" need not be personally observed. Rather, a rea-
Although one's freedom of movement is restrained during a Terry stop, Miranda warnings
need not be given. United States v. Collom, No. 77-1040, slip op. at 1867 (9th Cir. June 15,
1978).
227. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir.
1973) (per curiam) (without reasonable grounds for suspicion, detention ofjaywalker to run
warrant check unreasonable).
228. 575 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855 (1978).
229. Id. at 745.
230. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). Eg., United States v. Walker, 576 F.2d 253,
255-56 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (search of handbag reasonable after suspect reached into
it before stop). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ("The purpose of this
limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence. .. ").
231. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) (per curiam) ("IT]he bulge in
the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that [the traffic violator] was armed and thus
posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer."); United States v. Hill, 545
F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (lifting of suspect's shirt not overly intrusive
after officer spotted bulge in waistband that could have been a gun) ("Terry does not...
limit a weapons search to a so-called 'pat-down' search. Any limited intrusion designed to
discover guns, knives, clubs or other instruments of assault are permissible."). The scope of
an investigatory search may be expanded, however, by the consent of the suspect. United
States v. Collom, No. 77-1040, slip op. at 1867 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978).
232. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 111 n.6 (1977) (per curiam). In Mimms,
the Court found that the additional intrusion into the driver's freedom, after a valid stop,
was minimal. "What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against
legitimate concerns for the officer's safety." Id. at 111.
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sonable suspicion may be based on an informant's tip that has "suffi-
cient indicia of reliability" to justify interrogation.233 In United States
v. Sierra-Hernandez,234 for example, a Terry stop based on an inform-
ant's tip was upheld; the informant personally gave the information to
the police officer, and the tip indicated that a specific individual was in
the process of committing a specific crime nearby.235
4. Warrantless vehicle searches
Vehicle searches 36 fall outside the fourth amendment warrant re-
quirement when both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at
the time of the seizure.2 37 Although the finding of exigency tradition-
ally rests upon the vehicle's mobility and the ease with which it may be
moved from the area,238 warrantless searches have also been sustained
when necessary to protect the guarding officers or the general public, 239
233. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) ("Some tips, completely lacking in
indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation
before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized."). Cf. United States v. DeVita, 526
F.2d 81, 82-83 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (vague tip about possible criminal activity at
uncertain future date from "unlisted" informant held unreliable).
234. 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1978).
235. Id. at 763. Whether the information is sufficient to justify detention must be deter-
mined from the facts of each case, for there is no per se rule of reliability. However,
"[i]nformation from a citizen who confronts an officer in person to advise that a designated
individual present on the scene is committing a specific crime should be given serious atten-
tion and great weight by the officer." .d.
236. Although courts usually refer to this warrant exception as the "automobile excep-
tion," it applies to a wide variety of vehicles. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
151 (1925) ("goods in course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel . . ."
within exception); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
836 (1978) (warrantless search and seizure of aircraft held within exception); United States
v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976) (war-
rantless search and seizure of boat held within exception).
237. United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460,463 (9th Cir. 1978) (vehicle searched
after reliable informant told agents that marijuana was inside).
238. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d
735, 737 (9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1213 (1979); United States v. Beasley, 476
F.2d 164, 166 (9th Cir. 1973) (search of car at stationhouse upheld because "mobility" was
still a factor); United States v. Gibbs, 435 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
994 (1971) ("[A]gents had reasonable cause to believe that. . . [the parked car] would soon
be moved outside the jurisdiction.").
239. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973) (search of auto upheld where police
believed a weapon to be inside) ("Here the justification. .. [was] concern for the safety of
the general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the
trunk of the vehicle."); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1966) (search of auto while
in police custody upheld even though conducted one week after impoundment) ("It would
be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car in their custody for such a
length of time, had no right, even for their own protection, to search it."); United States v.
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to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence,240 and to safeguard
contraband and dangerous items.24 Therefore, the fact that a car is
stopped on the highway with probable cause to believe that it was in-
volved in a crime is sufficient to justify an immediate search, without
any further showing of exigency.242
A vehicle properly subject to search upon the highway may be re-
moved to the stationhouse before the search is conducted.243 In United
States v. Trejo-Zambrano,24 however, the Ninth Circuit went even fur-
ther by validating a delayed warrantless automobile search conducted
at a nearby gas station rather than at the police station. The court rea-
soned that by taking the car to the gas station the police "could conduct
the search thoroughly, with more ease and with greater safety."
245
In South Dakota v. Opperman,246 the Supreme Court confirmed that
warrantless inventory searches of impounded vehicles may be con-
ducted without probable cause.2 47 A proper inventory search must be
conducted solely to protect the car or its contents; the police must have
Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1978) (when it could be done "with more ease
and with greater safety," delayed search of vehicle stopped on highway upheld).
240. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1972) (gun inside auto trunk "vulnerable to
intrusion by vandals"); United States v. Baker, 567 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 818 (1978) (immediate search of parked car justified because of possibility that circling
green van contained accomplices who might remove car).
241. United States v. Moreno, 569 F.2d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972
(1978) (search of auto held proper when police had probable cause to believe weapon in-
side).
242. United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1978) (search of car be-
lieved to contain contraband proper); United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1213 (1979); United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 828 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953 (1978) (search of auto stopped on highway upheld when
agents had probable cause to believe car contained LSD).
243. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) ("[Tihere is little to choose in terms of
practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's immo-
bilization until a warrant is obtained.") (footnote omitted). As long as the initial stop is
legal, the circumstances surrounding it are irrelevant in determining whether a delayed
search will be valid. Compare id. n.10 (upholding delayed search of car stopped in a "dark
parking lot in the middle of the night") with Texas v. white, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam)
(upholding delayed search of car seized at 1:30 in afternoon). Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent
in White noted that in view of the time of the instant seizure there was "no indication that an
immediate search would have been either impractical or unsafe for the arresting officers."
423 U.S. at 70.
244. 582 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1978).
245. Id. at 463.
246. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
247. Id. at 370 n.5. The Court justified allowing inventory searches without probable
cause by categorizing them as routine, non-criminal police procedures. Id. See also United
States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263, 1271 (9th Cir. 1977) (discovery of contraband held proper
although made while officer removing vehicle contents inventoried several hours earlier).
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no investigatory motive.248 The Ninth Circuit has expanded Opperman
by consistently validating any subsequent search of a vehicle validly
seized for forfeiture.249 The Ninth Circuit reluctantly applied this rule
in United States v. Johnson,250 upholding an extremely intrusive "in-
ventory search" conducted two weeks after seizure for the avowed in-
vestigatory purpose of discovering contraband.251
5. Seizure of items in plain view
The warrantless seizure of items in "plain view" is authorized when
(1) the officer is legitimately in the area or on the premises at the time
of the discovery,252 (2) the objects to be seized are in plain view, 253 (3) it
is immediately apparent that the item is evidence, contraband, or the
fruit or instrumentality of crime,254 and (4) the discovery of the item is
248. 428 U.S. at 376.
249. Eg., United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227,232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907
(1978). Butsee South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377 n.2 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) ("[Tihe unrestrained search of an automobile and its contents would constitute a seri-
ous intrusion upon the privacy of the individual in many circumstances.").
250. 572 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978).
251. Id. at 233.
252. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plain view seizure of auto
parked on private property struck down) ("[T]he [plain view] doctrine serves to supplement
the prior justification . . . whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with
a search directed against the accused."). Eg., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236
(1968) (upholding seizure of evidence coming into plain view after agent lawfully opened
door of impounded auto); United States v. Blalock, 578 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1978) (plain
view seizure upheld when agent in store making arrest was lawfully behind counter for
purpose of flushing out and securing hidden persons when discovery occurred. Cf. United
States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1974) (police illegally entered defendant's
home, so plain view seizure inadmissible); United States v. Valentin, 569 F.2d 1069, 1071
(9th Cir. 1978) (seizure of evidence appearing in plain view upheld when officer was lawfully
in house to make arrest); United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 926 (1978) (seizure of evidence appearing in plain view upheld when officers law-
fully inside house during "hot pursuit").
253. It should be noted, however, that when police simply observe evidence in plain view
they are not considered to be conducting searches within the fourth amendment. Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23,43 (1963) ("[Ihe discovery of the brick of marijuana did not consti-
tute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view."); United
States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229, 236 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923 (1974) (use of
flashlight to illuminate interior of auto not a "search").
254. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,466 (1971) ("TIhe extension of the origi-
nal justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges."); United States v. Sedillo, 496 F.2d 151, 152 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 947
(1974) (seizure of envelope in plain view in defendant's pocket upheld as inadvertent discov-
ery of an "incriminating object"). The dissent in Sedillo took issue with the liberal interpre-
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inadvertent.255
The fourth requirement of inadvertent discovery was addressed by
the Ninth Circuit in 1978. In United States v. Blalock,256 the court vali-
dated the plain view seizure of a bag of heroin although the searching
officers knew of the bag's contents in advance and its exact location.257
The court found the inadvertence requirement to be inapplicable be-
cause the agents entered the shop to effect a lawful arrest and not to
seize the heroin.25
The Ninth Circuit in 1978 addressed whether the seizure of contra-
band is valid under the "plain view" doctrine when only an opaque
container is visible to the seizing officer. In United States v. Blalock,
259
only an unmarked brown paper bag was in plain view, but the police
had information that heroin was inside. The court summarily upheld
the search, stating that "[t]he inescapable nexus between the brown bag
and the purpose of the Agents' entry and arrest of Blalock is too obvi-
ous to play riddle games."260
6. Consent searches
Law enforcement officers may conduct searches without warrants or
probable cause if they first obtain the valid consent of the party or par-
ties involved.261 Searches based on the consent of a third party can be
tation of "immediately apparent" and argued that "[n]o view of the incriminating aspects of
the check became plain until the search and the seizure had been concluded. Thus, it was
not 'immediately apparent' that the envelope and the check were 'evidence incriminating the
accused'." Id. at 153 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opin-
ion to the Court's denial of certiorari, agreed that the plain view doctrine could not justify
the seizure in Sedillo. 419 U.S. at 947-48 (Douglas, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
255. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971). The Court reasoned that if
incriminating evidence is found inadvertently, "it would often be a needless inconvenience,
and sometimes dangerous-to the evidence or to the police themselves" to require the police
to wait and obtain a warrant. Id. at 467-68.
256. 578 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1978).
257. Id. at 249.
258. Id. at 248-49. See also United States v. Morel, 524 F.2d 550, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1975)
(inadvertence requirement not applicable because primary motive for entry was to make
arrest rather than to seize evidence). Despite this reluctance to apply the inadvertence re-
quirement, the Ninth Circuit has adopted Mr. Justice Stewart's reasoning and language in
Coolidge which includes this requirement. United States v. Brown, 470 F.2d 1120, 1122-23
(9th Cir. 1972). See United States v. Sedillo, 496 F.2d 151, 152 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 947 (1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
259. 578 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1978).
260. Id. at 249.
261. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (stolen checks found during consent
search of vehicle stopped for traffic violations). See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968) (to get consent to search, police falsely told owner of the house that they had search
warrant).
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upheld under the "property" theory,262 the "agency" theory, 263 or the
"assumption of risk" theory.2 "
The consent must be given freely and voluntarily and may not be the
result of expressed or implied duress or coercion.265 Voluntariness is a
question of fact to be determined on the basis of the totality of the
circumstances.266 The trial court's findings on this issue will be dis-
262. Under this theory, consent to search will be upheld if the party consenting has a
recognizable property interest in the place or object searched. Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 548 n.1 1 (1968) (consent by owner to search house and rifle binding on third
party). See id. at 543 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 212
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978) (partially relied on property theory by noting that
"Steams as a co-owner and possessor of the negatives and as owner (or co-owner) of the
prints could consent to a search and thereby bind [defendant]").
263. The "agency theory" will validate a consent when the consenting party has been
given authority to consent from the owner or possessor of the object of the search. Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (hotel clerk did not have authority to consent to search
of patron's room because consent could be given only by guest "either directly or through an
agent."). The Court in Stoner stressed that the interpretation of "apparent authority" must
be reasonable. Id. at 488. In United States v. Walker, 576 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 865 (1979), for example, agents knocked on defendant's apartment door
and were admitted by a woman who answered the door. The defendant later consented to a
search, and the court upheld the entry and search by reasoning that "[t]he agents were ad-
mitted to the apartment by one who had apparent authority to permit entry." Id. at 256.
264. Use of this theory requires
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most
purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the
right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk
that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (consent of one roommate to search
room valid as against the other).
The Ninth Circuit used this theory once in 1978. In United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978), the defendant entrusted his friends to return to
him developed photographic prints. While returning the pictures, however, one friend al-
lowed them to be inspected by jail guards. The court found the search to be valid because a
co-principal of the defendant, a co-owner of the negatives, had "assumed the risk that the
messenger might consent to let anyone inspect or examine [the photographs]." 1d. at 212.
See United States v. Murphy, 506 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 996
(1975) (employee's "custody of the key gave him sufficient dominion over the premises" to
enable him to grant the necessary consent). In United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208
(9th Cir. 1978), consent to search a house was given by the defendant's living companion.
Both resided on the premises, and the court held the companion's consent binding because
she was a mutual user of the property.
265. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
266. ld. at 227; United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir. 1973)
(consent to search was not voluntary because it was "systematically psychologically co-
erced") ("Where the consent is obtained through a misrepresentation by the government
* , . or under inherently coercive pressure and color of the badge. . . such a consent is not
voluntary.").
The Ninth Circuit has isolated several factors which may be considered in evaluating the
voluntary nature of consent. See, e.g., United States v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970, 972 (9th
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turbed only if "clearly erroneous.
Although consent need not be given with knowledge of the right to
refuse,268 the government must meet a more stringent burden when
consent is given while the consenting party is in police custody.269 The
Ninth Circuit, however, has narrowly interpreted the term "custody."
In United States v. Scharf,2 7 for example, the court refused to overturn
a trial court ruling that consent to search, which was given in the pres-
ence of five police officers, one of whom stood holding a shotgun, was
not given in a "custodial environment. ' 271
A valid consent search may not exceed the scope of the area for
which the consent is given.272 The failure to object to the continuation
of the search, however, can be considered as an indicator that the
search was within the scope of the initial consent.273
The Ninth Circuit held in 1978 that consent to an "administrative
search" could not be judged by the same free and voluntary standard
used in full-scale searches for evidence of crimes.274 In McMorris v.
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 908 (1974) (sophistication of accused and presence of Miranda
warnings); United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir. 1973) (psychological
atmosphere surrounding consent). It should be noted that mere acquiescence to the search
may be insufficient to sustain a finding of voluntariness. Id. at 1264. See also United States
v. Collom, No. 77-1040 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978) (consent to search rolled-up T-shirt after
Terry stop in parking lot held voluntary).
267. Eg., United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 936 (1978).
268. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). Knowledge of one's right to
refuse consent is only one factor to be considered in analyzing the "totality of circum-
stances." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976). It is unclear, however, whether
the Supreme Court would require that persons in custody at the stationhouse be informed of
the right to refuse consent. For although the Wason Court validated the consent given by
an arrestee on a public street, the majority expressly noted that the arrestee was "not in the
confines of the police station." Id.
269. United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Page, 302 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1962) (en banc). Mr. Justice Marshall recognized this higher
standard when he observed: "Many Courts of Appeals have recognized that a custodial con-
sent is different in kind from one obtained from a person not in custody, and have placed a
stiff burden on the Government to validate the consent." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 458 n.23 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Despite the importance placed by the
Supreme Court on the noncustodial setting in Schneckloth, the Ninth Circuit has held con-
sistently that consent given while a person is in police custody is valid. Eg., United States v.
Page, 302 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1962) (en banc).
270. No. 77-3080 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1978).
271. Id., slip op. at 4018.
272. See United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
936 (1978) (consent given to "look inside the trunk" but agent also looked in back cargo
portion of trunk and under hood).
273. Id.
274. McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1978).
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41io'o,2 7 5 the plaintiff-attorney was compelled to pass through a mag-
netometer and face the possibility of a limited body search each time he
entered the San Francisco courthouse. The plaintiff argued that he did
not voluntarily "consent" to the searches because he was forced either
to submit to a search or forego the practice of law by being held in
contempt each time he missed a court appearance. The Ninth Circuit
rejected this claim, reasoning that persons are not "physically" coerced
into the searches, for they "may leave the premises at any time, even
after activating the magnetometer. . . [and] may not be subjected to a
pat-down search unless. . . [they] fully and voluntarily agree to it."
276
7. Border searches
Persons entering the United States at the border or its "functional
equivalent"2 77 may be searched without any showing of probable
cause.27 All such searches, however, must satisfy the "reasonableness"
requirement of the fourth amendment.2 79 Additionally, only a single
search at the border is permitted,280 and once the subject of a search
275. 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978).
276. Id. at 901.
277. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973); United States v. Sayer,
579 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1978) (customs search of passenger arriving from Canada at Los
Angeles International Airport was a valid border search). Mail and packages may also be
searched at border equivalents. See United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2162 (1979) (search at San Francisco International Airport of leather
handbags sent from Colombia valid); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir.
1978) (package mailed from Thailand validly searched at San Francisco International Air-
port). Unlike persons, however, mail or packages entering from abroad may be inspected
only if customs officials have "reasonable cause" to suspect that the mail contains contra-
band. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 611 (1977). E.g., United States v. Botero, 589
F.2d at 432; United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d at 211. This standard is considerably less
stringent than the requirement of probable cause. Id.
Airports are not the only "functional equivalents" of borders. In United States v. Solnes,
527 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1975), the court held that a bay adjacent to the ocean was the
functional equivalent of the border with regard to vessels that have traveled in foreign wa-
ters before entry.
278. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). See United States v. Solmes, 527
F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1975).
279. Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf United States v. Cam-
eron, 538 F.2d 254, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1976). The defendant in Cameron was subjected to two
forced digital probes, two enemas, and was forced to drink a liquid laxative as part of a
border search. Holding the search to be unreasonably intrusive, the court observed: "[Al-
though] there is no per se requirement for a warrant to conduct a body search in border
crossing cases. . . the absence of a warrant is an important factor in assessing the reasona-
bleness with which the authorities acted." Id.
280. United States v. Selby, 407 F.2d 241, 242 (9th Cir. 1969). See United States v. Sayer,
579 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Itlhe search in Los Angeles was merely a secondary
examination which was a continuation of the preliminary inspection begun in Vancover,"
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has "mingled with the normal stream of commerce," customs officials
must be reasonably certain that any contraband thought to be in the
suspect's possession has entered from abroad.28 1
A proper border search may be no more intrusive than necessary to
determine whether the subject has contraband in his possession.282 As
the intrusiveness of the search increases, so also does the measure of the
cause necessary to make it reasonable. 283 For example, to uphold a
strip search, the government need only show a "reasonable suspicion"
that the suspect is carrying contraband.284 To justify a body cavity
search, however, the more demanding "clear indication" standard must
be met. 85
Although fixed border patrol checkpoints28 6 are not considered to be
and not the second of two customs searches). But cf United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721,
723 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978) ("The contention that a search conducted
after the passenger has been passed through customs . . . can never be considered as a
border search has been rejected by this court.").
281. United States v. Sayer, 579 F.2d 1169, 1170 (9th Cir. 1978) (search of passenger
upheld after customs officials watched him disembark from plane and then speak briefly
with one other person).
282. United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1976). See United States v.
Wilmont, 563 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1977) (patdown search followed by emptying of pockets,
followed by second patdown search, followed by strip search held valid in view of suspect's
unusual conduct).
283. United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875
(1978) (lifting of skirt to reveal undergarment far less intrusive than strip search and re-
quired less justification to render it reasonable).
284. Id.; United States v. Carter, 563 F.2d 1360, 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) (no decision on
whether removal of artificial leg was equivalent to a strip search). Information provided by
the companions of the person searched may be used to justify the strip search. United States
v. Gil de Avila, 468 F.2d 184, 186 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973). The
court should consider the totality of circumstances to determine the legality of strip searches.
United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1974).
285. United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 1976) ("searches involving a
'serious invasion of personal privacy and dignity,' such as close scrutiny of intimate portions
of the body, may proceed only when there is a clear indication or plain suggestion that the
individual may be involved in the importation of contraband.") (quoting United States v.
Henderson, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967)).
Noting the extreme intrusiveness of body cavity searches, the Ninth Circuit has issued a
cautionary warning to all officials: "In a situation thus laden with the potential for fear and
anxiety, a reasonable search will include, beyond the usual procedural requirements, reason-
able steps to mitigate the anxiety, discomfort, and humiliation that the suspect may suffer."
United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d at 258.
286. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). There is a difference be-
tween "permanent checkpoints" and "temporary checkpoints." Permanent checkpoints are
maintained "at or near intersections of important roads leading away from the border,"
located within the meaning of Martinez-Fuerte, while temporary checkpoints are established
in other strategic locations. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976);
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functional border equivalents, 287 routine stops for questioning may
nevertheless be conducted without consent, probable cause, or reason-
able suspicion.288 Probable cause or consent, however, is required to
justify any subsequent searches at fixed checkpoints. 289 The Ninth Cir-
cuit found the requisite probable cause clearly lacking in United Slates
v. Rubalcava-Montoya.29 ° The Rubalcava-Montoya court refused to
sustain the search of defendant's vehicle when based only on the
searching officer's knowledge that the suspect had been arrested previ-
ously for the same crime at the same location, and that he had a "de-
jected hangdog demeanor" when he exited his car.29'
Roving patrols in the vicinity of, but not at, the border may stop a
vehicle only if the officers are aware of specific articulable facts, to-
gether with rational inferences from those facts, that warrant a suspi-
cion that illegal entry or smuggling is in progress.2 92 A subsequent
search, however, must be based on probable cause.2 93
When an officer's constant surveillance of a particular vehicle in a
sparsely populated area convinces him that the vehicle has just crossed
the border, an "extended border search' 294 may be conducted. As with
United States v. Vasquez-Guerrero, 554 F.2d 917, 920 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S, 865
(1977) (Oak Grove checkpoint was "permanent" and reasonable).
287. United States v. Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). See
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
288. See United States v. Rubalcava-Montoya, 597 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1978).
289. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975). E.g., United States v. Rubalcava-
Montoya, 597 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1978).
290. 597 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1978).
291. Id. at 142.
292. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 887 (1975) (roving patrol
stopped defendant's vehicle solely because its occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent;
subsequent search invalid); United States v. Pulido-Santoyo, 580 F.2d 352, 356 (9th Cir.
1978) ("A reasonable or founded suspicion is all that is necessary-some basis from which it
can be determined that the detention was not arbitary or harrassing."). The Ninth Circuit
has also held that there is no substantial difference between the doctrines of "founded suspi-
cion" and "reasonable suspicion." United States v. Gonzales-Diaz, 528 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.
1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976).
In United States v. Avalos-Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974
(1977), the court named several considerations relevant to determining whether a reasonable
suspicion exists:
the location and traffic patterns of the area in which the vehicle is seen, information
about recent illegal border crossings in the area, the driver's behavior such as erratic
driving or attempts to escape, the appearance of a heavily loaded car, and the officer's
experience in detecting illegal entry and smuggling.
Id. at 1302. See United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1974) (considerations
to establish a "real suspicion of smuggling" listed).
293. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975).
294. United States v. Pulido-Santoyo, 580 F.2d 352, 354 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978) (issue not
decided because requirements of "founded suspicion" met); United States v. Tutwiler, 505
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searches at the border itself, "extended border searches" will be upheld
without a showing of even "reasonable suspicion."29
Generally, border search rulings will not be applied retroactively.296
In United States v. Barela,297 for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a
search that was valid under the then-existing law, but which became
illegal under the rules of subsequent Supreme Court decisions.298
8. Probation searches
The Federal Probation Act299 provides that convicted offenders may
be placed on probation "for such period and upon such terms and con-
ditions as the court deems best.' '3°" The Ninth Circuit has held that
conditions of probation are only valid if they "contribute significantly
both to the rehabilitation of the convicted person and to the protection
of the public."301
Rehabilitation can be accomplished by imposing any conditions
"reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not un-
duly restrictive of his liberty.
302
In United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales,°3 the court observed that
these conditions of probation could include the defendant's agreement
to submit to all searches "conducted in a reasonable manner and at a
reasonable time by a probation officer.' '304 Although the officer con-
ducting the search reasonably must believe in the necessity of the incur-
F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1974) (search at checkpoint fifty miles from border not extended
border search because of "interruption in keeping a complete surveillance of the defendant
and his companion northbound from border.").
295. See United States v. Pulido-Santoyo, 580 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Tutwiler, 505 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1974).
296. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1975) (Aimeida-Sanchez should
not be applied retroactively); United States v. Torres-Rios, 534 F.2d 865, 867 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898 (1977) (Brignoni-Ponce should not be applied retroactively).
297. 571 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 963 (1978).
298. United States v. Bowen, 422 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891
(1975).
299. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
300. Id. The purpose of the Act is to provide "an amelioration of the sentence by delay-
ing actual execution or providing a suspension so that the stigma might be withheld and an
opportunity for reform and repentence be granted before actual imprisonment should stain
the life of the convict." United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928).
301. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975) (any contra-
band found during an improper probation search may not be used to convict the proba-
tioner of a new offense). Those conditions and restraints which are invalid with respect to
prisoners and parolees will also be improper if applied to probationers. Id.
302. Id. at 263.
303. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
304. Id. at 263. The condition struck down in Consuelo required that the probationer
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sion, probable cause to search need not be established. 30 5 The Ninth
Circuit in 1978, however, upheld a probation search based on an overly
broad condition similar to that struck down in Consuelo,3 °6 because the
authority was "narrowly and properly exercised.1
30 7
The Ninth Circuit will not consider constitutional challenges to pro-
bation searches after the probation period has expired. In Cervantes v.
Walker,30 for example, the defendant was convicted of possession of
narcotics and was placed on three years probation. As a condition of
probation, he was to submit to a search of his person and property at
any time without notice. The issue of whether that condition was un-
constitutional was found to be moot because the probationary period
expired shortly before oral argument.30 9
F Identftcations
The sixth amendment right to counse 3 10 attaches when "the accused
requires aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his
adversary."3 1' It is well established that a post-indictment lineup is a
"critical stage" in the proceedings and that the accused therefore has
the right to presence of counsel 2.3 1  The Ninth Circuit has, however,
submit to searches of her person or property any time that a law enforcement officer re-
quested. Id. at 261 n. 1.
305. Id. at 266. All that is necessary to sustain a probation search is "a reasonable belief
on the part of the probation officer that such a search is necessary to perform properly his
duties." Id.
306. That condition read: "You shall submit person and property to search and seizure at
any time of the day or night when so requested by a probation officer with or without a
warrant and with or without probable cause." United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074, 1075
(9th Cir. 1978).
307. Id. United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1976) (search pursuant to
overbroad condition of probation reasonable where probation officer had received informa-
tion that probationer was violating the conditions of his probation and search was reason-
ably and properly exercised). Gordon held that Consuelo "established the proper language
for future probation orders, but it did not invalidate prior, broader orders which would be
narrowly and properly exercised." Id. Although the search in Jefers was conducted with
the aid of police officers, the court stated that "[a] probation officer may enlist the aid of
police, and police may be present to expedite a search." United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d
1074, 1075 (9th Cir. 1978). See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d 259, 266 (9th
Cir. 1975) (probation search may be made "under the immediate and personal supervision
of probation officers").
308. 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978).
309. Id. at 425.
310. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment provides in part: "In all criminal pro-
ceedings the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense."
311. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313 (1973).
312. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
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refused to extend the counsel guarantee to conferences between a wit-
ness and prosecuting authorities held either during or after the
lineup. 13 The Supreme Court has held that no sixth amendment right
to counsel exists at post-indictment identifications based on photo dis-
plays,314 and the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Kim,3 15 has appar-
ently extended that rationale to identifications based on recorded
sounds. In Kim, the court held that a pre-trial identification of voices
obtained through lawful electronic surveillance is not a critical stage of
a criminal proceeding for sixth amendment purposes.31 6
In cases where the defendant is not entitled to presence of counsel
during identification procedures, he may nonetheless assert a fifth or
fourteenth amendment due process claim if the identification was con-
ducted in a manner "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa-
rable mistaken identification. ' 3 7  In accord with this standard is
Simmons v. United States318 wherein it was stated that "convictions
based on eyewitness identifications at trial following a pre-trial identifi-
cation by photograph will be set aside only if the photograph procedure
was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable mis-identification. ' 31 9 The Ninth Circuit has
generally utilized a two-part approach in implementing this decision.32°
First, the court considers the necessity of the procedure and second, it
determines the substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-identification
by using the "totality of the circumstances" criteria enunciated in Neil
313. United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978)
(fact that defendant's counsel was absent from the post-lineup interview of a witness did not
constitute a denial of due process); United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977) (counsel's presence not required during post-linup conver-
sation); Doss v. United States, 431 F.2d 601, 603 (9th Cir. 1970) (defendants' counsel is not
entitled to listen in on any remarks that may pass between witnesses and officers, both dur-
ing the proceeding or afterward).
314. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317-21 (1973) (presence of counsel not essential
because of ability to recreate photo spread and confront witnesses at trial).
315. 577 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1978).
316. Id. at 480-82.
317. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
318. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
319. Id. at 384. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973) (due process require-
ment provides protection in any identification procedure conducted in absence of counsel).
320. See, e.g., United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 836 (1978) (court states that Stovall suggests such a test); United States v. Peele, 574
F.2d 489, 490 (9th Cir. 1978) (court states test as a balancing process); United States v.
Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 369-70 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977); United
States v. Valdivia, 492 F.2d 199, 210 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974). In
Pheaster, the Ninth Circuit suggests that the two-part aproach was initiated by the decision
of United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974).
1979]
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v. Biggers.32' Using this standard, it has been held that lack of neces-
sity for a pre-trial identification procedure is not sufficient by itself to
invalidate an in-court identification.322 Further, unnecessary suggesti-
bility alone will not require exclusion of identification testimony, for
the primary focus is on the reliability of the witness.
323
In the case of United States v. Crawford,3 24 the Ninth Circuit seems
to have stepped away from the two-part approach. The court stated
that, if the necessity of the procedure should be given any effect at all, it
should be considered as part of the evaluation of the law enforcement
officials' conduct that may have made the identification "impermissibly
suggestive. '325 The Crawford court asserts that Simmons never estab-
lished a two-part test and that "necessity" was simply one factor in the
overall evaluation.326 In a footnote,327 the court pointed out that the
factors utilized in Neil were not "precisely applicable 328 to Simmons
or the present case, because Neil involved exclusion of evidence of a
pre-trial identification and Simmons and Crawford involved overturn-
ing a conviction based on an in-court identification.
While this is a departure from previous Ninth Circuit language, it
does not appear to be a significant break. The court merely removes
the first prong of the two-part test and places it with the factors to be
considered in the second prong. However, doubt now exists as to the
nature of the test and the weight of the factors involved. This has espe-
cial relevance when considering Washington v. Cupp. 329 There the
Ninth Circuit held that reliability of an out-of-court identification al-
legely tainted by earlier suggestive out-of-court identification proce-
dures will be tested by using the same standard as for in-court
identification.330 Will the court use the two-part approach or will it
321. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). This inquiry should focus broadly on "the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the
accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the con-
frontation." .1d. at 199-200.
322. United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064
(1977).
323. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
324. 576 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 851 (1978).
325. Id. at 797.
326. Id.
327. Id. n.l.
328. Id.
329. 586 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1978).
330. Id. at 136-37.
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utilize the Crawford standard?331
The rule that unnecessary suggestibility by itself will not require ex-
clusion of identification testimony was originally enunciated with re-
gard to visual identification.332 In United States v. Flickinger,333 the
Ninth Circuit held that this test was "equally applicable to a voice
identification. ' 334 In lickinger, an FCC agent identified two suspects
by comparing a recording of two voices with the live voices of the sus-
pects. The court found the identification procedure unnecessarily sug-
gestive in that it was akin to a face-to-face interview rather than a
lineup.335 However, several factors indicated that the suggestive ele-
ment did not undermine the reliability of the identification. First, the
agent was experienced in voice identification; second, he had a tape of
the voices and was able to become very familiar with their sound so as
to assure more reliable identification; and third, the identification was
based solely on his own comparison between the taped and live
voices.336
Flickinger is consistent with other cases decided in the Ninth Circuit
this past year in that the court has focused on the reliability of the wit-
nesses' identification rather than on the flaws of the pre-trial identifica-
tion procedure.337
331. It is interesting to note that in United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1978),
decided 12 days after Crawford and involving much the same factual situation (pretrial
photo identifications) the court made no mention of the Crawford decision or the test enuni-
cated therein.
332. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
333. 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978).
334. Id. at 1358.
335. Id.
336. Id. United States v. Kim, 577 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1978) (identification upheld even
though F.B.I. agent who conducted voice identification asked each witness if he could iden-
tify a particular defendant and then asked the witness to identify that defendant while a tape
of his voice was being played; not impermissible prompting). See also United States v.
Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977) (police officer's in-
court identification of defendant's voice upheld because it was based on the officer's in-
dependent acquaintance with the defendant and not upon the unecessarily suggestive pre-
trial identification).
337. United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1978) (where defendant was only
one in lineup with a big nose; only one of twenty-five surveillance pictures displayed the
victim bank in backround; some witnesses viewed allegedly suggestive photo spread before
viewing lineup pictures; some witnesses making identification from photo spread were aware
the other witnesses had positively identified someone at the lineup; one witness received
non-verbal approval after making indentification and another was told she made correct
selection; court upheld in-court identification); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349,
1358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,
111 (1977)).
In United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 935 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978),
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In United States v. Satterfleld,338 the court stated that the "manner in
which in-court identifications are conducted rests with the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court. 339 So long as attempts are made to minimize
any prejudicial effect and the probative value outweighs such effect, the
identification will be admissible.34 ° In Satterfield, the defendant was
made to wear a mask similar to the one involved in the crime. The
probative value outweighed the prejudicial impact because: (a) by see-
ing the defendant in the mask the jury could better evaluate the wit-
ness' ability to make a positive identification; (b) the jury could
compare the defendant to the person pictured in the bank surveillance
photographs; and (c) defendant was allowed to put it on and remove it
outside the presence of the jury thereby restricting the possibly prejudi-
cial use to the minimum necessary.341
Finally, in United States v. Peele,34z the Ninth Circuit considered a
due process claim where there was no government involvement in the
suggestive identification procedure. In that case, the witness had seen
defendant's picture in the newspaper and she told the prosecuting au-
thorities that it helped her in identifying the defendant at a lineup.343
The court enunciated the familiar two-part approach used to determine
whether defendant's due process rights were violated by the pre-trial
identification 34" but concluded that it was not applicable since there
was no government involvement.345
II. PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
A. Grand Jury
1. Selection
The fifth amendment provides that, in federal criminal prosecutions,
"[n1o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
appellant was the only participant in a lineup whose picture had been used in a prior photo
display. Five weeks had passed between the photo identification and the lineup, neverthe-
less the procedure was upheld by the court. While the court did not specifically focus on the
reliability of the identification, the inference of such appears strong.
338. 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
339. Id. at 690.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. 574 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1978).
343. Id. at 490.
344. See notes 320-24 and accompanying text.
345. 574 F.2d at 490 (9th Cir. 1978). However, the court made it clear that a case might
arise where the mind of a witness is so clouded by suggestions from non-government sources
that a conviction based principally on the testimony of that witness violates due process. Id.
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mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury. ' 346 The Supreme Court has long recognized that, while a state
need not provide for a grand jury indictment, 347 if it does use the grand
jury, the jury may not be selected in a manner that deliberately and
systematically discriminates against persons of a particular race.
348
Congress, in 1968, enacted the Jury Selection and Service Act 349 to en-
sure that juries are chosen from a fair cross-section of the community in
the district in which the court convenes and that no citizen is excluded
because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or economic sta-
tus.
350
In United States v. Brady351 the defendants contended that the Mon-
tana Jury Selection Plan systematically excluded Indians from the
grand and petit panels in violation of the Federal Act.352 Section 1867
of the Act provides for a dismissal of indictment or a stay of proceed-
ings if there has been a substantial failure to comply with its provi-
sions,353 and section 1863 allows additional sources to supplement the
voter lists when it is determined that the voter lists do not represent a
fair cross-section of the community.
35 4
The Ninth Circuit recently created a new test to determine when sup-
plemental source lists should be added to voter lists to implement the
purposes of the Act; the inquiry focuses on whether there is a "substan-
tial deviation" between cognizable groups' numbers in the community
and their representation on the voter list.355 This standard represented
a sudden departure from previous Ninth Circuit authority, which re-
346. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
347. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment does not require grand jury indictment in a state prosecution for murder).
348. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (white defendant entitled to federal habeas
corpus relief when all blacks were systematically excluded from state grand and petit juries
that indicted and convicted him); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (discriminatory
administration of fair jury selection laws is unconstitutional).
349. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1976).
350. Id §§ 1861-1862.
351. 579 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978).
352. Appellant argued the latest census figures showed that Indians comprised approxi-
mately 30% of the population of Rosebud Couniy (one of 15 counties in the Billings Divi-
sion), while only 6 1/2% of those selected for the grand jury from that county were Indian.
Appellant also presented evidence that Indians comprised only 4 1/4% of the registered
voters. Id at 1133-34.
353. 28 U.S.C. § 1867 (1976).
354. Id § 1863(b)(2).
355. United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant failed to estab-
lish substantial underrepresentation of blacks on grand jury panel). See also United States
v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant failed to prove blacks or males
were substantially underrepresented on the grand jury panel).
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quired proof of "systematic exclusion." '356 In Brady, the court incorpo-
rated both tests and held that, to prevail under either a constitutional
challenge or a statutory challenge, appellants must prove either a "sys-
tematic exclusion" of an identifiable group or "substantial deviation"
between identifiable groups on a division-wide basis.357
In applying these new standards in Brady, the Ninth Circuit held
that while Indians formed a cognizable group358 able to challenge the
Montana Jury Selection Plan, they failed to support their claim by of-
fering statistical proof of substantial deviation on a district- or division-
wide basis.359 The fact that no Indian was called on three successive
grand jury panels did not establish "substantial deviation. 360
2. Witnesses
Once the grand jury has been impaneled, it has the power to sub-
poena witnesses and to compel the production of documents.36' While
the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination applies in the
grand jury setting,362 it is not a violation of the privilege to compel
handwriting samples for identification purposes so long as they are not
356. United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1978). See United States v.
James, 453 F.2d 27,29 (9th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff must show a discriminatory purpose or effect
in the jury selection plan); United States v. Parker, 428 F.2d 488, 489 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied,
400 U.S. 910 (1970) (plaintiff has burden to show systematic exclusion of an identifiable
group in the community to show a prima facie case). These two tests appear to mirror those
adopted by the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), for constitutional
challenges to the composition of juries. United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d at 1132.
357. 579 F.2d at 1133. Following the lead of the Fifth Circuit in Foster v. Sparks, 506
F.2d 805, 816-17 (5th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit incorporated the test of "substantial
deviation" for constitutional challenges to the jury panel developed by the Supreme Court in
Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), into the previous Ninth Circuit test of "systematic
exclusion" for statutory challenges laid down in United States v. James, 453 F.2d 27, 29 (9th
Cir. 1971). The Brady Court thus removed any distinction between a constitutionally-se-
lected jury and a jury properly selected under the Act. 579 F.2d at 1132-33.
358. The requirement of a cognizable group originated in Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 478 (1954), in which the Supreme Court held that the determination of a cognizable
group is a question of fact. It must be demonstrated that the law singled out this class and
treated it differently based on economic, social, political, racial, religious, or geographic
grounds. Systematic exclusion based on these grounds violates the cross-section require-
ment. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). See also Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (women may not be excluded from federal juries).
359. 579 F.2d at 1134.
360. Id at n.3.
361. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (government has the power to
compel persons to testify before grand juries).
362. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (defendant under investigation for
securities violations is not obliged to answer questions after invoking the fifth amendment).
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used as testimonial expressions of the truth of the writing.3 63
The Supreme Court, in Fisher v. United States,3 64 rejected the con-
tention that an attorney could raise the fifth amendment privilege in his
client's behalf.365 The decision did, however, establish a test for the
proper assertion of an attorney-client privilege. Relying on federal evi-
dentiary rules, the Court held that if documents were turned over to an
attorney by a client in the course of seeking legal advice, and if a client
would have a fifth amendment privilege if the documents had been in
his possession, the attorney may successfully raise the attorney-client
privilege in response to a subpoena duces tecum. 36 6 If the proceeding is
before a state court, however, the attorney-client privilege is a matter of
state law.367 The existence of an attorney-client privilege is therefore
determined on the basis of federal evidentiary rules rather than on con-
stitutional considerations. In Lowthian v. United States,368 the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the proper procedure for challenging a subpoena du-
ces tecum is for the attorney to refuse to produce the documents and
then to appeal any contempt judgment entered against him as a result
of that refusal.369
Although a witness may refuse to testify to facts that might incrimi-
nate him,370 one who refuses to testify or provide information without
just cause is subject to civil contempt and can be confined during the
life of the grand jury proceedings; in no case, however, may this con-
finement exceed eighteen months.37'
And, finally, while proceedings of the grand jury are secret,3 72 gener-
363. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967). E.g., United States v. Antill, 579
F.2d 1135, 1136 (9th Cir. 1978) (handwriting sample is an identifying physical characteristic
outside protection of fifth amendment; request for specific phrases in handwriting not viola-
tive of fifth amendment privilege).
364. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
365. Id at 396. In Fisher, the Internal Revenue Service had summoned attorneys to pro-
duce specified documents prepared by their client's accountants, and the attorneys raised the
client's fifth amendment privilege.
366. Id at 401-05; In re Fred R. Wittee Center Glass No. 3, 544 F.2d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.
1976) (work papers prepared by accountant can be subpoenaed so long as taxpayer produc-
ing them is not compelled to "restate, repeat or affirm" the incriminating information).
367. Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1978) (attorney-client privilege
is a matter of state law and not a matter of constitutional law under the fifth amendment).
368. 575 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1978).
369. Id at 1293.
370. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
371. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976); In re Garmon, 572 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1978) (court allowed
the civil contempt sentence to be imposed upon a witness already serving a criminal sen-
tence by suspending the criminal sentence during the period of the contempt confinement).
372. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). For the Supreme Court's rationale for secrecy of the grand
jury, see United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958).
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ally, testimony before the grand jury can be used for impeachment pur-
poses.373
B. Indictments
1. When required
The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to an-
swer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a grand jury. ' 374 The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure codify this requirement and require an indictment for of-
fenses punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding a
year, but any other offense may be prosecuted by indictment or infor-
mation.37- A defendant whose offense does not fit within these require-
ments is not entitled to a criminal indictment.376
2. Sufficiency
The indictment must be a plain, concise, and definitive statement of
the essential facts constituting the offense charged.377 It must ade-
quately inform the defendant of the charges against him,378 and may
not be so unfairly ambiguous or vague as to mislead him.37 9 A defend-
ant has standing to object to the wording of an indictment if, by nam-
ing an unindicted co-conspirator, it is unduly prejudicial to him.38 0 A
373. United States v. Shield, 571 F.2d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1978) (court allowed impeach-
ment of witness before the grand jury with the transcript of the grand jury proceedings);
Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969) (use
of grand jury testimony to impeach defendant was proper and any weight as affirmative
evidence was incidental to its impeachment purpose).
374. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
375. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
376. United States v. Marthaler, 571 F.2d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant charged
with criminal contempt of court is not entitled to indictment).
377. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
378. United States v. Chamay, 537 F.2d 341,351-53 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1000
(1976) (indictment alleging knowing participation in securities fraud sufficient; specific in-
tent not required because not an element of the crime); United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d
307, 312 (9th Cir. 1973), a'd, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (indictment in language of statute
prohibiting knowledgeable mailing of obscene matter sufficiently advised defendant of
charges).
379. United States v. Allsup, 573 F.2d 1141, 1145-46 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 436 U.S. 961
(1978) (slightly erroneous recitation of facts did not make indictment for transportation and
possession of firearms by convicted felon unduly inflammatory or prejudicial); United States
v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847 (1976) (surplusage in
indictment regarding requisite intent for mail fraud not misleading or prejudicial when de-
fendant represented by counsel chargeable with knowledge of intent necessary to prove of-
fense).
380. United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2864
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defendant lacks standing, however, to raise the due process claims of
the unindicted co-conspirator.
381
An indictment is sufficient if it sets forth the essential facts constitut-
ing an offense in the language of the proscriptive statute, or if it refers
directly or by implication to the essential elements of the crime.38 2
When the indictment is sufficient, it is within the court's discretion to
allow a bill of particulars.8 3 Absent abuse, the exercise of this discre-
tion will not be disturbed. 4
Federal Rule 7 of Criminal Procedure requires that the indictment
be signed by a government attorney.38 5 The signature of the United
States Attorney himself, however, is not necessary. The Ninth Circuit,
in United States v. Walls, 86 held that the signature of an assistant
United States Attorney was sufficient to show the concurrence of the
United States Attorney in an action taken by the grand jury.387 Rule 7
permits allegations made in one count of the indictment to be incorpo-
(1979) (defendant not prejudiced by the naming of an unindicted co-conspirator when jury
instructed that indictment was not evidence).
381. Id at 502-03.
382. United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839
(1976). See United States v. Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1977), in which defendant
alleged that the indictment which closely followed statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1006
(1976) (fraud against government institutions), was insufficient to adequately inform him of
the nature of the charges against him. The Ninth Circuit held that the indictment was suffi-
cient because it stated precise dates and amounts with respect to the fraudulent transactions.
Id at 301. See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117-18 (1974) (sufficiency of
indictment defined); United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888) (language of statute may
be used in a general sense so long as accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to inform
accused of specific offense); United States v. Markee, 425 F.2d 1043, 1047-48 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 847 (1970) (distinction exists between an indictment that fails to state essen-
tial facts and one that fails to state theory upon which the facts will be proved).
In United States v. Bolar, 569 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1978), the indictment for possession of
counterfeiting materials was not fatally defective in failing to state that photographic nega-
tives of Federal Reserve notes were subject to forfeiture, since defendant was not deprived of
the opportunity to seek return of negatives and since such negatives were, per se, contra-
band. Cf. United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406, 408 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant prosecuted for
smuggling diamonds on indictment which failed to state smuggled materials must be for-
feited to the United States was deprived of opportunity to contest the forfeiture).
383. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f); United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 553 (9th Cir. 1978)
(court's refusal to allow a bill of particulars was not an abuse of discretion when the indict-
ment was adequate to allow defendant to prepare his defense); United States v. Chenaur,
552 F.2d 294, 302 (9th Cir. 1977) (proper exercise of discretion to deny motion for bill of
particulars when prosecutor supplied information requested in open court instead of giving
written bill).
384. United States v. Clay, 476 F.2d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 1973) (no abuse of discretion in
denying bill of particulars when defendant given full discovery).
385. FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(c)(1).
386. 577 F.2d 690 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978).
387. Id at 696. Accord, United States v. Wright, 365 F.2d 135, 137 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
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rated by reference into another count in order to avoid unnecessary
repetition.3"8 Dismissal of one count of an indictment, if referred to in
remaining counts, does not require reversal of the conviction of the re-
maining counts if the reference is so complete so as to incorporate the
matter from the dismissed Counts.
389
3. Duplicity and multiplicity
The problem of duplicity arises when an indictment charges two or
more distinct offenses in a single count, thereby precluding the jury in a
general verdict from acquitting or convicting the defendant on each
separate charge. In order for a defendant to dismiss an indictment on
the grounds of duplicity, substantial prejudice must be shown 390 and
the objection must be made by a motion prior to trial.39'
A multiplicitous indictment is one which charges a single offense in
several counts. A defendant may be prejudiced by multiple sentences
resulting from a single offense.3 92  The imposition of consecutive
sentences based on multiplicitous counts is therefore deemed unconsti-
tutional.393
denied, 386 U.S. 918 (1967); Abramson v. United States, 326 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 957 (1964).
388. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Shavin, 287 F.2d 647, 650 (7th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963); Barnard v. United States, 16 F.2d 451, 453 (9th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 736 (1927).
389. See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981
(1978). The defendant in Weiner contended his conviction on six counts of securities fraud
should be reversed because the first paragraph of each count realleged by reference portions
of the two counts of conspiracy which were dismissed before the case was submitted to the
jury. The Ninth Circuit held that the reference to the dismissed counts was sufficiently full
to incorporate them into the remaining counts. Id at 776.
390. United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977)
(defendant claimed indictment was duplicitous in that it charged two separate statutory vio-
lations stemming from the same acts; appellate court found the acts to constitute two sepa-
rate offenses; even assuming the charges were duplicitous, defendant failed to show
prejudice).
391. In United States v. Gulino, 588 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit held that
a defendant who failed to object to the indictment on grounds of duplicity until appeal had
waived the error. Defendant also claimed counts I and V of his indictment for perjury
before the grand jury were dupicitous, but the court found each count contained a separate
instance of perjury..
In United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977), and
Gulino, both defendants asserted as duplicitous two separate counts charging the same of-
fense. An analysis of the cases indicates this was really a multiplicity question, but the court,
in both cases, chose to dispose of the case assuming the defendants' charges that the indict-
ment was duplicitous.
392. See United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cer. denied,
430 U.S. 966 (1977) (multiplicitous indictment pyramids punishment for single offense).
393. Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770, 771 (9th Cir. 1978) (two counts of indictment
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4. Evidence before the grand jury
In United States v. Fried,394 the Ninth Circuit affirmed its position
that, when a duly constituted grand jury returns an indictment valid on
its face, no independent inquiry may be made to determine the suffi-
ciency of the evidence presented to the grand jury. Although the in-
dictment may be challenged if it can be demonstrated there is a
complete absence of evidence, 95 a heavy burden is placed on the one
who challenges the presumption of validity.
3 9 6
5. Prosecutorial misconduct
The federal courts, in the exercise of their inherent supervisory pow-
ers, have the discretion to dismiss an indictment on the basis of govern-
mental misconduct.3 97 This remedy is used to discourage future
deliberate prosecutorial misconduct and to preserve judicial integ-
rity.3 98 The Ninth Circuit, however, considers this a harsh sanction and
has been reluctant to dismiss indictments because of prosecutorial mis-
conduct.3 9 9 In United States v. Owen,4 ° the court adopted the view
held by the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that there must be ac-
tual prejudice to the accused by virtue of the alleged acts of miscon-
charging conspiracy were multiplicitous when in fact there was but one conspiracy; consecu-
tive sentences imposed on the two counts violated double jeopardy clause). See United
States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978), where the Ninth Circuit held that
an indictment charging ten counts of violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was multiplic-
itous and dismissed nine counts.
394. 576 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978). See Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (indictment valid on its face returned by legally consti-
tuted and unbiased grand jury is sufficient to bring defendant to trial).
395. United States v. Romero, 585 F.2d 391, 399 (9th Cir. 1978) (record failed to establish
a complete absence of competent evidence to support grand jury indictment).
396. United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant failed to
show insufficient evidence was presented to grand jury to warrant indictment). See Martin
v. United States, 335 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1964) (heavy burden is placed on one who seeks
to prove there was no competent evidence before grand jury).
397. See generally United States v. Baskes, 433 F. Supp. 799, 804-07 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
398. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (exclusionary rule is to deter gov-
ernmental misconduct); United States v. Houghton, 554 F.2d 1219, 1224 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1978) (when government received order to locate informant for de-
fense counsel and it did so in two working days, there was no deliberate misconduct).
399. See United States v. Romero, 585 F.2d 391, 399 (9th Cir. 1978) (indictment not inva-
lid merely because prosecutor failed to present exculpatory evidence to grand jury, since
evidence did not clearly negate guilt or undermine authority of grand jury to act); United
States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978) (grand jury need not be advised of all
matters bearing on credibility of witnesses; dismissal of indictment required only in cases of
flagrant abuse).
400. 580 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1978).
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duct. o'
The United States Attorney has a duty to prosecute for all offenses
against the United States. 0 2 This power permits broad discretion in
determining which cases to file.40 3 The Ninth Circuit has held that the
doctrine of separation of powers precludes judicial interference with
the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion unless it is abused to
such an extent as to be "arbitrary, capricious, and violative of due proc-
ess."4° 4 Indictment on a more serious charge after an accused has exer-
cised a procedural right places a heavy burden on the prosecution to
show that the additional charges are not vindictive in nature.40 5
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. A4lstup,406 found this heavy
burden satisfied. Allsup charged prosecutorial vindictiveness when he
was indicted on a gun charge after he refused to plea bargain his prior
prosecution for bank robbery. The Ninth Circuit, relying on the recent
Supreme Court decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,4°7 reaffirmed its po-
401. Id at 367. Accord, United States v. Serlin, 538 F.2d 737, 749 (7th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1196-97 (8th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977);
United States v. Acosta, 526 F.2d 670, 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 920 (1976). Con-
ira, United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 421 U.S. 930
(1975); United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389 (D.S.D. 1974).
402. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1976).
403. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("Executive branch has
exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case,"); United
States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976) (defend-
ant not denied due process by government's refusal of immunity to witness).
404. United States v. Welch, 572 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978) (court has no power to
dismiss indictment on grounds it violated Justice Department internal policy). See also
United States v. Chavez, 566 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1977) (federal court has no power to deter-
mine if internal policy of Attorney General's office is violated). But see United States v.
Mikka, 586 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1978), where the court found that the previous state prosecu-
tion of defendant and the later federal prosecution lacked the identity necessary to invoke
the petite policy of the Department of Justice, which states that no federal case should be
prosecuted when there has been a state prosecution for the same act or acts, absent compel-
ling federal reasons.
405. United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant was
initially arraigned on a misdemeanor charge of unlawful entry into the United States, but
was reindicted on felony charges of unlawful entry after he refused to waive his right to be
tried by a judge and a jury; sufficient appearance of vindictiveness to place heavy burden on
prosecution to justify the increased charge).
The concept of retaliatory prosecution was examined in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711 (1969). The Pearce court held that due process prohibits a judge from increasing a
sentence in retaliation for defendant's exercise of his statutory right to challenge his original
conviction. Id at 725. This principle was extended to deter prosecutorial vindictiveness in
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974).
406. 573 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 961 (1978).
407. 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (Supreme Court held there was no violation of due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment when prosecutor explicitly warned defendant in plea
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sition that the prosecution, as part of the plea bargaining process, can
use potential charges against the defendant as a bargaining tool.
40 8
Thus, when the subsequent charge is part of the plea bargaining proc-
ess, and a failure to plea bargain results in the actual filing of that
charge, there is no prosecutorial misconduct.
In United States v. Groves,4 °9 the Ninth Circuit failed to find a reason
for the defendant's reindictment on a more severe charge. In Groves,
after a plea bargain was struck and the negotiated charges filed, the
defendant exercised a procedural right.410 The prosecution then filed
another more serious indictment against the defendant. The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a manifest appearance of vindictiveness, rather than vin-
dictiveness in fact, was sufficient grounds for reversal of the conviction
and dismissal of the indictment. 41 1 The defendant in Groves was ar-
rested pursuant to an investigation for marijuana trafficking between
California and Canada by agents of the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration. The defendant, while plea bargaining, supplied the name and
address of the principal drug supplier, but refused to cooperate further
out of fear for his life. The negotiations for plea bargaining were com-
pleted and the defendant was then charged with cocaine possession.
Eight days after he moved for a dismissal of the cocaine charge under
the Speedy Trial Act,412 the prosecution filed a felony indictment
against him for conspiracy to distribute marijuana.41 3 Reversing the
district court's ruling that there was no vindictiveness, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the "coincidence of events presents overwhelming cir-
cumstantial evidence" that the indictment was filed in retaliation for
appellant's assertion of his procedural right to use the Speedy Trial
bargaining that if he did not plead guilty on pending charges the government would seek
another indictment for more serious offense).
408. 573 F.2d at 1143.
409. 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978).
410. The defendant moved for dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1361(b)
(1970). 571 F.2d at 452.
411. 571 F.2d at 453 (citing United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1978) (apprehension and appearance of vindictiveness are sufficient to
place heavy burden on prosecutor)).
412. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1970).
413. The appellant had informed the government before any charges were fied that he
would furnish only one name and address. The government had all the information relating
to the marijuana charge the same day the cocaine charge was filed. Although the govern-
ment maintained that the new charges were filed because the defendant failed to cooperate,
the record showed that the government did not rely on any promise by the defendant to
furnish further information. The court concluded that the government brought charges in
retaliation for the appellant's exercise of his statutory rights on the cocaine charges. 571
F.2d at 454.
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Act.4 14 The court also held that, while one of the factors to consider in
questioning vindictiveness is the factual similarity/dissimilarity of the
two charges, the fact that the two indictments involved different crimes
is not dispositive of the issue. 15
6. Joinder of offenses
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) provides that two or more
defendants may be charged in the same indictment if they are alleged
to have participated in the same act or the same series of acts or trans-
actions constituting an offense or offenses.4 6 It is insufficient that the
acts are of the "same or similar character," as provided in rule 8(a);
there must exist a more substantial relationship.417 Although the pur-
pose of rule 8(b) is to promote trial efficiency, that advantage must be
balanced against subjecting the defendant to potential prejudice.418 In
United States v. Barney,41 9 the joinder of a stolen vehicle charge
against two defendants with a perjury charge against one of the two
defendants was held to be proper because the underlying facts of both
offenses were so intertwined that the same evidence could prove both
offenses. Conspiracy will provide the necessary link to satisfy the re-
quirement that the charges against more than one defendant consti-
tuted a "series of acts or transactions," but the government must use
conspiracy in good faith and not merely to bypass the requirements of
the rules of joinder.420
414. Id at 453.
415. Id at 454.
416. FED. R. CRM. P. 8(b).
417. United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1977) (when appellant
involved in only two of five similar bank robberies with which co-defendant charged, join-
der improper and prejudicial because most evidence adduced at trial related to robberies in
which appellant was not involved).
418. United States v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1977) (joinder of defendant
charged with five counts of indictment with co-defendant charged with ten counts was im-
proper, but any error was harmless). See United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.
1978) (where two defendants, charged with violating court order against fishing in violation
of treaty rights, were together fishing in one boat, there was no error in trying the two
defendants together).
419. 568 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978).
420. Baker v. United States, 393 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968)
(where substantive counts and the conspiracy count all arose out of the same transaction
joinder was permissible). 4ccord, United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.), cer.
denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974); 1 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 144 (1969). See United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1006 (1978) (government acted in good faith in bringing conspiracy charge against both
defendants).
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7. Delay
The due process clause of the fifth amendment protects against pre-
indictment delay that creates substantial prejudice to a defendant's
rights to a fair trial and was purposely designed to give the prosecution
a tactical advantage over the accused.421 In addition to the constitu-
tional protection, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) provides
for discretionary dismissal of an indictment if there is unnecessary de-
lay in presenting the charge to the grand jury or in bringing the defend-
ant to trial.422 In United States v. Jernigan,423 the Ninth Circuit found
that there was deliberate delay in arresting the defendant, thereby
preventing him from going before a magistrate, having bail set and be-
ing released. Since no prejudice to the defendant could be shown from
the delay, dismissing the indictment and vacating conviction was con-
sidered too drastic a remedy, and the court upheld the conviction.424
8. Amendments and variances
Because a felony defendant in federal court has a fifth amendment
right to be charged only by indictment,425 neither the prosecutor nor
the court may materially amend an indictment.426 A trial judge, how-
ever, may amend the indictment by withdrawing a portion of the
421. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (de-
fendant failed to show prosecutorial delay prejudiced right to a fair trial, or that delay was
designed to gain tactical advantage, and therefore due process claims were speculative and
premature); United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 139 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955
(1978) (government's delay in filing indictment in transporting stolen vehicle charge did not
deny defendant due process where no prejudice and no intentional delay shown); United
States v. Manning, 509 F.2d 1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975) (due
process rights not violated by three and one-half year delay between acts constituting con-
spiracy and indictment, when defendant failed to show prejudice, harassment, or an inten-
tional ploy by prosecution to gain a tactical advantage).
422. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b). See United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 832-38 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 (1976), for standards to evaluate the propriety of dismissal
with prejudice under rule 48(b) for delay in bringing a case to trial after indictment. Dismis-
sal must be exercised with caution, and only after a warning to the prosecution that further
delay will result in dismissal of the indictment. See also United States v. Charnay, 577 F.2d
81 (9th Cir. 1978), where the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's dismissal of the indict-
ment after the trial court had given a clear and express warning that the indictment would
be dismissed if the prosecutor was not prepared.
423. 582 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978).
424. Id at 1214. The court added, however, that repetition of this type of behavior would
lead to dismissal of an indictment in a future case. Id
425. U.S. CONST. amend V.
426. United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855
(1975) (withdrawal of part of the indictment from the jury's consideration did not materially
alter or broaden the essential nature of the offense charged).
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charge, deleting surplusage, or making a purely formal change by in-
structions to the jury if the offense charged remains the same and the
defendant has not been prejudiced.427
A material variance between the indictment and the proof at trial
may result in reversal if the result is prejudicial to the defendant's sub-
stantive rights.428 The Ninth Circuit has interpreted these rights to in-
lude only: (1) preventing the defendant from presenting his defense
properly; (2) taking him unfairly by surprise; or (3) exposing him to
double jeopardy.429
While an amendment to an indictment is a change in the indictment
itself, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that a variance between the indict-
ment and the proof at trial may result in a constructive amendment.430
C. Guilty Pleas
A defendant's plea of guilty operates as a waiver of his constitutional
rights to a trial by jury, confrontation with his accusers, and the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.431 A plea of guilty is an explicit admis-
sion of all the elements of the offense charged and is itself a
conviction.432 Once the accused has admitted his guilt, any constitu-
tional challenges that would have prevented the prosecution from prov-
ing factual guilt become irrelevant, but he does not waive other
constitutional claims that would have prevented conviction even if fac-
tual guilt were established. 433 Applying this reasoning in Launius v.
427. United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 832-33 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
953 (1978) (trial judge upheld in striking the word "import" from charge of conspiracy to
"import, distribute and possess" LSD because there was no need to establish importation to
convict for possession and distribution).
428. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935) (substantial rights include right to be
definitely informed of charge so as to prevent surprise at trial and right to insure freedom
from multiple prosecutions for same offense; variance fatal only if it affects substantial
right).
429. United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839
(1976) (jury instructions did not operate to amend the indictment).
430. United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2864
(1979) (no constructive amendment occurred when charges which were not proved were
surplusage and did not support conviction for conspiracy).
431. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (guilty plea is a waiver of jury trial,
privilege against self-incrimination, and right to confront accusers).
432. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). See Forstner v. INS, 579 F.2d
506, 508 (9th Cir. 1978), where the Ninth Circuit held that even if a conviction after a guilty
plea could at some future time be expunged from the record under an Oregon law, it did not
render it any less a final conviction.
433. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975) (guilty plea did not bar defendant's
claim that his indictment violated the double jeopardy clause).
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United States,4  the Ninth Circuit held that the appellants' guilty pleas
to two counts of conspiracy (when in fact there was only one conspir-
acy) did not result in a waiver of their right to challenge the consecutive
sentences imposed for the two counts as a violation of the double jeop-
ardy clause.435
The use of the "conditional guilty plea," wherein the defendant is
allowed to plead guilty and yet preserve his right to appeal certain is-
sues, was strongly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in 1978. In United
States v. Benson,43 6 the court held that its use was grossly inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's rulings in the Brady4 37 line of cases.438
Before accepting a guilty plea, the court must be satisfied that the
accused makes the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and with an under-
standing of the consequences of the rights waived.439 When a guilty
plea is entered as a result of a plea bargain with the prosecutor, and the
prosecutor fails to keep his bargain, the plea is considered involuntary
and the court can allow the defendant to withdraw his plea or require
specific performance of the promise inducing the plea." 0 If the plea is
434. 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978).
435. Id at 771.
436. 579 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978).
437. In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), the Supreme Court summarized the
essence of its holdings in Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), McMann v. Rich-
ardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), as follows:
[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the
criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that
he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred
prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent
character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not
within the standards set forth in McMann.
411 U.S. at 267.
438. 579 F.2d at 511.
439. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 243 n.5, 244 (1969).
440. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1972) (defendant pled guilty after
agreement with prosecutor that he would make no recommendation as to sentence; prosecu-
tor failed in his promise and Supreme Court vacated conviction and remanded for the court
to either allow withdrawal of plea or specific performance of the agreement by prosecutor).
See Stone v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 1978), where in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing the court held that the due process clause, which requires that the guilty plea be know-
ingly and voluntarily made, takes precedence over state law which did not allow review of
the trial court's ruling denying petitioner's motion to withdraw guilty plea. See Lopez v.
United States, No. 76-3674 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1978), where the defendant entered a guilty plea
in reliance on misinformation that the court could impose a concurrent sentence for cocaine
possession with any sentence received for violation of his parole. Since the misrepresenta-
tion was remedied by the cooperation of the parole board, which agreed to have the
sentences run concurrently, the court denied post conviction relief. Cf Gardner v. Pogue,
568 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1978) (court denied federal habeas corpus relief when record of state
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entered on the erroneous advice of the accused's counsel that he may
plead and still preserve issues for direct appeal, the defendant can at-
tack the voluntary and intelligent character of his plea.44'
The court must also satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 governing the acceptance of guilty pleas; if the
requirements are not met, the defendant must be given the opportunity
to plead anew.442 Rule 1 (c) requires the judge to inform the defend-
ant of the nature of the charges against him, the minimum and maxi-
mum penalties provided by law, and other specified consequences of
the plea." 3 In United States v. Hamilton,4' the court held that this rule
did not require that the judge specifically inform the defendant of the
possibility of consecutive sentences where the defendant was advised of
the possible sentences as to each of the two counts and could reason-
ably conclude there was a possibility of consecutive sentencing.445 The
court held further that the requirement of informing the defendant of
the penalties does not necessarily mean that the words literally must
come from the judge's lips, as long as the judge ensures that the defend-
ant understands the possible penalties.446 This decision is consistent
with the Ninth Circuit's previous position that compliance with rule 11
does not require adherence to formal procedures"7 or ritualistic per-
formances,448 so long as the record shows the defendant voluntarily
and knowingly pled.
The Ninth Circuit, however, has adhered strictly to the rule that
when a statute requires a mandatory parole term appended to the sen-
proceedings supported state determination that petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary, know-
ing, and uncoerced).
441. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) (for plea to be subject to col-
lateral attack because of erroneous advice of counsel, accused must show that advice of
attorney fell below minimum standards for competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases).
442. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 471-72 (1969) (plea vacated because of
noncompliance with rule 11).
443. FED. R. CRIM. P. I 1(c).
444. 568 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978).
445. Id at 1306.
446. Id The judge informed the defendant of all rule I I matters except penalties, and
then asked if the defendant understood the penalties as explained by the prosecutor.
447. Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976)
(court's failure to specifically advise accused that guilty plea constituted a waiver of rights to
confrontation and compulsory process not violative of rule 11).
448. Guthrie v. United States, 517 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1975) (rule does not require
needless colloquy and time consuming padding of record when record shows plea voluntary
and supported by fact); United States v. Youpee, 419 F.2d 1340, 1344 (9th Cir. 1969) (no
ritual is prescribed by rule 11).
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tence, the accused must be so informed.' 9 In United States v. Del
Prete,450 the court held that, while the defendant had been advised of
the existence of the special parole term, the court had failed to explain
adequately that if any term of imprisonment were imposed, the special
parole term of three years or more would be required in addition to the
prison term.
Rule 11 requires additionally that the court be satisfied that the plea
has a factual basis before judgment can be entered on the plea.45' In
United States v. Herrell,452 a felon charged with possession of firearms
challenged the validity of his previous grand theft conviction because
the record showed no factual basis for his guilty plea, as required by an
Arizona law similar to rule 11(f). In affirming his conviction, the
Ninth Circuit held that his grand theft conviction had not been chal-
lenged prior to his being found in possession of the firearms, and, be-
cause his appeal was based on a violation of a statute and not
constitutional grounds, it was unavailing.453
D. Discovery
1. Jencks Act
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
discovery to the federal criminal defendant of his own pre-trial state-
ments, confession, grand jury testimony, prior criminal record, and the
results of medical or scientific tests.45 4 It also provides that the defend-
ant can inspect and copy any documents or tangible evidence in the
government's possession that are material to the preparation of his de-
fense or are intended for use as evidence by the government. 455 The
449. Bunker v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1977) (court gave retroactive effect to Harris
decision); United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendants who plead guilty
must be advised that mandatory special parole term will be appended to sentence).
450. 567 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1978).
451. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f).
452. 588 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1978).
453. Id at 713.
454. FED. R. CGlM. P. 16. But see United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1978)
(prosecutors with "open fie" policies for discovery did not violate policy and defendant not
unduly prejudiced when, after defense counsel examined file, additional report was prepared
and added to the file without notifying accused); United States v. Rinn, 586 F.2d 113, 120
(9th Cir. 1978) (government's failure to disclose pretrial inculpatory statement made by de-
fendant in presence of two government agents was not reversible error when defendant was
not under interrogation and was unaware the other participants were government agents).
455. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. But see Jett v. Castaneda, 578 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1978),
where the Ninth Circuit reversed a contempt conviction for failure to comply with discovery
order where the district court had no grand jury investigation pending and no charges were
pending.
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government does not have to disclose a list of witnesses 456 or the con-
tents of statements made by its witnesses prior to trial. The Jencks
Act,457 however, provides that once a government witness has testified
at trial, the defendant is entitled to inspect any pre-trial statements
made by the witness to aid in cross-examination.4 58
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that rough notes taken during interviews
with potential witnesses during the course of an investigation are dis-
coverable materials and, therefore, must be preserved. 45 9 In United
States v. Shields,46° however, the court refused to apply the holding
retroactively in the absence of some showing of prejudice.
In Goldberg v. United States,46' the Supreme Court held that notes
taken by government attorneys while interviewing their witnesses may
be discovered by the defendant if they are "truly the statement of the
witness-that is, a statement written and signed or otherwise adopted
or approved by him or a substantially verbatim recording of an oral
statement. 462 This requirement is not satisfied unless a lawyer reads
456. United States v. Thompson, 493 F.2d 305, 309 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 834
(1974). See United States v. Rinn, 586 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1978) (although court did not
reach issue of obligation to inform, entire criminal record of government witness was sup-
plied to defendant even though government not obliged to furnish it); United States v. Sey-
mour, 576 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1978) (trial court's action
ordering parties to exchange lists of witnesses, summaries of their testimonies, and all trial
exhibits would not be sanctioned by court of appeals, but due to defendant's minimal com-
pliance, his failure to object, and overwhelming evidence of guilt, defendant was not
prejudiced and any error was harmless).
457. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). The Jencks Act grew out of Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657, 668-72 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that after a prosecution witness
had testified at trial, any previous statements made by the witness relating to this testimony
were to be turned over to the defendant for his inspection and use in cross-examination or
impeachment of the witness.
458. See United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 553 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant not
prejudiced by trial court's refusal to disclose names of expert witnesses and their test results
since the witnesses were not called at trial); United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2864 (1979), where it was found there was no merit to a conten-
tion that the government violated the Jencks Act when the government in fact tendered the
notes for defense inspection but they were not accepted nor utilized by the defense.
459. United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1976) (court rejected the
government's argument that destruction of notes was proper because agents had incorpo-
rated contents into a formal report).
460. 571 F.2d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant failed to show any prejudice resulting
from destruction of notes).
461. 425 U.S. 94 (1976).
462. Id at 102 n.5 (emphasis in original). 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1) (1976) defines "state-
ment" as "a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or
approved by him." See United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1006 (1978) (court refused to overturn the district court's ruling that the unreleased
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back, or the witness himself reads, what the lawyer has written.463 The
Goldberg court emphasized that the determination of whether notes
constitute a "statement" within the statutory definition must be made
initially by the trial court.464 The court of appeals may overturn those
findings only if they are clearly erroneous.465
The district court found on remand466 that the writings were not pro-
ducible under the Jencks Act, and the defendant appealed. The Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Goldberg,467 affirmed the district court's rul-
ing that the attorney's notes had not been adopted or approved by the
defendant and therefore were not "statements" of the witness for dis-
covery purposes. The court further held that the government was not
required to produce the witnesses' personal notes which were not in the
government's possession at the time of the Jencks motion and of which
the government was unaware.468
2. Prosecutor's duty to disclose
The Supreme Court also has recognized that in some instances a re-
fusal of discovery to a defendant is a denial of due process, 469 and, in
certain cases, the prosecutor may have an affirmative duty to disclose
to the defendant evidence that might exculpate him.470 In Brady v.
Maryland,47 the Supreme Court ruled that "suppression by the prose-
statements were not adopted by the witness when there had only been discussions of the
general substance of what the witness said).
463. 425 U.S. at 110 n.19.
464. Id at 111.
465. Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 493-95 (1963).
466. 435 F. Supp. 1172, 1177 (D. Ariz. 1977), a'd, 582 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1978).
467. 582 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1978).
468. Id at 487. Goldberg was convicted of fourteen counts of mail fraud. The govern-
ment's case against the defendant consisted primarily of the testimony of Newman, a fellow
employee. Prior to trial, the government delivered to Goldberg a copy of Newman's testi-
mony before the grand jury and a memorandum of an interview of Newman by two govern-
ment attorneys. The memorandum indicated the lawyers were going to conduct further
interviews with Newman. During the trial, Newman disclosed that he did have subsequent
meetings with the attorneys and the defendant moved for a copy of the attorneys' notes.
When the notes were turned over to the court, it was discovered that the government had 40
pages of notes by Newman himself of which they previously had been unaware. Id at 484-
86.
469. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1958), overruled on other grounds, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (denial of defendant's motion to see his written confession was not a denial of
due process in absence of showing of any prejudice).
470. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959) (prosecutor has duty to disclose when
he knows his witness perjured himself); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28,30, 32 (1957) (prosecu-
tion has duty to correct misleading impression created by his witness).
471. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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cution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 4 72 The
test of whether the evidence is material is whether the requested evi-
dence would affect the outcome of the trial,473 and the Ninth Circuit
interprets this test as synonymous with the harmless error standard.474
If the request is couched in such general terms as for "all Brady mate-
rial" or "anything exculpatory," however, it is the equivalent of no re-
quest at all, and the court may deny the motion.4 71
A mere delay in disclosure of Brady material, however, will warrant
reversal only if the "lateness of the disclosure so prejudiced appellant's
preparation or presentation of his defense that he was prevented from
receiving his Constitutionally guaranteed fair trial. '476 In United States
v. Shelton,477 for example, the appellant claimed that his conviction for
filing a false income tax return should be reversed because the prosecu-
tion delayed in disclosing over 500 pages of alleged Brady material un-
til the eve of trial, and failed to release an additional 1900 pages of
Brady material until after the trial.
The Ninth Circuit found the failure to disclose material until the eve
of trial insufficient to prejudice the defendant's preparation or presen-
tation of his case.47 The Shelton court further found a portion of the
material released after the trial to be merely cumulative or collateral in
effect, and therefore non-prejudicial to the defense.4 79 Although the
Ninth Circuit found the remaining documents to be material in the
Brady sense, the request for new trial was rejected since the Govern-
ment had made a good faith effort to locate the materials prior to trial
472. Id at 87.
473. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976) (Court distinguished specific re-
quests in cases like Brady from general requests for exculpatory evidence).
474. United States v. Goldberg, 582 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1978) (the usefulness of the
notes related to the impeachment of the witness Newman, not to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant; therefore, if there was error in excluding them, it was harmless beyond rea-
sonable doubt).
475. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 767 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981
(1978) (in securities fraud prosecution it was not error to deny broad motion for all SEC
transcripts and statements and FBI interviews).
476. United States v. Miller, 529 F.2d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924
(1976).
477. 588 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2822 (1979).
478. Id. at 1247.
479. Judge Ely, however, rejected the majority position that the error was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Instead, Judge Ely reasoned that the conviction should be re-
versed because the government had been lax and had failed to seriously undertake their
duty to produce the evidence requested. Id. at 1252-53 (Ely, J., dissenting).
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and the defense had exhibited a lack of diligence in attempting to ob-
tain the evidence independently.480 Emphasizing the significance of a
diligent defense attempt to obtain Brady material, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the Seventh Circuit that "a failure to exercise diligence can
be so obviously bordering on gamesmanship as to place the evidence
constructively in the category of non-newly discovered."48 '
3. Depositions
The taking of depositions in criminal cases is limited to the purpose
of preserving testimony under exceptional circumstances, such as when
a witness will be unable to attend the trial.4 82 Depositions, therefore,
are generally disallowed merely for discovery purposes.483 If the de-
fendant does not plead or prove the unavailability of the witness at
trial, it is within the discretion of the court to deny the motion for a
deposition.484
4. Pre-sentence reports
The pre-sentence report is usually made available on request to the
defense counsel prior to sentencing so that the defendant can contest
any alleged factual inaccuracies. 485 The disclosure of the report, how-
ever, is discretionary and may be withheld if its disclosure would ad-
versely affect the defendant or other persons.486 The Ninth Circuit has
held that in noncapital cases, the defendant's right to confrontation is
not violated when the court withholds information that might disrupt
an existing police investigation, and the judge indicates that he has not
relied on the withheld portion.487
480. Id. at 1249 & n.12.
481. Id. at 1250 (quoting United States v. Hedgeman, 564 F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 1977)).
482. United States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148, 1154 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
984 (1973). FED. R. CRIM. P. 15; 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1978). Motions under rule 15 are
considered under the same legal standard as § 3503(a).
483. See In re United States, 348 F.2d 624, 626 (lst Cir. 1965) (defendant not allowed to
take deposition on bare assertion that witness may not be at trial).
484. United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935
(1978) (defendant who sought deposition failed to plead or prove unavailability of wit-
nesses). See United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
881 (1978) (Ninth Circuit upheld as not clearly erroneous the finding of the trial court that
defendant was not denied his right to take depositions).
485. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3). See United States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir.
1972), in which the court held that fundamental fairness required that the defendant be told
of the substance of all information which adversely affects his interests.
486. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
487. Pavao v. Cardwell, 583 F.2d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1978). The defendant was con-
victed of assault with a deadly weapon. Portions of the presentence report were withheld on
1979]
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In United States v. Dubrofsky,488 the Ninth Circuit seemed to go one
step further and sanctioned the withholding of information to protect
ongoing police investigations when the judge did not rely "exclusively
or even compellingly" on the confidential information, but, in addition
to the report, relied on information available to the defendant and in-
formation gleaned from the trial.48 9
5. Competency reports
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Winn,49° was confronted with
the question of a defendant's right to a pre-trial competency report.
The court ruled that when a competency hearing is held without the
testimony of the reporting psychiatrist or, when a competency hearing
is not required, the decision to disclose the report rests with the trial
court.49' Vhile the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not ex-
pressly regulate the disclosure of competency reports, the court analo-
gized the exercise of its discretion to withhold these reports to rule
32(c)(3) governing disclosure of pre-sentence reports. 492
E. Right to Jury Trial
The United States Constitution guarantees a trial by jury in criminal
prosecutions.493 The Supreme Court consistently has held that this
right extends only to individuals charged with a serious offense that
carries a punishment in excess of six months.494 Thus, if there is a pre-
trial stipulation that the court will not impose a jail sentence in excess
the ground that they would disrupt an existing police investigation. The court upheld the
ruling, distinguishing Pavao from Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), on the basis that
the latter was a death penalty case.
488. 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant convicted of importing heroin and posses-
sion with intent to distribute).
489. The court distinguished this case from United States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.
1975), where the judge made it clear that he relied solely on the confidential report in impos-
ing the sentence. 581 F.2d at 214-15. Judge Sneed disagreed with the majority that protec-
tion of an existing police investigation was a reason recognized by rule 32(c)(3) for
withholding information. He argued that the majority position was contrary to the court's
ruling in Perri. Id. at 215.
490. 577 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1978). FED. R. C iM. P. 12.2(c) governs psychiatric examina-
tion of federal criminal defendants and requires that the psychiatrist report only to the court.
491. 577 F.2d at 92. But see In re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916, 918 (1st Cir. 1970) (if psychia-
trist testifies at a hearing, his report should be available to both prosecutor and defendant as
basis for their examination).
492. 577 F.2d at 92. See FED. R. CuM. P. 32(c)(3)(a).
493. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id, amend. VI.
494. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72-74 (1970) (not a petty offense for purposes
of right to jury trial if defendant subject to more than six months imprisonment).
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of six months, the defendant has no right to a jury trial.4 95 Similarly, if
the defendant is charged with violating a statute that does not prescribe
any specific term of imprisonment, there is no right to a jury trial when
the actual sentence imposed is six months or less.
49 6
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a jury of twelve
497
and a unanimous verdict.498 If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous
verdict, they may be asked to deliberate further, or they may be dis-
charged.499 In United States v. Lopez,"° after the jury had begun de-
liberations and had been unable to reach a verdict, the defendant
informed the court that she wished to waive her right to a unanimous
verdict of twelve jurors and to accept the verdict of ten of the twelve.
Following a jury poll, the defendant was found guilty on each count by
a vote of ten to two. Reversing her conviction, the Ninth Circuit held
that the unanimity required by rule 31 cannot be waived.5"' Although
the court did not consider the constitutional implications, 0 2 it sup-
ported its view by reference to clear language of the rule. The court
emphasized that a unanimous verdict requirement has a beneficial ef-
fect on the fact-finding process "by requiring the minority view to be
examined and, if possible, accepted or rejected by the entire jury.' 5 °3
III. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. Right to Counsel
1. General and statutory
Prior to the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, the due
process clause of the fifth amendment confers a right to counsel for
495. United States v. Marthaler, 571 F.2d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1978) (in criminal con-
tempt of court proceedings, pretrial stipulation that trial court would not impose sentence in
excess of six months in jail made jury trial unnecessary).
496. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (when no penalty is set by legislature, best
evidence of actual seriousness of offense is penalty actually imposed).
497. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23.
498. Id 31(a). In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972), however, the Supreme
Court held that less than a unanimous verdict is acceptable in state cases.
499. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d).
500. 581 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1978).
501. Id at 1342.
502. The Fifth Circuit, however, in ruling that the right to a unanimous verdict may not
be waived, based its ruling on the sixth amendment and rule 31. Sincox v. United States,
571 F.2d 876, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1978). The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion based
only on rule 31. Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 836, 838 (6th Cir. 1953). The Third
Circuit has held that unanimity is required based on the Supreme Court dicta in Apodaca v.
Oregon. See note 498 supra. United States v. Scalzitti, 578 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1978).
503. 581 F.2d at 1341.
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those party to criminal investigations."° At the point where such pro-
ceedings begin, sixth amendment protections provide additional rights
to counsel. 5 In addition to judicial interpretations of constitutional
requirements, Congress has enacted various statutes requiring the ap-
pointment of counsel when the accused is subject to governmental
sanctions.
50 6
The Ninth Circuit in Jell v. Castaneda0 7 examined the scope of a
section of the Criminal Justice Act.5 0 The Act provides that counsel
be furnished to those "for whom the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion requires the appointment of counsel or for whom, in a case in
which he faces loss of liberty, any Federal law requires the appoint-
ment of counsel."50 9 Upon review of the legislative history of this sec-
tion of the Act,510 the court concluded that "Congress used [the term]
'Sixth Amendment' as shorthand for 'constitutional right to counsel,'
whatever the specific derivation of the right. '511
If no constitutional right to counsel exists, federal statutes may create
504. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: "No person shall.. . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
470-74 (1966).
505. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." See Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122-23 (1975) (hearing after arrest not requiring adversary proceeding
results in no right to counsel); Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1974) (no right to coun-
sel for discretionary appellate review); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (pre-
liminary hearing for probable cause confers the right to counsel); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128, 135-37 (1967) (right to counsel attaches where substantial rights of accused may be
affected, e.g., sentencing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (right to coun-
sel attaches at post indictment line-up); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 59-60 (1963) (right
to counsel at initial appearance); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 354-58 (1963) (right to
counsel for appeal of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963) (right to
counsel at trial); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957) (no right to counsel at grand jury
proceeding).
506. Eg., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976).
507. 578 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1978).
508. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(4) (1976).
509. Id
510. H.R. REP. No. 91-1546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 3982, 3988.
511. 578 F.2d at 844-45. Jell involved the propriety of the appointment of counsel for an
inmate who wished to speak with an attorney during the investigation of a fatal stabbing at
the prison. Since the suspect's right to counsel in that situation was derived from the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination, it was posited that the "Sixth Amendment" ref-
erence in § 3006A provided the basis of the right "whatever the specific derivation of the
right." Id In addition, the Ninth Circuit held that absent an "indictment or other charge
bringing a defendant before the court, or in the absence of a pending grand jury investiga-
tion, a district court has no general supervisory jurisdiction over the course of executive
investigations." Id
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a right to counsel. In a deportation proceeding, for example, in which
there is no constitutional right to counsel,512 the federal statutory right
must be enforced.513
The accused's right to counsel, however, is not without limitation." 4
In 1978, for example, the Ninth Circuit found there to be no depriva-
tion of the right to counsel when the defendant's counsel was removed
because of a conflict of interest resulting from his representation of a
co-defendant who had become a prosecution witness.
51 5
2. Waiver of the right to counsel
In an effort to "import a greater degree of flexibility and realism in
the application of Miranda,' 516 the Ninth Circuit recently held that a
suspect in a criminal investigation can waive his right to counsel, after
asserting the right, but before actually speaking with an attorney.517
The court's rejection of a per se prohibition of such a waiver followed a
host of inconsistent decisions on the waiver issue within the circuit. In
formulating its decision in United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum,18 the
court attempted, by drawing from the "spirit of Mosley, 5 19 to avoid
512. Castro-Nuno v. INS, 577 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1978) (no sixth amendment right to
counsel in deportation proceeding).
513. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b), 1362 provide aliens the privilege of representation in deporta-
tion proceedings. Castro-Nuno v. INS, 577 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1978), involved a deportation
hearing where the attorney was present twice, but the hearing was continued at the I.N.A.'s
request. At a third hearing, when the attorney representing Castro was absent, the defend-
ant was deported although there was no waiver of counsel. The Ninth Circuit reversed the
deportation order on the ground that the trial judge violated the defendant's statutory right
to counsel. Id at 579.
514. See United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935
(1978) (federal agent's advice to witnesses that they need not confer with defense counsel did
not interfere with defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel or his access to witnesses).
515. United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978) ("While a
defendant's choice of counsel should not be subject to unnecessary interference, this right is
not unlimited."). See United States v. Rohl, 588 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1978) (mem.) (represen-
tation by two attorneys is permitted on appeal for defendant in forma pauperis, but total
compensation may not exceed the amount payable if only one attorney had been appointed).
516. United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 919 (1978) (quoting United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 368 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977)).
517. Id. at 486-88.
518. 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978).
519. Id. at 487. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). The Court in Miranda noted:
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown
that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the
person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise.
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"imprison[ing] a man in his privileges."52 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that, since the express procedures set down in Miranda concerning the
right to silence had been modified, the similar language in Miranda
concerning a defendant's assertion of his right to counsel did not re-
quire actual consultation with an attorney before waiver. While ac-
knowledging that the government bears a greater burden of showing
waiver when the right to counsel is asserted than when the right to
silence is asserted,5 22 the court concluded that the traditional waiver
analysis provided in Johnson v. Zerbs123 would be sufficient to test the
validity of the waiver. 24
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that statements made to a crimi-
nal suspect following the assertion of the right to counsel that can be
distinguished from questioning, such as the presentation to him of
available evidence, do not conflict with the requirements of Johnson v.
Zerbst.121 Rodriguez-Gastelum provided the basis for several subse-
quent decisions that rejected claimed sixth amendment violations.5 26
Id at 473-74. The Court in Mosle, allowed the questioning of a suspect who had earlier
invoked his right to silence.
520. 569 F.2d at 487.
521. Id at 486. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Court ob-
served:
If, however, [the suspect] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Like-
wise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him.
Id at 444-45.
522. 569 F.2d at 485 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405 & n.10 (1977)).
523. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Johnson Court reasoned:
[Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitu-
tional rights . . . and. . . we do not presume aquiesence in the loss of fundamental
rights. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent
waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and con-
duct of the accused.
Id at 464 (citations omitted).
524. 569 F.2d at 488.
525. Id Judge Goodwin, however, noted that the waiver must be "explicit, initiated by
the suspect, and not in any way induced by the interrogators." Id at 489 (Goodwin, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
526. See United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1978) (valid waiver of right to
counsel upon signing written waiver following the recitation of military equivalent to Mi-
randa warnings); United States v. Evans, 575 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 854
(1978) (implied waiver found the day after the assertion of the right to counsel); United
States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978) (request for attorney, followed by cooperation
with D.E.A. agents resulted in waiver of right to counsel). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 571
F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978) (government failed to sustain burden of waiver where interroga-
tion followed "hard on the heels of the demand for counsel.").
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In United States v. Evans,27 for example, illegal aliens were identified
as passengers in Evan's car when he attempted to enter a military base.
The day after his request to speak to an attorney, he was questioned
again by border patrol agents and he made incriminating statements.
The court, in reliance on Rodriguez-Gastelum, concluded that the gov-
ernment sustained its heavy burden of demonstrating a voluntary
waiver.5 28
3. The right of self-representation
The implied sixth amendment right of self-representation was con-
firmed for defendants in state prosecutions in Faretta v. California.
52 9
The rights incident to the sixth amendment right to counsel, such as
confrontation and notice of charges, are said to be guaranteed to the
"accused, not counsel." 30 The right to self-representation rests on the
important value of free choice on which the Constitution is based.53'
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a defendant, in waiving his sixth
amendment right to counsel, has constitutional as well as statutory jus-
tification for insisting upon self-representation.1
32
In Bittaker v. Enomoto5 33 the Ninth Circuit reinstated the fundamen-
tal right of self-representation when it held that a state convict was enti-
tled to federal habeas corpus relief because he was denied self-
representation, even though the denial had occurred before Faretta.534
Satisfaction of the traditional requirements of a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of the right to counsel is necessary before electing self-rep-
527. 575 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1978).
528. Id at 1287.
529. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). See Bittaker v. Enomoto, 587 F.2d 400, 401 (9th Cir. 1978) (the
federal right to self-representation existed in Ninth Circuit prior to Faretta).
530. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
531. Id at 815 (quoting Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80 (1942)).
532. Bittaker v. Enomoto, 587 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1978) (denial of right of self-representa-
tion alone sufficient to set aside conviction, actual prejudice need not be shown); United
States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1973) (pre-Faretta case holding that defendant
need not show prejudice resulting from denial of right of self-representation). But f. Badg-
er v. Cardwell, 587 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1978). In Badger the Ninth Circuit observed that the
right of self-representation is not to be confused with the right of presence. When the de-
fendant represents himself, loses self-control and disrupts the trial, the rights to both pres-
ence and self-representation may not be curtailed unless it is also demonstrated that the
defendant's presence in the courtroom alone would stil be too disruptive. Id at 978-79.
533. 587 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1978).
534. Id at 401-02. The court justified its decision in two steps: first, the right of self-
representation existed within the Ninth Circuit before Faretta, pursuant to Arnold v. United
States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970); and second,
federal courts must apply federal constitutional law in all cases properly before them under
the federal habeas corpus statute. 587 F.2d at 402 n.l.
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resentation. 535  To establish that the waiver meets constitutional
requirements to the satisfaction of the trial judge, the defendant should
be addressed before trial and on the record informed of the nature of
the charge, possible penalties, and the dangers of self-representation.
5 36
Absent such a pre-trial, on-the-record finding of an intelligent and
knowing waiver, a conviction may be reversed.537
The Faretta right to forego representation of counsel does not, how-
ever, extend to a right to lay representation.538 While expressing a will-
ingness to protect the accused's sixth amendment rights, the Ninth
Circuit is unwilling to forego the benefits it receives by allowing only
qualified attorneys in court.539
4. Effective assistance of counsel
It is implicit within the sixth amendment that counsel will perform at
some minimal level of competency and effectiveness. 540 In Cooper v.
Fitzharris41 the Ninth Circuit resolved the uncertainty surrounding
the standard by which an attorney's performance is to be judged.542 In
535. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). In Faretta the Court explained:
Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in
order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."
Id. at 835 (citing Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). See United States v.
Titus, 576 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978) (refusal to retain coun-
sel, failure to fill out financial affidavit to qualify for appointed counsel, and statement of
being better able to handle the case than an attorney, deemed waiver of counsel); United
States v. Aponte, 591 F.2d 1247, (9th Cir. 1978) (conviction for bail jumping reversed when
record did not reflect pre-trial waiver by accused of right to counsel).
536. United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("me too"
uttered by a co-defendant is not proper showing of knowing and intelligent waiver of coun-
sel); United States v. Aponte, 591 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1978) (requirement of an on-the-
record, knowing and intelligent, waiver of counsel before electing self-representation). Com-
pare Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123
(1975) (failure to obtain an on-the-record waiver does not require reversal) with United
States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1973) (requirement of an on-the-record
intelligent waiver must be met).
537. United States v. Aponte, 591 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1978) (the specific finding of mental
competency to stand trial should be distinguished from knowing and intelligent waiver of
counsel).
538. United States v. Wright, 568 F.2d 142, 143 (9th Cir. 1978).
539. Id; United States v. Marthaler, 571 F.2d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(criminal contempt charge may lie against non-lawyer representing defendants in civil
cases).
540. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
541. 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (the appropriate standard is whether trial
counsel failed to render reasonably competent and effective assistance).
542. Id at 1328.
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Cooper the Ninth Circuit rejected the traditional performance standard
that required counsel's performance to be so poor as to reduce the trial
to a "farce or mockery of justice. ' 543 The Ninth Circuit held instead
that the sixth amendment requires that "persons accused of crime be
afforded reasonably competent and effective representation." 544 While
acknowledging that particularization of the "elements of the minimal
performance to be expected of counsel. . . would serve to enhance the
objectivity of the general standard," 545 the Cooper court chose to re-
frain from enumerating such a checklist and noted that such matters
"'should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts'."54 6
The majority also concluded that when such a claim is based on
"specific acts and omission of counsel at trial. . . relief will be granted
only if it appears that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's con-
duct. '5 47  The court distinguished this type of claim from those in
which the harmless error standard is inapplicable.5 48 The harmless er-
ror rule would not apply when the claim is based on failure to either
provide counsel or permit counsel to discharge his customary duties. 49
543. Id at 1327. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (effective assist-
ance is that which is within "range of competence demanded of attorneys" in criminal
cases).
544. 586 F.2d at 1330. United States v. Kazni, 576 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1978). The
court in Kazni discussed the importance of a fully-developed factual record on the "ineffec-
tive" claim, noting that, while such records normally require collateral proceedings pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976),
if it was evident during the trial that the defendant's legal representation was so inade-
quate as obviously to deny him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, or to deny him a
fair trial in the due process sense, the failure of the trial court to take note sua sponte of
the problem might constitute plain error which may be considered on direct appeal.
576 F.2d at 242.
545. 586 F.2d at 1330.
546. Id (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
547. Id at 1331. Judge Hufstedler found the requirement of a showing of prejudice to
"impermissibly dilute" the sixth amendment right. "The right to have the assistance of
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to
the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Id at 1334 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and
dissenting). See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 (1970) (claims of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel fail absent showing of prejudice).
548. 586 F.2d at 1332. The court noted that in such situations the "evil lies in what the
attorney does not do, and is either not readily apparent on the record, or occurs at a time
when no record is made." Concerning claims of "ineffective" counsel, the court observed
that an analysis of the record would be helpful as the errors occur at trial and are "readily
identifiable." Id
549. E.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-91 (1976) (defense counsel not permit-
ted to confer with client during overnight mid-trial recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853, 856-65 (1975) (state statute barring final summation by defense counsel); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (no defense counsel appointed); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (joint representation of co-defendants with conflicting interests).
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In Lowery v. Cardwel1550 the Ninth Circuit distinguished counsel's
permissible passive refusal to actively pursue a particular line of de-
fense from impermissible direct action that deprives the accused of a
fair trial. Following what appeared to defense counsel to be a perjured
statement by Lowery, counsel abruptly ceased examination of the de-
fendant and called for a recess. In chambers, in absence of the defend-
ant, the attorney moved to withdraw from the case declaring that he
could not state the reason for his motion.-" This statement was held
prejudicial because the trial judge, sitting as the finder of fact, could
only rationally conclude that the defendant had suborned perjury.
55 2
Although the Ninth Circuit was sympathetic to the dilemma of coun-
sel seeking to uphold his ethical responsibilities while at the same time
rendering a competent defense, the Lowery court found the attorney's
behavior to be unduly prejudicial. 553 While not prescribing the proce-
dure to be followed under such circumstances, the court noted that,
when counsel is surprised by his client's perjury, he should not act in
such a fashion as to disclose his quandry to the fact finder.55 4 Relying
on an alternative due process analysis, rather than on sixth amendment
considerations,555 the Ninth Circuit concluded that, because the feasi-
bility of withdrawal is unlikely, such action is unnecessary.
556
550. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
551. Id at 729.
552. Id at 730. See United States v. Dipp, 581 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 99
S. Ct. 841 (1979). In Dipp, the defendant claimed that prosecutorial misconduct prevented
evidence from reaching defense counsel and led to counsel's failure to advise the defendant
to refuse to testify. The court rejected this claim, observing that "[t]he Supreme Court has
clearly established that perjury is not a permissible response even when a witness' constitu-
tional rights arguably have been violated." Id at 1327.
553. 575 F.2d at 730.
554. Id at 731 & n.4. The court noted that A.B.A. DISCIPLINARY RULE No. 7-102(A)(4)
provides: "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not. . . knowingly use perjured
testimony or false evidence." 575 F.2d at 730. Of significant consideration to the court were
the A.B.A. Defense Function Standards which, while not on point for the specific factual
situation, provide in relevant part:
[T]he lawyer must confine his examination to identifying the witness as the defendant
and permitting him to make his statement to the trier or the triers of the facts; the
lawyer may not engage in direct examination of the defendant as a witness in the con-
ventional manner and may not later argue the defendant's known false version of facts
to the jury as worthy of belief and he may not recite or rely upon the false testimony in
his closing argument.
A.B.A. DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS § 7.7(c).
555. 575 F.2d at 730. In a concurring opinion, Judge Hufstedler observed that the issue
should be based on the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Of defense
counsel she wrote, "his interest in saving himself from potential violation of the cannons
was adverse to his client, and the end product was his abandonment of a diligent defense."
Id at 732.
556. Id at 731.
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B. Right to Speedy Trial
1. Pre-accusatorial delay
The importance of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial has in
recent years been increasing.557 While governmental fiscal policies
have forced the criminal justice system to carry an enormous caseload,
defendants have borne much of the hardship stemming from such poli-
cies.5 58 In response, Congress and the judiciary have attempted to fash-
ion statutory and constitutional means of preventing oppressive delays
between arrest and trial.559 These remedial measures, however, apply
only to situations involving post-arrest delay.560 The justification for
the difference in treatment lies in the belief that "post-arrest delay is
inherently more capable of abuse and oppressive prejudice to the crim-
inal defendant."'561 The protection available to the individual in the
pre-indictment setting stems from the applicable statute of limitations,
with its built-in protection from "overly stale criminal charges. ' 562 Ad-
ditionally, the due process clause may provide relief in those situations
where the pre-indictment delay is "oppressive. '56
3
In order for an accused to sustain a pre-indictment due process
speedy trial claim, he must show actual prejudice resulting from the
delay. 64 The focus of the analysis at this point centers on the "reasons
557. United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 499-501 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911
(1978) ("[C]onsiderable attention has been directed to the fact that our criminal justice sys-
tem is laboring under an ever-burgeoning case load.").
558. Tucker v. Wolff, 581 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1978) ("A state government's allocation
of resources plays a major role in creating congested dockets, and it is unfair to require
defendants to bear the entire burden that results from the government's fiscal decisions.").
559. Eg., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (judicial application of sixth amendment
speedy trial provisions); United States v. Diaz-Alvarado, 587 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1978) (rem-
edy for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3164 (1976) (Speedy Trial Act) is pre-trial release, not rever-
sal of conviction or dismissal of indictment); United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir.
1978) (defendant's assertion of speedy trial right pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) resulted in
new indictment; court reversed based on valid vindictive prosecution claim).
560. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (speedy trial provisions of the sixth
amendment, as well as FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b), apply only to post-arrest delays).
561. United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911
(1978). See United States v. Romero, 585 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1978) (sixth amendment
speedy trial right activated at date of federal accusation rather than date of state arrest).
562. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966).
563. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977) (oppressive pre-indictment delay
has due process implications).
564. United States v. Titus, 576 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978)
("[A] finding of actual prejudice is a prerequisite to finding a due process violation."). See
United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978) ("[T]o
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for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused." '565 The intrinsic
difficulty in proving such a claim lies in the broad discretion granted
the government in determining the point at which actual charges are
filed.566 A claim of prejudicial delay may prevail when the defendant
can show, for example, that the delay was motivated by a desire to
harass the accused or to gain a tactical advantage. 67
In Arnold v. McCarthy56 the Ninth Circuit reiterated that "the due
process test for impermissible pre-accusatorial delay requires a delicate
balance of the circumstances of each case. '5 69 The prejudice must be
"actual and not speculative"570 and must be compared with its justify-
ing circumstances. 7' In United States v. Mays, 72 the Ninth Circuit in
1977 identified a third factor that should enter the due process balanc-
ing analysis-the length of the delay itself.573 The Arnold court, how-
ever, rejected this factor from the analysis,5 74 allowing prosecutorial
discretion "even if the suspect's defense might be somewhat prejudiced
by the delay.
' '57s
2. Post-accusatorial delay
The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial attaches once a person
becomes accused either by or in a formal indictment or information or
block a prosecution on the basis of pre-indictment delay, the defendant must first show
actual, nonspeculative prejudice resulting from the delay.").
565. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977).
566. Id at 791. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966). The Court in Hoffa
noted:
There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not required to guess at
their peril the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect,
risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the
Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no consti-
tutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the mini-
mum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far
short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.
567. United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955
(1978) (defendant failed to show intentional delay to gain tactical advantage).
568. 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978).
569. Id at 1383.
570. Id at 1384. The Arnold court failed to find actual prejudice even though the delay
prevented a potential witness from testifying; more than a mere assertion that the "witness
might have been useful" is needed. Id at 1385.
571. Id at 1383.
572. 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977).
573. Id at 678.
574. 566 F.2d at 1383-84 n.l. Although the length of the delay had sixth amendment
relevance, the court concluded that it was not of great import under a due process analysis.
Delay was said to be evidence of possible, rather than actual, prejudice; a primary showing
of actual prejudice must be made before the due process analysis begins. Id
575. Id at 1385.
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else by the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer to
a criminal charge.576 Courts show a greater willingness to find delay at
this stage constitutionally impermissible. 57 7 In determining whether a
delay has extended beyond permissible bounds, the Ninth Circuit will
balance four interrelated considerations: (1) the length of the delay, (2)
the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and
(4) the prejudice to the defendant. 578 Although the test seems explicit,
its application varies depending upon other relevant circumstances.
5 79
The gravity of the alleged crime, for example, may be considered in the
equation. °
In Tucker v. Wolff I" the court suggested that there was some point
at which an alleged "congested docket" excuse will become "so unac-
ceptable that by itself it violates the right to a speedy trial. s5 8 2 The
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo583 identified three categories of de-
lay that should be assigned different weight in the analysis: (1) deliber-
ate delay to hamper the defense demands a heavy weight against the
government; (2) negligence or overcrowded courts should receive less
weight against the government although such reason is the "ultimate
responsibility" of the government; (3) valid reasons such as missing
witnesses will justify appropriate delay.5 84 The court will also consider
the defendant's timely assertion of his right, and this assertion "is enti-
tled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether defendant is
being deprived of the right. . . . [F]ailure to assert the right will make
it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy
trial. 58 5s The defendant is therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing
576. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
577. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[A]lthough standards are
still imprecise, the courts have been more willing to find delay to be constitutionally imper-
missible.").
578. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1971).
579. Id at 533. See United States v. Martin, 587 F.2d 31, 33 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[Defend-
ant] failed to show that the length of the delay was anything more than de minimus;... did
not explain his failure to assert his speedy trial rights until appeal; and. . . failed to show
prejudice .. ").
580. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1971) ("[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an
ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.").
See United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1978) (nine-month delay acknowl-
edged as lengthy but allowable because of complex nature of the case).
581. 581 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1978).
582. Id. at 237. The delay in Tucker of 280 days was by itself sufficient to substantiate the
claim of denial of a speedy trial. Id at 238.
583. 407 U.S. 514 (1971).
584. Id at 531.
585. Id at 531-32.
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regarding his claim of timely assertion of the right.5 86
The prejudice to the defendant is to be viewed in terms of the inter-
ests that the right is designed to protect-those comprising a fair
trial.58 7 Although prejudice itself is not a strict requirement in order to
sustain a claim of violation,588 nonprejudice was asserted by the Ninth
Circuit this term in denying such claims.58 9
C. Bail
"A bail bond is a contract between the government and the defend-
ant and his surety, the forfeiture of which results in the surety becom-
ing the government's debtor." 590 The terms of the bond contract are
strictly construed 591 and, when there is a breach of a condition of the
bond, the court declares a forfeiture. 92 In 1978 the Ninth Circuit re-
jected a claim that a bail bond is to be interpreted by reference to appli-
cable state law593 and held that a surety is entitled to notice of
forfeiture at the time the "government moves for judgment but not
when the defendant fails to appear and his bond is forfeited."5 94
In United States v. Jernigan,595 the Ninth Circuit cautioned that Fed-
586. See Tucker v. Wolff, 581 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1978) (public defender's acquies-
cence to delay required a showing that defendant knowingly consented thereto).
587. These interests include: (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) mini-
mization of the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limitation of the possibility that
the defense will be impaired. "Mhe most serious is the last, because the inability of a de-
fendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532.
588. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973) (per curiam) (prejudice not essential to
claim of violation of speedy trial right).
589. United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 550 (9th Cir. 1978) (assertion of lost or
pilfered records, changed testimony by witnesses and police harassment require more than
self-serving hearsay statements). See Blackburn v. United States District Court, 564 F.2d
332, 334 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) ("No showing has been made that any witness' memory
as to given matters has been dimmed or that the presentation of petitioner's defense has been
otherwise impaired as a result of this delay.").
590. United States v. Lujan, 589 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1978).
591. Id
592. Id
593. United States v. Vera-Estrada, 577 F.2d 598, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1978). The appellant
in Vera claimed that CAL. PENAL CODE § 1305(a) (West Supp. 1978), requiring notification
of the surety within 30 days of forfeiture, was to be read as an implied term of the bail bond
contract. The appellant relied on dictum in United States v. Gonware, 415 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1969), which indicated that a bail bond is to be interpreted in accordance with applicable
state law. The Ninth Circuit in Vera, however, expressed its belief that FED. R. CRIM. P.
46(e) is the exclusive rule of procedure governing such matters in federal court. 577 F.2d at
599-600.
594. 577 F.2d at 600. See FED. R. CIuM. P. 46(e).
595. 582 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978).
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eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 9(c)(1), 596 requiring the arresting of-
ficer to bring an arrested person promptly before the court to obtain
bail, must be satisfied or dismissal of the indictment may be war-
ranted.-97 In Jernigan a warrant was issued on Tuesday, but the arrest
was not made until late the following Friday afternoon. The arresting
officer did not grant the defendant's request to be taken before a magis-
trate and have bail set, and the defendant subsequently spent a three-
day vacation weekend in jail. While acknowledging the deliberateness
of the delay, the court found dismissal of the indictment to be "too
drastic a remedy in this case."
598
IV. CONFESSIONS
Miranda v. Arizona599 established the basic guidelines to be followed
by law enforcement officers when questioning suspects in a custodial
setting °00 Before the suspect is questioned, he must be told that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against
him, that he has the right to consult with an attorney prior to any ques-
tioning, and that if he desires an attorney and cannot afford one, one
will be appointed for him by the court.60 ' These warnings were seen by
the Court as the only effective way to combat the inherent compulsive
atmosphere of custodial questioning.6 2 A defendant's refusal to an-
swer questions after receiving Miranda warnings may not be brought to
the jury's attention for either substantive or impeachment purposes.6 3
A. Custodial Questioning
Miranda warnings are required only when the questioning occurs in
596. FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(C)(1).
597. 582 F.2d at 1214.
598. Id
599. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
600. Id at 444.
601. Id at 444-45, 467-74, 478-79.
602. Id at 445-58, 467-68. If such warnings are not given prior to custodial questioning,
the defendant's statements may be used for impeachment purposes only. Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
603. See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 981 (1978) (prosecutor's reference to defendant's failure to testify held proper, as
the government "took no unfair advantage of the situation" for substantive or impeachment
purposes); Douglas v. Cupp, 578 F.2d 266, 267 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 865
(1979) (question by prosecutor "Did he make any statements to you?" and the answer "No"
held to have violated defendant's Miranda rights); United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294,
297 (9th Cir. 1978) (government could not use the fact at trial that defendant had claimed
his constitutional privileges at trial) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 438 n.37
(1966)).
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a custodial setting6°4 and not all police questioning is necessarily custo-
dial. For example, volunteered statements, 605 as well as questioning
during an investigatory stop,60 6 do not require Miranda warnings,
"even though one's freedom of action is inhibited to some degree. ' 6 7
Statements obtained as a result of questioning by foreign authorities
who did not give Miranda warnings are admissible if found trustwor-
thy, unless the questioning is the result of a joint venture between the
foreign and United States authorities.0 8
B. Voluntariness
A confession is not automatically admissible, even if the required
Miranda warnings are given.609 No warning can make an involuntary
604. See, e.g., United States v. Scharf, No. 77-3080, slip op. at 4017 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1978)
(defendant who arrived at his home to find it surrounded by patrol cars and who was ques-
tioned in one of those patrol cars by police, held to have been in custody for Miranda pur-
poses); United States v. McCrea, 583 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(defendant who was told by officers searching his home pursuant to a search warrant that he
was not in custody, and who proceeded to make inculpatory statements, held not to have
been in custody as he was free to leave the premises at any time); United States v. Walker,
576 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
The Ninth Circuit test of custodial interrogation is
an objective reasonable man test .... The factors to be considered are the language
used to summon him, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the extent to
which he is confronted with evidence of his guilt, and pressure exerted to detain him. If
the person reasonably believes he can not leave freely, he is considered in custody ....
United States v. Luther, 521 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1975).
605. See, e.g., Pavao v. Cardwell, 583 F.2d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (de-
fendant who was ordered out of car and directed to lie on ground after high speed chase and
who simultaneously gave statement, without being questioned, was held to have volunteered
the statement; Miranda warnings, therefore, were not required).
606. The investigatory stop, discussed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), is a stop made
by an officer who has only a reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, to suspect that
criminal activity is afoot and that the suspect might be involved. Id at 30.
607. United States v. Collom, No. 77-1040, slip op. at 1867 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978) (Mi-
randa warnings are not required on Terry-type stop until probable cause to arrest is found).
See also United States v. Dipp, 581 F.2d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 99 S. Ct.
841 (1979) (failure to give defendant Miranda warnings prior to his testifying before the
grand jury does not make testimony inadmissible in subsequent perjury trial).
608. United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 1978) (questioning of defend-
ant by Mexican authorities was a "joint venture" with American authorities, therefore, Mi-
randa warnings were required). Cf. United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978) (statements originally obtained by Peruvian authori-
ties and later by DEA agents held to be products of separate operations and therefore admis-
sible).
609. United States v. Johnson, No. 77-3808, slip op. at 4121 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1978) ("In
addition to meeting the requirements set forth in Miranda,. . . statements made by a de-
fendant, in order to be admissible, must also be the product of a free and rational choice, as
evidenced by the 'totality of the circumstances' surrounding the statements") (citation omit-
ted); United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 646-47 (9th Cir. 1978) (Miranda warnings not
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confession admissible.61° The judge must determine whether the con-
fession was given voluntarily by considering the totality of the circum-
stances present at the time of questioning.611  The compulsion
invalidating the confession can arise from the threat of either penal
sanctions or certain noncriminal sanctions.612
C. Waiver
After a suspect has been given Miranda warnings, he may waive his
right to remain silent or his right to counsel, or both.613 The waiver
must be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. 14 Whether
required as questioning was not custodial) ("[T]he issues of voluntariness and compliance
with Miranda are separate constitutional defenses.").
610. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-42 (1966) (confession obtained
during sixteen-day incommunicado questioning held involuntary; Miranda warnings are a
significant factor in determining the voluntariness of a statement); United States v. Schmidt,
573 F.2d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978) (confession to DEA agents
which followed involuntary confession given to Peruvian agents, held voluntary) (the deter-
mination of voluntariness of a statement is done on a case-by-case basis; the test is "whether
the accused, at the time he confesses, is in possession of 'mental freedom' to confess or deny
a suspected participation in a crime.") (quoting Lynons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602
(1944)). Cf. United States v. Duncan, 570 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (state-
ment made by defendant properly admitted against him, when he had been subpoenaed to
appear before grand jury, had been given full Miranda warnings, and had executed a written
waiver); United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 522-23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926
(1978) (confession of defendant in bank robbery case who "seemed alert," gave "fairly spe-
cific answers" to officers' questions, was in good condition and not suffering adverse symp-
toms from medical problems was voluntary); Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1277
(9th Cir. 1979) (because deportation proceedings are civil and not criminal in nature, the
analysis of voluntariness is markedly different from that used in a criminal situation).
611. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544 (1967) (trial judge must make preliminary finding
of voluntariness of confession and this finding must clearly appear from the record); United
States v. Johnson, No. 77-3808, slip op. at 4121 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1978) (the "voluntariness
test" is whether the confession was 'extracted by any sort of threats or violence,. . . [or] by
the exertion of any improper influence'.") (quoting Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976));
United States v. Brown, 575 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (record must show
trial court's consideration of the voluntariness issue with unmistakable clarity). See also
United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1978) (voluntariness will not be consid-
ered on appeal if not contested in the trial court) ("[I]t is particularly essential that this issue
be raised before or during trial.")
612. Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 990 (9th Cir. 1978) (compulsion not found in refus-
ing to grant defendant immunity in probation revocation hearing). See Lefkowitz v. Cun-
ningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804-06, 808-09 (1977) (choice of waiving immunity or losing job
held compulsion within terms of fifth amendment).
613. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). The decision to speak must be an
"unfettered exercise of [the defendant's] own will." Id. at 460. Cf. United States v. Botero,
589 F.2d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2162 (1979) (statement admissible
when defendant, after waiving Miranda rights, was denied the right to make a phone call,
when the understood purpose of the call was not to obtain an attorney).
614. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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there is a valid waiver is a factual inquiry, decided on a case-by-case
basis. 615 Although the suspect may revoke his waiver, and thereby pre-
clude further questioning, 616 pauses between answers given after a
waiver will not necessarily serve as a revocation,617 nor will the sus-
pect's choice to answer some questions and not others.618
Once a defendant has claimed his right to remain silent, he may later
change his mind and answer police questions. In Michigan . Mos-
ley,619 the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant had withdrawn his
prior assertion of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
The Court, however, has not decided whether a defendant who has in-
voked his fifth or sixth amendment right to counsel may waive that
right prior to consulting with counsel or outside the presence of coun-
sel.620 The Ninth Circuit, however, in United States v. Rodriguez-Gas-
/elum62 ' held that a defendant's statement obtained after an assertion
of his fifth amendment right to counsel is not per se inadmissible if
made prior to his consulting with counsel. Other circuits are divided
on this issue,622 and prior to Rodriguez-Gastelum the Ninth Circuit's
615. See United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
881 (1978) (determination of admissibility of confession is on a case-by-case basis). See,
e.g., United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant who testi-
fied to understanding Miranda warnings on a printed waiver card, which he had signed, held
to have waived his Miranda rights knowingly and intelligently, although the oral warnings
were given in Spanish spoken with Mexican accent, while defendant spoke Spanish with a
Cuban accent); United States v. Basile, 569 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 436
U.S. 920 (1978) (defendant was given Miranda warnings twice within forty-five minutes,
freely talked with officers after these warnings and testified in his own defense as an intelli-
gent and articulate witness; held to have impliedly waived Miranda rights).
616. United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 298 (9th Cir. 1978) (failure to respond to one
question out of several held not a revocation of defendant's waiver of Miranda rights).
617. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966); United States v. Lorenzo, 570
F.2d 294, 297 (9th Cir. 1978).
618. See United States v. Ford, 563 F.2d 1366, 1367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021
(1977) (intermittent silences in response to questions did not revoke prior Miranda waivers).
619. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). The defendant in Mosley was arrested for robbery, and before
interrogation on that crime, was given his Miranda warnings. Defendant invoked the Mi-
randa rights and questioning ceased. More than two hours later, another interrogator re-
turned, gave the defendant new Miranda warnings, and began questioning concerning an
unrelated murder. The Supreme Court held a statement, given during the second interroga-
tion, to be admissible against the defendant in a murder prosecution. The Mosley Court
found that per se application of the language in Miranda would be too restrictive on police
and in effect would imprison the defendant in his rights. Id at 102.
620. Id at 101 n.7. ("The present case does not involve the procedures to be followed if
the person in custody asks to consult with a lawyer, since Mosley made no such request at
any time.")
621. 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978).
622. The Fifth Circuit currently is split. Compare United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300,
307 (5th Cir. 1977) with United States v. Hodge, 487 F.2d 945, 946 (5th Cir. 1973) (per
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position had been unclear. In United States v. Flores-Calvillo,623 for
example, one Ninth Circuit panel had held that, once a request for
counsel was made, no questioning could take place until after the de-
fendant had consulted with counsel, and any statement obtained in the
meantime would be excluded. In United States v. Pheaster,6 24 another
panel held that such a request for counsel could be waived prior to
defendant's consulting with counsel, and thereby make a statement
given during this period admissible. The Rodriguez-Gastelum court
faced a choice between the spirit or letter of Miranda. Seven members
of the panel chose the former,62 allowing the defendant to waive his
sixth amendment right to counsel after having asserted that right, pro-
vided the waiver is proper.626
Rodriguez-Gastelum allows a police officer to inform a suspect of the
evidence against him after the suspect has requested counsel. If the
suspect is not badgered, pressured or coerced, he may then waive his
previously invoked right to counsel.62 7
The standard of waiver adopted by the Rodriguez-Gastelum court
caused three members of the panel to dissent in part. The dissent pro-
posed a stricter standard of waiver, observing that "[t]he waiver...
[should] be explicit, initiated by the suspect, and not in any way in-
duced by the interrogators. ' 628 The majority rejected this standard, as
curiam). The Eighth and Tenth Circuits appear consistent with the new Ninth Circuit posi-
tion. See United States v. Scogin, 459 F.2d 182, 184 (8th Cir. 1972); Halloway v. United
States, 495 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir. 1974). The Seventh Circuit recently reserved this ques-
tion. White v. Finkbeiner, 570 F.2d 194, 200-01 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978) (question whether right
can ever be waived by defendant before it is honored is left "for another day").
623. No. 75-3785 (9th Cir. July 14, 1976), opinion vacated and remanded in light of United
States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), 571 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.
1978).
624. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
625. "[A] majority of the court is now satisfied that theperse rule. . . is neither required
by the Sixth Amendment nor consistent with good law enforcement ... . Miranda must be
applied with.. . 'flexibility and realism' ...." United States V. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569
F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978).
626. Id at 487-88 (quoting United States v. Flores-Calvillo, No. 75-3785, slip op. at 4-5
(9th Cir. July 14, 1976), opinion vacated and remanded in light of United States v. Rodriguez-
Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), 571 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1978)).
627. 569 F.2d at 485 n.6, 487-88. See Pierce v. Cardwell, 572 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir.
1978) (police cannot question defendant after he has requested counsel, but may present the
evidence they have against him and resume questioning should the defendant, after seeing
this evidence, waive his request); United States v. Wilson, 571 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 1978)
(statement made by defendant who had requested counsel but later waived his request after
being informed of additional charge against him, was properly admitted against him at
trial).
628. United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482, 489 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978) (Anderson, Browning & Goodwin, Circuit JJ., dissenting).
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it would have the same effect as a per se exclusion and would be, there-
fore, too restrictive.
6 29
V. TRIALS
A. Elements of Crimes
1. Intent
To sustain a conviction for a federal crime the prosecution is re-
quired to allege in the indictment,630 as well as to prove at trial, every
element of the offense. This includes the element of criminal intent.63'
Although the defendant is responsible for proving his appropriate de-
fenses, the prosecution may not shift this essential element of the of-
fense to the defendant. 632 There are, however, exceptions to the
629. Id at 488.
630. United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1978) (failure of an indictment to
detail each element of the charged offense generally constitutes a fatal defect).
631. United States v. Erksine, 588 F.2d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The rule that a defend-
ant may rebut or seek to disprove the Government's case by showing that one or more
elements of a criminal offense did not occur extends to any of the mental components neces-
sary to establish guilt of the crime in question."); United States v. Ballesteros-Cordova, 586
F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (tolling of statute of limitations pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3290 (1976) requires prosecution to prove concealment with intent to avoid arrest
or prosecution); United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1978) (evi-
dence of non-military uses of information is relevant to the issue of scienter; whether the
defendant knew or should have known he was violating the law); United States v. Brown,
578 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1978) (government required to prove intent relating to fraudu-
lent act, but not as to knowledge that the instrument used is a security under the Security
Act); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1359 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 830
(1978) (no specific intent proven "because the logical relationship between what he could
have known and a specific intent has no rational basis"); United States v. Burnim, 576 F.2d
236,237 (9th Cir. 1978) (unarmed bank robbery, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) is a
general, rather than a specific intent crime); United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 501 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978) (in prosecution for tax evasion, the term "willfully"
requires proof of specific intent); United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 299 (9th Cir. 1978)
(passing of counterfeit bill is not criminal offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1976)
unless government proves knowledge of counterfeit nature and intent to pass "bad money");
United States v. Jones, 569 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 908 (1978)
(refusal by trial court to instruct that "intent to avoid confinement was an element" of proof
required for conviction for escape not reversible error); United States v. Jenkins, 567 F.2d
896, 897 (9th Cir. 1978) (government has the burden of proving the specific intent charged).
632. Tucker v. Wolff, 581 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1978). In Tucker the trial court instructed
the jury that NEv. REv. STAT. § 205.065 (1973) created a presumption that "anyone who
unlawfully enters one of the structures does so 'with intent to commit grand or petit larceny
or a felony therein, unless such unlawful breaking and entering or unlawful entry shall be
explained by testimony satisfactory to the jury to have been made without criminal intent'."
Id. at 238. Tucker's defense was that he was too intoxicated to form the intent required to
commit the crime of burglary. The Ninth Circuit concluded that such a statutory presump-
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general requirement of intent in some federal statutes.633
In United States v. Erne,634 the court stated the factors that must be
considered in evaluating the propriety of a criminal statute which does
not require proof of a mental state, but rather imposes strict liability for
a defendant's actions: (1) behaviors that are not positive aggressions,
but rather neglect of a public welfare duty;635 (2) the nature of assumed
responsibilities places the accused in a position to prevent the viola-
tion;6 36 (3) penalties for the violation are usually small and do no grave
damage "to the accused's reputation; '637 (4) the "probability of regula-
tion is so great that one who does the act is presumed to be aware of the
regulation;" 638 and (5) a legislative history that reveals an intention not
to require proof of intent.639
When the criminal statute is unclear as to the requisite level of in-
tent, an analysis of the legislative history is required.64° In order to
prove the requisite intent, the prosecution is entitled to present circum-
stantial evidence from which the trier of fact may draw reasonable in-
ferences.64
tion did not constitute harmless error, and remanded to the district court for examination of
the "unconstitutionality" issue that the presumption presented. Id. at 239.
633. See United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1978). In Mowat, the defendant
was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976), which provides: "Whoever, within the
jurisdiction of the United States, goes upon any military, naval or Coast Guard reservation,
post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, for any purpose prohibited by law or lawful
regulation. . . [s]haU be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months,
or both." The court, noting that the statute did not require intent on its face and the com-
mon law term of "trespass" was not used concluded, that, "Congress clearly did not make
motive or intent a factor in determining guilt and on these facts the absence of mens rea does
not invalidate the statute." Id. at 1204.
634. 576 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1978). The defendant in Erne was convicted under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7215 (1976) for failure to deposit withholding and FICA taxes into a bank trust account.
The defendant asserted that such a crime required proof of intent to violate tax law. The
Ninth Circuit, after an analysis of the factors, concluded that the statute, enacted in order to
avoid "the difficulty of proving willfulness," was justified. Id. at 215. See [1958] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2187, 2191.
635. 576 F.2d at 214.
636. Id.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 214-15. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (registration provision
violates due process where no "willfulness" need be shown for conviction and applied to
person who has no knowledge of duty to register).
639. 576 F.2d at 215.
640. United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he plain meaning
of the statute. . . indicates that specific intent need not be proven."); United States v. Gra-
ham, 581 F.2d 789, 790 (9th Cir. 1978) (nothing in the legislative purpose or history suggests
that Congress intended the corrupt purpose to be the only purpose).
641. United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1978) (trier of fact can view
evidence as a whole and consider relevant circumstances in determining specific intent);
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The courts often must interpret statutory language that was intended
to convey the level of intent required for conviction. Whereas the re-
quirements of the phrase "knowing" have been addressed and settled
by the Ninth Circuit,642 the meaning of the term "willful" has been
interpreted in many ways depending on the specific statute. 43 Gener-
ally, "an act is done willfully if done voluntarily and intentionally and
with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say,
with a purpose either to disobey or disregard the law."'644 The term
"willful," however, is to be distinguished from "knowing" in that one
can "willfully" break the law without knowing of its existence.645
2. Conspiracy
The crime of conspiracy is a separate and distinct offense.646 In or-
United States v. Winn, 577 F.2d 86, 91 (9th Cir. 1978) (circumstantial evidence can be used
to prove any fact); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 830 (1978) (circumstantial evidence is sufficient to find intent to defraud); United
States v. Young, 573 F.2d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 1978) ("conspiracy may be proved by evi-
dence entirely circumstantial and viewed collectively").
642. United States v. Jewel, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976)
("knowingly" requirement may be satisfied upon showing that the defendant acted with
"deliberate ignorance. . . [or] an awareness of the high probability of the existence of the
fact in question"). See United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1977)
("knowing" requires subjective awareness of a high probability of the existence of the fact in
question and a conscious or deliberate disregard of that probability by the defendant in
order to remain ignorant of the fact).
643. United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The meaning of
'willful' has not been uniformly applied in federal criminal statutes.").
644. United States v. Winn, 577 F.2d 86, 91 (9th Cir. 1978). See United States v. McIn-
tyre, 582 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1978). The defendants in Mclntyre were convicted of the will-
ful interception of oral communications by wire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(a)-(b)
(1976). The Ninth Circuit concluded that a willful state of mind to do the illegal act, rather
than a willful desire to break the law, was the pivotal issue. 582 F.2d at 1225. Similarly, in
United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1978), when the language requiring "bad
purpose" was omitted from the jury instruction, the court found there to be no error when
the instruction as a whole conveyed the need for the necessary specific intent. Id. at 549.
See also United States v. Jones, 569 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 908
(1978) (willful failure to remain or return does not require an intent to avoid confinement).
645. United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1978). The defendant in Brown was
convicted in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1976). The Ninth Circuit concluded that knowl-
edge that the items involved in the fraud were securities as defined by the statute was unim-
portant as long as specific intent regarding the fraudulent, misleading or deceitful conduct
was demonstrated. 578 F.2d at 1284.
646. United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1978). In Carman, the defendant
was aquitted of one of the substantive offenses that gave rise to the conspiracy. As a result,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the conspiracy count because of the following combination of
factors in the case: the conspiracy count was of the "composite" type; the jury received a
"one-is-enough" charge, making it impossible to know upon which crime the conspiracy
verdict was based; and one of the substantive counts was reversed for failure to state a crime.
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der to sustain a conspiracy conviction, the prosecution must establish
an agreement to engage in criminal activity647 accompanied by an overt
act committed in furtherance of the agreement." 8 Whereas the defend-
ant must be more than a mere spectator,649 only "slight evidence" is
needed to link the defendant to the established conspiracy. 650 The
Ninth Circuit in 1978 emphasized that the prosecution must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's connection with the con-
spiracy, however slight it may be.65'
Id. at 566. The court emphasized that such a result is limited to the situation in which all
three factors exist and, therefore, in other situations a conspiracy conviction may prevail
even if all of the substantive counts are reversed. Id. at 567-68. See United States v. Tal-
kington, 588 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1978) ("one-is-enough" charge makes it impossible to
affirm conviction when three of five false statements were not found to be material). Cf.
United States v. Miller, 546 F.2d 320, 325 (9th Cir. 1976) (completion of objective is not
element of conspiracy and, therefore, acquittal on substantive count does not preclude con-
viction on conspiracy count with substantive offense as its object).
647. United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 566, 567 n.12 (9th Cir. 1978). This act need not
be unlawful. Id See United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1006 (1978), where the court reasoned that the initial agreement need not contemplate "the
entire series of assaults. . . .The ongoing relationship and the similarity of the crimes over
a short period of time convince us that there was an implicit continuing agreement to com-
mit the crimes." Id. at 197 n.10. See also United States v. Espinoza, 578 F.2d 224, 228 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 849 (1978) (prior similar act may be used to prove existence of
unlawful agreement); United States v. Uriarte, 575 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 936 (1978) (evidence of other criminal activity relevant to existence and aims of con-
spiracy admissible).
648. 577 F.2d at 567 n.12. In addition, there is no need for the object of the agreement to
be completed in order for a conspiracy count to be sustained. United States v. King, 587 F.
2d 956, 962 (9th Cir. 1978) (fact that drug deal never materialized irrelevant to conspiracy
charge); United States v. Espinoza, 578 F.2d 224, 228 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 849
(1978) ("Espinoza with knowledge of the existence of the unlawful enterprise acted to fur-
ther it.").
649. United States v. Rosales, 584 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1978) (in view of evidence
suggesting that defendant was actual supplier of cocaine, court distinguished cases in which
defendant was "merely a spectator-knowing or unknowing-and not a participant in the
criminal activity"). See United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1978) (conten-
tion of unknowing participation justifies admission of evidence to prove intent under FED.
R. CRIM. P. 404(b)).
650. United States v. Thomas, 586 F.2d 123, 127 (9th Cir. 1978) ("the only issue is
whether the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas had
a slight connection to the Avery conspiracy proved"). See United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d
787, 793 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978), where the court distinguished be-
tween the quantum of evidence needed to support a conviction (each element must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt) and the lesser amount needed to allow the introduction
of co-conspirator's statements pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (judicial policy of
placing probative and reasonably credible evidence before the trier of fact). See also United
States v. Dunn, 564 F.2d 348, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussion of the slight evidence rule in
the context of sufficiency of evidence).
651. In United States v. Thomas, 586 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned:
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A frequent contention on appeal is that in the indictment the prose-
cution alleged a single conspiracy yet proved more than one at trial,
with the appellant common to both.652 Such variance in proof, it is
often alleged, is prejudicial.653 Refuting this challenge, the court in
United States v. Thomas654 emphasized that Kotteakos v. United
States655 involved uniquely erroneous jury instructions656 and stressed
that whether a scheme is one or several conspiracies becomes a ques-
tion of fact once a prima facie case of a single conspiracy is
presented.657 In Thomas, the court enunciated the standard of proof by
which a charge of conspiracy would be judged. The government must
show that (1) the defendant knew of and agreed to the purpose of the
conspiracy; (2) he had reason to know others were involved; and (3) his
benefits were dependent on the success of the entire venture.
658
The Ninth Circuit in 1978 reaffirmed that while 42 U.S.C. section
1985 reaches private conduct, it is limited to conspiracies motivated by
"some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discrimina-
tory animus. 659
Once the existence of a conspiracy is established, evidence establishing beyond a rea-
sonable doubt a connection of a defendant with the conspiracy, even though the connec-
tion is slight, is sufficient to convict him with knowing participation in the conspiracy.
Thus, the word "slight" properly modifies "connection" and not "evidence." It is tied
to that which is proved, not to the type of evidence or the burden of proof.
Id. at 127 (quoting United States v. Dunn, 564 F.2d 348, 357 (9th Cir. 1977)). See United
States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 769 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978) ("Once the
existence of a conspiracy has been established, independent evidence is necessary to show
prima facie the defendant's connection with the conspiracy, even if the connection is
slight.").
652. United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 928 (1978).
The defendant in Brown alleged that the evidence showed two conspiracies, with the defend-
ant a common factor in each. The Ninth Circuit sustained a finding that the second transac-
tion was merely "a new source of revenue... utilized in the consummation of the on-going
conspiracy." Id. at 1286.
653. Id. at 1286.
654. 586 F.2d 123, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1978).
655. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
656. 586 F.2d 123 at 131-32.
657. Id. at 132. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). In Kotteakos,
thirty-two defendants were charged with one conspiracy. The jury was instructed that, "It is
one conspiracy, and the question is. . . which of the defendants. . . are members." Id. at
767. The evidence showed that although there was one central figure, there were at least
eight independent groups, none of which had any connection with any other. The court of
appeals held the instruction to be plainly wrong, since the jury could not possibly have
found.. . that there was only one conspiracy. .d. at 768.
658. 586 F.2d at 132.
659. Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1978). Convicted of defrauding investors,
Blevins brought a civil action against the government witness, his own attorney, and the
prosecuting attorney for conspiring to conceal the witnesses' perjury at the first trial. The
dismissal of Blevin's 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim was sustained. The court noted: "While 42
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3. Lesser included offenses
In order for a crime to be a lesser included offense of another crime
"the two offenses 'must relate to protection of the same interests, and
must be so related that in the general nature of these crimes. . . proof
of the lesser offense is necessarily presented as part of the showing of
the commission of the greater offense'." 66 This formulation provides
the necessary guidance for determining whether a crime is a lesser in-
cluded offense pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.6 '
The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed the "inherent relationship" test
in United States v. Raborn.662 Convicted of bribery,66 3 the defendant in
Raborn claimed on appeal that the trial court erroneously refused to
give an instruction on an alternative lesser included offense.6 " The
court reasoned that, whereas "both sections seek to prevent the divided
loyalty of public employees, ' 665 the element in the lesser offense, that
salary be compensation to an employee of the United States, required
more than the greater offense in which compensation was required only
"in return for influence or the commission of a wrongful act."666 The
U.S.C. § 1985 reaches private conduct, it does not extend to 'all tortious, conspiratorial inter-
ferences with the rights of others,'. . . but is rather limited in its coverage to conspiracies
motivated by 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory ani-
mus'." Id. at 1338 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971)). In response
to Blevin's statement that he had "suffered discrimination at the hands of a group of attor-
neys," the court stated: "IT]he complaint does not charge a conspiracy directed at non-
lawyers as a class, but only the specific conduct of three people who are also lawyers, di-
rected at one person who is not a lawyer, but not because he is not a lawyer." Id. at 1338.
660. United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v.
Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). This test is often referred to as the "inherent
relationship" test. Id.
661. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c). Upon a proper showing that the lesser crime is indeed a
"'lesser included offense," the defendant is entitled to an instruction on the lesser crime.
Such a showing, in addition, permits a jury to find guilt on the lesser charged offense, even if
not alleged in the indictment. See 8A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrICE 31.03 [1]-[5] (2d ed.
1977).
662. 575 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1978).
663. The defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1976), which "requires proof
that: (I) a public official (2) corruptly (3) asked, demanded, received, or agreed to receive an
item of value (4) in return for being influenced in the performance of any official act or
being influenced to commit or aid in committing a fraud on the United States, or being
induced to act in violation of an official duty." 575 F.2d at 692.
664. Defendant claimed that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 209 was a lesser offense included
within 18 U.S.C. § 201(c). "Section 209 prohibits (1) an officer or employee of the executive
branch or an independent agency of the United States government from (2) receiving salary
or any contribution to or supplementation of salary from (3) any source other than the
United States (4) as compensation for services as an employee of the United States. 575
F.2d at 691-92.
665. Id. at 692.
666. Id.
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lesser offense, therefore, would have required proof of an additional
element not needed to constitute the greater offense.
667
4. Crimes involving regulation of firearms
The Gun Control Act of 1968,668 has been construed quite liberally
by the courts. 69 Sections of the Act proscribing a felon's mere posses-
sion of a firearm have been the subject of an array of challenges.67 °
Recently, in United States v. Robbins67 1 the Ninth Circuit applied the
rule of Barrett v. United States,672 in which the Supreme Court held
that, for a conviction to be sustained, it does not matter that the trans-
portation in interstate commerce occurred long before the defendant
received the firearm.673
In Robbins the defendant was convicted of receipt of firearms
through interstate commerce in violation of both 18 U.S.C. sections
1202(a) and 922(h). 674 The court concluded that a sufficient "nexus" is
established by the fact that the firearm "previously traveled in inter-
state commerce. ' 675 A temporary confiscation of the firearm by law
enforcement agents and subsequent return to the defendant will not
"insulate" the "receipt" element of a section 922(h) violation.
676
The Ninth Circuit also considered under what circumstances a previ-
667. Id. See also Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1969).
668. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976).
669. See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 564 (1977) (previous travel in inter-
state commerce satisfies nexus between possession of firearm by felon and commerce); Bar-
ret v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 216 (1976) (no limit on length of time firearm traveled in
interstate commerce before receipt by felon). See also United States v. Moore, 580 F.2d 360,
362 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1976) need not'
actually brandish or discharge firearm).
670. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1976) which provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punish-
able by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. . . to receive any firearm or ammuni-
tion which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." See also 18
U.S.C. Appendix 1202(a) (1976) (prohibits possession, receipt or transport by a felon of a
firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce); United States v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (9th
Cir. 1978) United States v. Robbins, 579 F.2d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 1978).
671. 579 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1978).
672. 423 U.S. 216 (1976).
673. Id. at 216; United States v. Robbins, 579 F.2d at 1153.
674. The defendant in Robbins consented to the search of his vehicle, which led to the
discovery of a pistol manufactured in Connecticut. After paying a $100 fine for carrying a
pistol without a permit, he sought return of the pistol. Upon signing the receipt for the pistol
and taking possession of it, the prosecution alleged that he violated § 922(h), prohibiting
receipt of a firearm by a felon. 579 F.2d at 1154.
675. Id. at 1153 (citing Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 564 (1977)).
676. Id. at 1154. See United States v. Haddad, 558 F.2d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 1977) ("re-
ceipt" is sufficient for a violation of § 922(h)).
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ously convicted felon's status may change, rendering the application of
firearm regulation statutes inappropriate.677 The court concluded that
"convicted felon as used in the statute does not include one whose prior
conviction is later reversed because of certain constitutional defects. 67 8
On the other hand, the violation of statutes providing for procedural
safeguards679 or ones which expunge a defendant's record upon fulfill-
ment of parole or sentence conditions68° do not result in a changed
status.8 1
5. Crimes involving aliens
The deportation of aliens is governed by the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act.68z The proceedings are civil in nature683 and "must con-
form to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due
process. 684 In the proceedings, the defendant alien must initially es-
tablish that he entered the United States lawfully.685 If this burden is
sustained, the Immigration and Naturalization Service must present
677. United States v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1978). The defendant in Herrell
alleged that his prior guilty plea to a grand theft charge was void because the value of the
goods admittedly stolen had not been factually established. This was said to be in violation
of ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17-3, which provides:
Before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, the court shall address the defendant
personally in open court and determine that he wishes to forego the constitutional rights
of which he has been advised, that his plea is voluntary and not the result of force,
threats or promises (other than a plea agreement) and that there is a factual basis for the
plea.
Herrell claimed additionally that since his grand theft charge had been dismissed and his
civil rights restored pursuant to Arizona's expungement statute, his status as a convicted
felon had changed, rendering § 922(h) inapplicable to him. Id. at 713.
678. 588 F.2d at 713 (citing United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 1976)).
679. In Herrell, the court concluded that the federal rules were not constitutionally man-
dated by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). 588 F.2d at 713 n.4. Boykin pro-
vides the only constitutional requirements for a guilty plea: the defendant must be informed
of waiver of right against compulsory self incrimination, jury trial, and confrontation of
accusers. 395 U.S. at 243. The court further stated in Herrell that the federal rules are based
on the "housekeeping power of the Supreme Court" in order to assure voluntariness. 588
F.2d at 713 n.4.
680. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-1744 (1957-77 Supp.), amended and renumbered as ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-807 (1978), contains the proviso: "except that the conviction may be
pleaded and proved in any subsequent prosecution of such person for any offense as if the
judgment of guilt has not been set aside." 588 F.2d at 712.
681. 588 F.2d at 713.
682. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976).
683. Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1978). See Murgia-Meledrez v. INS,
407 F.2d 207, 208-09 (9th Cir. 1969).
684. Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d at 1277.
685. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976); Hoonsilapa v. INS, 575 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.), modifed, 586
F.2d 755 (1978) (burden of showing lawful entry is on the subject of the proceeding).
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"clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence of alienage and de-
portability.686 If it does so, a rebuttable presumption of deportability is
created. 687 Although the defendant may elect to remain silent,688 such
silence could lessen the government's burden of proof.
689
Whether or not an alien will be deported depends upon whether the
government can establish that the alien has exceeded the terms of his
admission or has violated one of the regulations that governs his stay.
Certain criminal conduct is proscribed by such regulations. Conse-
quently, an alien involved in a state or federal criminal action may find
himself subject to deportation proceedings. 690  For example, in
MeJunkins v. INS 69 1 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government
might establish a prima facie case for deportation by showing that the
defendant alien was found to be an addict in a proceeding under the
Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act.692 Recently, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that information that is initially the product of an illegal
search, but is subsequently obtained from an independent source, may
be used by the government at a deportation proceeding.693
6. Securities
The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933694 is to "compel full and
fair disclosure in the issuance of securities so that investors will be ade-
686. Hoonsilapa v. INS, 575 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.), modfied, 586 F.2d 755 (1978).
687. 575 F.2d at 737.
688. Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d at 1277-78.
689. Hoonsilapa v. INS, 575 F.2d at 737.
690. See Winestock v. INS, 576 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1978). The defendant in Winestock
was convicted of dealing in counterfeit obligations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 473 (1976). As
a result he was found to be deportable for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(4) (1976). 576 F.2d at 235. See also Forstner v. INS, 579 F.2d 506
(9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). Forstner pleaded guilty to a state narcotics charge and subse-
quently was deported pursuant to § 1251(a)(11) (deportation required for any alien con-
victed of "illicit possession of narcotics or marijuana") 579 F.2d at 507.
691. 579 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1978).
692. Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, §§ 2-316, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3426
(1976); 579 F.2d at 536. The court reconciled its result with Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962) (imposition of criminal sanctions for acquiring status of addict constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment) by emphasizing that Congress has power to "impose conditions
upon the privilege of remaining in this country which could not be imposed upon citizens."
579 F.2d at 536.
693. Hoonsilapa v. INS, 575 F.2d at 738. As a result of an illegal search of the defend-
ant's home the INS was alerted that the defendant was possibly subject to deportation. A
search of the files subsequently unearthed enough information to sustain deportation. The
court held "that there is no sanction to be applied when an illegal arrest only leads to the
discovery of the man's identity and that merely leads to the official file." I1d. at 738.
694. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
CRIMINAL L4W SUR VEY 1978
quately protected."6 95 The Ninth Circuit in 1978 addressed several
claims that convictions for securities laws violations were improper be-
cause the instruments used in the transactions were not securities as
defined by the Act.
In United States v. Dunla, 6 96 the defendants were indicted under 18
U.S.C. section 2314697 for transportation of counterfeit securities in in-
terstate commerce. The securities at issue were counterfeit department
store scrip. The prosecution maintained that such instruments fell
within the definition of securities as either an "evidence of indebted-
ness" or an instrument "commonly known as a security." '6 9 8 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that "the statute disclose[d] no congressional intent
to give a broad meaning to include" as securities "all obligations on the
part of the maker of a paper to the holder."69 9 In declining to make the
two above-mentioned phrases a catchall rubric, the court cautioned
that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed.7 °0
In contrast, however, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Urciuoli7 0
affirmed a conviction for transporting stolen securities.702 The defend-
ant in Urciuoli asserted that canceled certificates ceased to be "securi-
ties" within the scope of the Securities Act.70 3 The court rejected this
assertion, reasoning that the certificates retained their status as securi-
ties since there was nothing on their face to suggest their invalidity or
nonredeemable status to an innocent purchaser who may have bought
them for value.7M
695. United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 564 (9th Cir. 1978).
696. 573 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1978).
697. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
698. 573 F.2d at 1093. 18 U.S.C. § 2311 (1976) provides in part: "'Securities' includes
any note, stock certificate, bond, debenture, check, draft,. . . evidence of indebtedness,...
or, in general, any instrument commonly known as a 'security,'... or any forged, counter-
feited, or spurious representation of any of the foregoing ....
699. 573 F.2d at 1094.
700. Id. See Prussian v. United States, 282 U.S. 675 (1931) (strictly construe criminal
statutes).
701. 575 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
702. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
703. 575 F.2d at 769.
704. Id. But see United States v. Simpson, 577 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1978). Simpson was
convicted in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) (transportation of forged securities). Upon
receiving canceled certificates, Simpson forged the names of the true owners and sold them
to a stock brokerage firm. He claimed that since the securities were "valueless," they fell
outside the scope of § 2314. The court, while doubting the correctness of his premise, as-
sumed its validity, but held the certificates to have value by reason of the fact that they were
sold at their actual market value. Id. at 80. Simpson's conviction, however, was reversed
because he forged the endorsements on genuine certificates rather than forging the certifi-
cates themselves, as the court held the statute required. Id. at 81.
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B. Severance
Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits join-
der of two or more defendants if the charges against them arise out of
"the same series of. . . transactions constituting an offense."705 While
recognizing that the primary purpose of joinder is the promotion of
efficiency in the administration of justice,7 °6 the Ninth Circuit has been
careful to guard against potential prejudice that may result from the
joinder of multiple defendants. The Ninth Circuit therefore has inter-
preted rule 8(b) to require that "substantially the same facts . . . be
adduced to prove each of the joined offenses. 70 7
A defendant properly joined under rule 8(b), however, may move for
severance pursuant to rule 14,708 when prejudicial joinder threatens to
705. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) provides:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series
of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be
charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not
be charged in each count.
706. The general rule is that a joint trial "expedites the administration of justice, reduces
the congestion of trial dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens the burdens upon citizens to
sacrifice time and money to serve on juries and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses
who would otherwise be called upon to testify only once." United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d
1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978) ("The purpose of Rule 8(b) is to balance the need to avoid
the potential prejudice that may result from joining multiple defendants with the need to
attain trial efficiency.").
707. United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977). Compare id. (when
defendant was involved in only two of five charged bank robberies and most evidence re-
lated to other three, joinder improper because substantially same facts would not have been
adduced at separate trials; allegation of charges similar in character insufficient to warrant
joinder) with United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1006 (1978) (conviction for conspiracy, assault with intent to rob, robbery, and murder af-
firmed, rejecting contention that the five substantive charges did not constitute a "series of
acts or transactions," so as to permit joinder under rule 8(b) rejected). The Adams court
found the five incidents to constitute a series; the conspiracy count, charged in good faith,
provided the necessary link. 581 F.2d at 197. See also United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d
876, 885 (9th Cir. 1978) (no error in conducting joint trial where co-defendants found fishing
in violation of a court injunction protecting Indian fishing rights: "Rules 8(b) and 13 . . . fit
these cases exactly. [The co-defendants] 'participated in the same act or transaction'-they
were together, fishing on [co-defendant's] boat, when caught."); United States v. Barney, 568
F.2d 134, 135 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978) (per curiam) (no error in
joining stolen vehicle charge against appellant and co-defendant with perjury charge against
co-defendant when perjury count related to receipt appellant possessed when apprehended
while driving stolen vehicle: "[A]Ueged false testimony related directly to the illegal transac-
tion with which appellant was charged . . . . Indeed, the facts underlying the joined of-
fenses were so intertwined that most of the evidence admissible in proof of one was also
admissible in proof of the other.") (citations omitted).
708. FED. R. CriM. P. 14 provides:
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deny him a fair trial.7 9 Unlike a rule 8(b) motion, which raises mis-
joinder as an issue of law,710 the decision to grant or deny a motion for
severance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.7 1 The
Ninth Circuit will not disturb a trial court's refusal to sever a joint trial
unless the defendant can demonstrate that the prejudice to him from
joinder so outweighed the consequent gain in judicial economy and ef-
ficiency that the refusal constituted an abuse of discretion.71a To meet
this heavy burden the defendant must establish that a joint trial was so
prejudicial as to have compelled the trial court to exercise its discretion
to sever.713
Although "[t]he burden of proving this prejudice is a difficult one
and the ruling of the trial judge will rarely be disturbed, '7 14 a success-
ful challenge to a denial of severance has been made in at least three
kinds of circumstances. Severance is improperly denied when (1) join-
der effectively denies a defendant his sixth amendment right to con-
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses
or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together,
the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defend-
ants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a de-
fendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to
the court for inspection in camera any statements for confessions made by the defend-
ants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
709. See 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.02[1], at 14-3 (2d rev. ed. 1978). See also
United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1970) (although joinder is proper
under rule 8(b), severance permitted when facts of a given case make it unlikely that jury
will reach proper verdict; when few defendants are joined and few factual issues are in-
volved, jurors competent to give impartial consideration).
710. See United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
958 (1971).
711. United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978) ("Rule 14 motions for severance are committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court."). See United States v. Hernandez-Berceda, 572 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Al-
though the decision to grant ...severance is a matter in which a trial judge has wide
discretion ...that discretion is not without limits.") (citations omitted).
712. See United States v. Uriarte, 575 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 963
(1978). The court noted that the "test for when severance should be granted is . . .'whether
joinder is so manifestly prejudicial that it outweighs the dominant concern with judicial
economy and compels the exercise of the court's discretion to sever.'" Id. (citations omit-
ted) (quoting United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1976)). See also
United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978)
(sufficient prejudice not shown merely because separate trial might offer better chance for
acquittal).
713. United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[U]Iltimate question is
whether under all of the circumstances, it is within the capacity of the jurors to follow the
court's admonitory instructions and, correspondingly whether they can collate and appraise
the independent evidence against each defendant solely upon that defendant's own acts.").
714. Id. at 1127.
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frontation,1 5 (2) evidence, admissible only against a co-defendant, also
incriminates the defendant, and despite admonitory instructions, can-
not reasonably be dxpected to be ignored in the jury's determination of
the defendant's guilt7 16 or innocence,7 17 and (3) it is clear that a co-
715. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125 (1968). Bruton, the leading case in
this area, concerns the violation of a defendant's constitutional rights to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him. In that case, defendants Evans and Bruton were jointly
tried for armed postal robbery. Prior to trial, Evans had made a confession that inculpated
Bruton. Although the confession was admitted into evidence, Evans did not testify. The
court clearly instructed the jury that the confession was to be considered only in deciding the
guilt or innocence of Evans. The Supreme Court reversed Bruton's conviction on the
ground that his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine Evans, a witness against
him, had been violated. The Court argued that it was unrealistic to assume that the jury
could apply the confession against Evans and ignore its implication of Bruton. As such, the
confession unduly prejudiced Bruton and subjected him to a conviction based upon incom-
petent evidence. The Court stressed that severance of trial could dispel such prejudice. But
see United States v. Basile, 569 F.2d 1053, 1057-58 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 436 U.S. 920
(1978). In Basile, the Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant Holden's conviction for possession
of marijuana. In Bruton, the defendant was unable to cross-examine a co-defendant whose
out-of-court statement, inculpatory as to the defendant, had been admitted into evidence. In
Basile, the evidentiary constraints inherent in a joint trial had prevented Holden's introduc-
tion of the out-of-court statements of his co-defendant, Basile. The statements were excul-
patory as to Holden. The Ninth Circuit, however, found no error in the trial court's refusal
to sever. The court reasoned that because the evidence that Holden sought to introduce was
eventually admitted, albeit not in the desired context, no undue prejudice had resulted from
the joint trial.
Judge Hufstedler dissented, contending that Basile's statements could not be used to ex-
culpate Holden without impermissibly inculpating Basile:
The only way to safeguard Holden's right to introduce the exculpatory evidence and at
the same time protect Basile from evidence inadmissible against him . . . is to sever
the trials of the two men.
The error was not cured by the opportunity that Holden later had to cross-examine
Basile after he took the stand. The maximum that Holden could have realized from
cross-examining Basile was a denial that Basile owned the marihuana [sic], with an
opportunity to impeach that portion of Basile's testimony, and an admission that Basile
had made exculpatory statements about him. The ability to bring out before the jury
that Basile was a liar certainly did not cast Basile's exculpatory statements about
Holden in an attractive light.
Id. at 1061 (citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876, 877 (9th Cir.
1978) (appellant's claim of right to separate trial disappeared when co-defendant, who made
out-of-court statement implicating appellant, chose to testify at joint trial). See United
States v. Adams, 531 F.2d 193, 197-198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978). The
Ninth Circuit in Adams affirmed Pinkerton's conviction for conspiracy, assault, robbery and
murder, and rejected his claim that joinder with Adams prejudiced his defense because it
required the jury to consider evidence of one assault with which only Adams was charged.
The Adams court concluded that Pinkerton had not carried the burden of demonstrating
prejudice sufficient to require severance, stating that "[hlere [Pinkerton] can show no
prejudice other than that which necessarily inheres wherever multiple defendants or multi-
ple charges are jointly tried. Furthermore, the instructions delivered to the jury were calcu-
lated to remove, to the extent possible, any prejudice resulting from joinder." Id. at 198
(footnote omitted).
716. Cf. United States v. Sanchez, 532 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1976). In Sanchez,
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defendant will provide testimony exculpating the defendant only if
their trials are separate.71 s
In 1978, the Ninth Circuit applied these precedents in several cases
challenging denials of severance, and in no case found severance im-
properly denied. In United States v. Brady7 19 for example, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed appellants' convictions for voluntary manslaughter,
concluding that neither had demonstrated a likelihood of prejudice suf-
ficient to set aside the trial court's exercise of discretion in denying sev-
erance. In Brady, appellants' claims were based on two instances of
rebuttal testimony in which a government agent testified about state-
ments made out of court by each appellant, contradicting the in-court
testimony given by each. Had the evidence consisted solely of the
agent's testimony that each appellant had accused the other, out-of-
court, of responsibility for the death, severance would have been re-
quired in order to prevent deprivation of sixth amendment confronta-
tion rights. However, no such deprivation had occurred; each appellant
who made an extrajudicial statement testified in court and subjected
himself to cross-examination. The statements, therefore, failed to add
"'substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case in
a form not subject to cross-examination', 72 ° and the Brady court con-
defendants Ruiz and Sanchez were jointly tried as co-conspirators in a scheme to sell heroin
and opium. Although the evidence against Ruiz was thin, there was a strong case against
Sanchez. Sanchez did not testify, but his attorney advised the jury that had Sanchez testi-
fied, he would have admitted the conspiracy charge. Sanchez's defense was entrapment.
Since Sanchez did not testify, Ruiz had no opportunity to cross-examine. The jury was not
cautioned that the confession was admissible only against Sanchez. The combination of a
damaging admission, the lack of appropriate limiting instructions, and the absence of cross-
examination were found by the Ninth Circuit io have deprived Ruiz of a fair trial.
717. See also United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978). The Brady court
rejected appellants' contentions that their mutual antagonism had resulted in undue
prejudice warranting severance, stating that "[w]hile a great disparity in proof may be suffi-
cient to allow a severance in certain cases, the fact that the evidence against one co-defend-
ant is more damaging than the evidence against another one is not a ground for severance."
Id. at 1128. There can be no undue prejudice, therefore, if the jury can compartmentalize
the evidence relating to each defendant, and consider the volume and limited admissibility
of such evidence. Id Accord, United States v. Companale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976) (no undue prejudice if the jury can reasonably be expected
to compartmentalize evidence as it relates to separate defendants in light of its volume and
limited admissibility).
718. United States v. Vigil, 561 F.2d 1316, 1317 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) ("When the
reason for severance is the asserted need for a co-defendant's testimony, the defendant must
show that he would call the co-defendant at a severed trial, that the co-defendant would in
fact testify, and that the testimony would be favorable to the moving defendant." Once the
defendant has satisfied this burden, he should be granted a separate trial.).
719. 579 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978).
720. Id. at 1129 (quoting United States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 128 (1968)).
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cluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying sev-
erance.7
21
The defendant in United States v. Uriarte722 appealed his conviction
for conspiracy to import marijuana, contending that the admission of
evidence concerning his co-defendant's previous arrest for possession
of marijuana created an inference so prejudicial to him as to mandate
severance. The Uriarte court, however, found no abuse of discretion in
the trial court's denial of severance. No testimony had linked Uriarte
to the evidence against his co-defendant and, as a safeguard, limiting
instructions had been given regarding the permissible use of the evi-
dence of the co-defendant's previous arrest. The Ninth Circuit there-
fore found that a joint trial was not unduly prejudicial to the appellant,
concluding that "[s]imilar cases have arisen where members of the con-
spiracy who . . . were not involved in all aspects of the conspiracy,
have been denied severance. This court has not found it impossible to
try co-conspirators together, even when not all of the evidence admit-
ted applied to each co-conspirator.
'723
In United States v. Hernandez-Berceda,2 the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the appellant's conviction for conspiracy to import heroin, concluding
that his asserted need for a co-indictee's testimony warranted neither
severance nor continuance. The court held that when the reason as-
serted for severance or continuance "is the need for a codefendant's
testimony, [either] should be granted upon a showing that (1) the code-
fendant would be called; (2) he would in fact testify; and (3) the testi-
mony would be favorable to the requesting defendant. 725  In
Hernandez, a co-indictee, Barron, had offered to provide exculpatory
testimony for the appellant, but only if their trials were separate. On
this basis the appellant requested severance of their joint trial. Shortly
before trial, however, Barron pleaded guilty, and appellant changed his
721. Severance was also held to have been properly denied despite each appellant's con-
tention that the other's antagonistic testimony had been unduly prejudicial to him. The
court stated that "[c]onflicting and antagonistic defenses being offered at trial do not neces-
sarily require granting a severance, even if hostility surfaces or defendants seek to blame one
another." Id. at 1128. The Brady court concluded that neither appellant was unduly
prejudiced by the testimony of the other. It was undisputed that both had participated in the
incident and "[c]onsequently, it would be only natural for one to try to place the blame on
the other . . . . inhere is no sound reason to suggest that the members of the jury, being
properly instructed as they were, could not realistically appraise the evidence against each
appellant." Id.
722. 575 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 963 (1978).
723. Id. at 217 (citations omitted).
724. 572 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1978).
725. .Id. at 682.
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motion for severance to one for continuance, maintaining that Barron
would only provide the exonerating testimony after he was sentenced.
Applying to this motion for continuance the standards governing a mo-
tion for severance in order to obtain a co-defendant's testimony, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that a sufficient showing of prejudice had not
been established. The Hernandez-Berceda court reasoned that because
of an agreement that other outstanding charges against him were to be
dropped, Barron had no real incentive for postponing testifying. A rea-
sonable doubt existed as to whether Barron would testify, and the trial
court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a
continuance.
C Conduct of the Trial
1. Conduct of the trial judge
The trial court judge is more than a moderator during the life of the
trial.726 It is incumbent upon a judge to ensure that the trial is con-
ducted fairly.7 27 To do so, he is vested with a broad range of discre-
tionary powers7zs in order to meet situations as they arise during the
course of the trial.7 29
a. Pre-trialproceedings
Unless hearing a motion, the trial court judge usually is not involved
to a significant degree in pre-trial proceedings. The judge, however,
has considerable latitude in dealing with these motions. The trial court
in its discretion may properly dismiss the indictment of a federal grand
726. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (error for judge to instruct jury
that defendant was lying because he wiped hands repeatedly while testifying); United States
v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 228 (9th Cir. 1978) (" '[Judges] are not referees at prize-fights but
functionaries ofjustice'.") (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948)); United
States v. Aguiar, 472 F.2d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (" '[A] trial judge is more
than a moderator or umpire.' His responsibility is to preside in the manner and with the
demeanor to provide a fair trial to all parties and his discretion in the performance of this
duty and management is wide.") (citations omitted).
727. See, e.g., United States v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1978) ("A trial judge
must constantly be aware of the sensitive role he plays. .. and avoid even the appearance
of advocacy or partiality.").
728. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1286 (9th Cir. 1976) (trial judge's
discretion in the management of the trial is broad); Roseman v. United States, 364 F.2d 18,
27 (9th Cir. 1966) (conduct of trial is always a matter within the discretion of the trial court
judge).
729. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1976) ("The trial judge must meet
situations as they arise and to do this must have broad power to cope with the complexities
and contingencies inherent in the adversary process.").
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jury,7 30 decide questions involving the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure,7 I and rule on motions for change of venue.732 The court fur-
ther is empowered to disqualify the prosecutor,733 to protect against the
730. United States v. King, 586 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1978) (No. 78-1230; unpublished opin-
ion) (court can dismiss indictment if an essential element of the charged offense is not
charged); United States v. Owen, 580 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1978) (a federal court using "its
inherent supervisory powers" can dismiss indictment obtained as a result of prosecutor's
impropriety). See United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 1979) (indictment
must contain the elements of offense to be charged and sufficiently apprise defendant of
charges against him) (quoting Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962)); United
States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2864 (1979) (strik-
ing of overt acts from indictment charging conspiracy held proper as it did not materially
alter nature of indictment) (citing United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 804 (9th Cir.), cert,
denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975)). Cf. United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978) (trial court cannot inquire into sufficiency of evidence presented
to grand jury).
731. The trial court has wide discretion in dealing with motions for severance. E.g.,
United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 1978) (trial court has considerable
discretion in criminal contempt case to grant or deny severance); United States v. Adams,
581 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978) (rule 14 motions for severance
are committed to sound discretion of trial court); United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121,
1128 (9th Cir. 1978) (test on appeal of denial of severance motion is whether joint trial
would be so prejudicial to defendant as to require exercise of trial court's discretion in only
one way, to order a separate trial); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978) (decision on rule 14 severance is within sound discre-
tion of the trial court); United States v. Hernandez-Berceda, 572 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir.
1978) (trial court has wide discretion to grant severance); United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d
134, 136 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978) (joinder did not violate
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) as nothing made joinder unduly prejudicial); United States v. Gay,
567 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1978) (rule 14 severance is entirely within trial court's discretion).
The trial court judge has considerable discretion to direct discovery. See United States v.
Dipp, 581 F.2d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 841 (1979) (trial court judge
has broad discretion in determining sanctions for rule 16 violations); United States v. Rich,
580 F.2d 929, 934 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978) (denial of rule 15 motion is
well within the discretion of the trial court); Jett v. Castaneda, 578 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir.
1978) (trial court could not properly enter discovery orders before a case or controversy
arose); United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 919 (1978) (sanctions for violating pretrial discovery rules are largely within trial
court's discretion).
The trial court judge also is broadly vested with discretion in other areas. E.g., United
States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1978) (district court has limited discretion in
resolving a rule 29(c) motion); United States v. Charnay, 577 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1978)
(dismissal with prejudice under rule 48(b) calls for trial court's sensitive exercise of discre-
tion); Fassler v. Moran, 576 F.2d 1372, 1373 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (trial court may not
extend time for rule 59(b), (d) & (e) motions except as provided in the rule); United States v.
Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1978) (rule 12.1 allows trial judge to exclude defendant's
alibi defense if notification is but one day late if the judge has weighed the interest of the
defendant in a full and fair trial against the interests of avoiding surprise and delay).
732. United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 552 (9th Cir. 1978) (decision on change of
venue motion is within sound discretion of the trial court).
733. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 767 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 981
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effects of excessive pre-trial publicity,"' and to allow hearings to deter-
mine a defendant's competency.735
When an accused challenges a judge's ability to hear his case by a 28
U.S.C. section 144736 motion alleging that the judge is biased, the judge
may properly rule on the legal sufficiency of the supporting affidavit.
In United States v. 4zhocar,737 the Ninth Circuit held that only after
the legal sufficiency of an affidavit alleging bias has been affirmatively
determined must the trial judge withdraw from the case.738 The Azho-
(1978) (mere fact that attorney now working for Securities and Exchange Commission once
worked for law firm that had previously represented defendant does not necessarily disqual-
ify United States Attorney's Office from the action). The Weiner court held that to disqual-
ify the Government, the defendant would have to show: (1) that the attorney in question
could have imputed to him the knowledge of the previous case possessed by the other mem-
bers of his law firm, (2) that this knowledge also could be imputed to the other attorneys at
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and (3) that this knowledge could be imputed to
the United States Attorney's Office through the alleged cooperation between it and the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission.
734. United States v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (in light of the kind of
publicity and length of elapsed time involved, any possible juror prejudice stemming from
newspaper articles four and twelve months prior to trial would have been detected by
judge's inquiries of the prospective panel of jurors); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d
1350, 1354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978) (trial court is given wide latitude in
gauging effects of pretrial publicity on prospective jurors). Cf. United States v. Sherman,
581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978) (restraining order on media prior to any attempted
contact with jurors has a heavy presumption against its constitutionality) ("The government
• ..must show that the activity restrained poses a clear and present danger or a serious and
imminent threat to a protected competing interest. ... )
735. Compare United States v. Richardson, 586 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1978) (denial of
competency hearing held not an abuse of discretion) with United States v. Ives, 574 F.2d
1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1978) (trial court abused its discretion in not considering proffered evi-
dence of change in defendant's competency when there had been four differing determina-
tions of defendant's competency within five months).
736. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976) states in part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias
or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall pro-
ceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
737. 581 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1213 (1979) (neither adverse
rulings nor merely ill-advised remarks are sufficient to show bias). See also United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (bias must result from an extra-judicial source).
738. 581 F.2d at 738. The court rejected the claim that the trial judge can decide only the
timeliness of the affidavit and must assign the § 144 motion to another judge for hearing on
the sufficiency of the affidavit. Id See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921) (judge
against whom bias affidavit is fied may properly rule on that affidavit's legal sufficiency);
United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876, 883 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Only if [the judge] finds [the
affidavit legally] sufficient is he required to have another judge hear the motion."). See also
United States v. Cassasa, 588 F.2d 282, 284 (9th Cir. 1978) ('The facts indicating bias must
be substantial.").
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car court employed a three-step test by which to test the legal suffi-
ciency of the affidavit:
It must state facts which if true fairly support the allegation that bias or
prejudice stemming from (1) an extrajudicial source (2) may prevent a
fair decision on the merits. The focus is not only on the source of the facts
and their distorting effects on a decision on the merits. . . but also on (3)
the substantiality of the support given by these facts to the allegation of
bias . . .73
In United States v. Olander74° the Ninth Circuit applied the same
standard to a 28 U.S.C. section 4551 motion alleging that the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
74 2
b. Discretion during the trial
The trial court judge, in controlling the flow of information to the
jury, may exercise a wide latitude of discretion when ruling on admissi-
bility of evidence,743 interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 4
739. 581 F.2d at 739-40.
740. 584 F.2d 876, 883 (9th Cir. 1978) (newspaper article that did not quote trial court
judge directly but was rather the "figurative interpretation" of a person interviewed by a
newspaper reporter held insufficient to allege impartiality).
741. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976) states in relevant part: "(a) Any. . .judge. . . shall disqual-
ify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b)
He shall also disqualify himself. . . : (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice con-
cerning a party .... "
742. 584 F.2d at 882 ("We agree with the Fifth Circuit that . . . the test for bias or
prejudice is the same under both statutes."). See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517
F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975) (test for disqualification of judge is same for motions made
pursuant to §§ 144-145).
743. United States v. Cassasa, 588 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1978) ("A trial judge is allowed
great discretion in determining whether to admit evidence as relevant. . . and he may ex-
clude evidence that is 'too flimsy'.").
The trial court has discretion in deciding whether to admit sound recordings into evi-
dence. See United States v. King, 586 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1978) (No. 78-1230; unpublished
opinion) (sound recordings deemed admissible). The Ninth Circuit has articulated a stan-
dard for the admission of sound recordings, holding that "the trial court, in the exercise of its
judicial discretion, must be satisfied that the recording is accurate, authentic, and generally
trustworthy." Id. The King court specifically rejected the addition of requiring a finding of
voluntariness vis-A-vis the making of the statement recorded. Id Cf. United States v. Mc-
Keever, 169 F. Supp. 426,430 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'don other grounds, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.
1959) (proponent must lay proper foundation to admit sound recording, including that the
conversation elicited was made voluntarily). Instead, the Ninth Circuit has held that volun-
tariness goes to the trustworthiness of the recording and its probative value. United States v.
King, 586 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1978) (No. 78-1230; unpublished opinion). See also United
States v. Rinn, 586 F.2d 113, 117-18 (9th Cir. 1978) (tape recordings admissible after judge
determined that "one could pick up and follow what was on them;" judge properly allowed
jury to use prosecution transcripts to aid in understanding the tapes when judge corrected
errors in the transcript and instructed the jury "that it was the tape recordings, not the tran-
script, which were controlling").
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minimizing potentially prejudicial publicity, 745 deciding whether to re-
cess the court or to sequester the jury,746 and dealing with jury miscon-
duct.747 Although the judge is allowed to comment on the evidence
The trial court judge has discretion in admitting polygraph results, United States v. MclIn-
tyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1978) (admissibility of polygraph results for even a lim-
ited purpose is within the judge's wide discretion), United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225,
229 (9th Cir. 1978) (polygraph results admissible only in trial court's discretion), and in the
admission of in-court identifications, United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 690 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978) (admission of in-court identification of defendant in
'bank robbery case was in court's discretion).
744. See, e.g., United States v. Spaulding, 588 F.2d 669, 670 (9th Cir. 1978) (gun that had
probative value admitted into evidence in mail extortion case was an exercise of the court's
discretion); United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1978) (previous conversa-
tions held admissible in trial court's discretion by rule 404(b)); United States v. Espinoza,
578 F.2d 224, 227-28 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 849 (1978) (admission of
prior similar acts by defendant in accordance with rule 404(b) was not error absent a show-
ing of an abuse of discretion); United States v. Walls, 577 F.2d 690, 696-97 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978) (danger of prejudice outweighing probative value of proffered
evidence to show a common plan or scheme by defendant's prior conduct is a decision com-
mitted to the sound discretion of the trial court); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) (determination of general relevancy of evidence
for rule 403 is within trial court's discretion); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350,
1356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978) (whether probative value of evidence of
defendant's prior actions to show knowledge and motive outweighs potential prejudicial
impact is a decision committed to the sound discretion of the trial court); United States v.
Peele, 574 F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir. 1978) (determination of witness' competency lies in court's
discretion); United States v. Young, 573 F.2d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 1978) (rule 404(b) balance
in admitting evidence of defendant's prior acts is generally a matter of the judge's discre-
tion); United States v. Shields, 571 F.2d 1115, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1978) (refusal to exercise
discretion under rule 403 to exclude evidence of witness' prior silence to impeach his testi-
mony held proper when judge's curative instructions minimized possibility of consideration
of defendant's silence); United States v. Kizer, 569 F.2d 504, 506 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 1626 (1978) (court's exercise of discretion in closing off impeachment was not improper);
United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1978) (rule 403 balance and procedure is
within sound discretion of the trial court).
745. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) ("If publicity during the
proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered."); United States
v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (admonishment to jury to avoid news regarding
trial held proper).
746. 588 F.2d at 752.
747. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 580 F.2d 360, 365 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
970 (1978) (when defendant "believed that one or more jurors had missed significant por-
tions of the summation, the onus was on him to ask the court to do something about it ....
[I]n not conducting an examination of the juror sua sponte, the court did not abuse its con-
siderable discretion in this area.") (citations omitted); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757,
765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978) (when juror initiated a conversation with the
bailiff asking if the judge expected a verdict and the bailiff answered that he didn't know, it
was not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion for a new trial as there was no prejudice);
United States v. Avila-Macias, 577 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978) (juror who passed by
outside a bar wherein alleged drug buy took place not precluded from serving on panel)
("The trial judge acted within appropriate limits of his discretion in appraising the
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presented to the jury74 8 and to question the witnesses,749 such com-
ments or questions should not be arbitrary and must comport with the
standards governing a judge's office.750
In 1978, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Adams75' set a standard
for the admissibility of statements made under hypnosis used to refresh
a witness' memory. Addressing a question of first impression, the Ad-
ams court applied the civil trial standard: the condition of hypnosis
bears on credibility rather than admissibility.
752
Great care must be taken, however, to ensure that the statements
were the product of the witness' own recollection and not the result of
suggestions given while under hypnosis. 3 Failure to disclose the state
of hypnosis is highly prejudicial, however, and may result in the grant
of a new trial. 4
probability of prejudice and the nature of any initiative he felt impelled to take in the mat-
ter.").
748. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933), wherein the Court observed:
It is within [the trial court's] province, whenever he thinks it necessary, to assist the jury
in arriving at a just conclusion by explaining and commenting upon the evidence, by
drawing their attention to the parts of it which he thinks important; and he may express
his opinion upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact
are submitted to their determination.
Id. at 469. See also United States v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1978) (comment
to jury indicating that elements of offenses were established held not to be error) (quoting
Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 486 (1933)).
749. United States v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1978) ("A trial judge may par-
ticipate in the examination of witnesses for the purpose of 'clarifying the evidence, control-
ling the orderly presentation of evidence, confining counsel to evidentary rulings, and
preventing undue repetition of testimony.' . . . Unless his intervention prejudiced the ac-
cused, [there is no error].") (quoting United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 427 (9th Cir.
1973)); United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1978) judge may properly question
a witness to develop facts and clarify questions as long as it is done in a non-prejudicial
manner and the court does not become "personally over-involved").
750. United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1978). See, e.g., United States v.
Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978) (any possible
prejudice resulting from judge's comment neutralized by curative instruction). Cf United
States v. Cassasa, 588 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1978) (counsels' absence during judge-jury
communication on a routine matter held as harmless error as no prejudice could have re-
sulted).
751. 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978) (memory of witness in
criminal trial may properly be refreshed with statements made while under hypnosis).
752. Id See also Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam) (witness whose memory was refreshed by statements made while under hypnosis
was not incompetent to testify in automobile accident case).
753. 581 F.2d at 199.
754. Id See also United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969) (failure to
disclose hypnosis of witness in criminal action requires a new trial) ("The test . . . is not
how the newly discovered evidence concerning the hypnosis would affect the trial judge. ..
but whether. . . there was a significant chance that this added item. . . could have induced
a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction.").
1979] CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY " 1978
The most effective tool the judge has for controlling the jury is his
power7 55 to instruct the jury as to the applicable law of the case prior to
its deliberations. The jury must be instructed fairly as to the theories of
the case, although not necessarily in the precise language requested by
counsel. 7 5 6 The wide scope of discretion allowed the trial judge in this
area is demonstrated by the standards employed on appellate review.
Although an instruction may be given or omitted erroneously, it will
not be held to be error if it is later withdrawn,757 a curative instruction
given,751 or if the jury is not misled by it.7 59 Instructions are reviewed
as a whole, 760 in the context of the entire trial.7 61 The jury is presumed
755. See United States v. Johnson, No. 77-3808, slip op. at 4122 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1978)
("The duty to instruct the jury extends to the accurate definition of words and phrases hav-
ing technical meanings."). See United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 563 (9th Cir. 1978)
(jury instructions must accurately state the applicable law); United States v. James, 576 F.2d
223, 226 (9th Cir. 1978) (although criminal defendant is allowed to have jury instructed on
his theory of the case, judge is given substantial latitude to tailor the instructions to cover
fairly and adequately the issues presented).
756. United States v. Lone Bear, 579 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1978) (jury instructions that
contain "only insignificant wording changes" from those proposed by defendant are not an
abuse of discretion) (citing United States v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 226 (9th Cir. 1978)); United
States v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 226 (9th Cir. 1978) (neither party may insist upon any particu-
lar language in the jury instructions); United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 504 (1978)
("Lyman was not entitled to an instruction that unduly restricted the possible factual bases
of criminal liability."). Cf United States v. Seymour, 576 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1978) (judge can refuse to give defendant's requested instructions if
the jury charge in its entirety adequately covers the theory of defense offered at trial).
757. United States v. Collom, No. 77-1040, slip op. at 1870 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978) (with-
drawal of instructions improperly before jury held proper if no doubt is left in the jury's
mind as to what the court declares the law to be).
758. United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 548 (9th Cir. 1978) (judge must provide jury
with corrected instructions if the first instructions did not adequately cover all elements
charged in the indictment); United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978) (supplemental instructions must eliminate jury confusion). See
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 536 (1947) (amplification of the jury charge is in the
judge's discretion once an accurate and correct charge is given).
759. United States v. Boettjer, 569 F.2d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976
(1978) (" 'Imprecision of statement and inexactness of language in the jury instructions is
not reversible error, unless the jury is misled'.") (quoting Pittman v. United States, 368 F.2d
560, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curiam), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 995 (1967)).
760. Stoker v. United States, 587 F.2d 438, 440 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (on review
jury instructions must be considered as a whole); United States v. Allen, 579 F.2d 531, 533
(9th Cir. 1978) (jury instructions must be examined as a whole); United States v. Walls, 577
F.2d 690, 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978) (consider jury instructions together
to determine whether omission of one instruction was an abuse of discretion); United States
v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 549 (9th Cir. 1978) (there is no error when "the instructions as a
whole communicate the proper notion of [the crime charged] in understandable terms");
United States v. Seymour, 576 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1978)
("[T]he adequacy of the jury instructions is not to be determined by the giving, or failure to
give, any one or more instruction, but by examining the instructions as a whole."); United
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to have followed the judge's instructions.76 z The court's exercise of dis-
cretion in this area will be disturbed only if it is found that the instruc-
tions prejudiced, misled, or coerced the jury,763 or if they constitute
plain error. 6
To obtain a fair trial for all parties, the trial judge has discretion to
control the actions of all trial participants. Limiting instructions7 65 and
admonishments 766 to the jury, and control of cross-examination, 767 ar-
States v. Crawford, 576 F.2d 794, 799 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 851
(1978) ("[Tlhe question presented here is whether the erroneous impression given by a fair
reading of the instruction is cured elsewhere, considering the jury charge as a whole.");
United States v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 227 (9th Cir. 1978) (the adequacy of the entire charge
must be reviewed in the context of the entire trial); United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993,
996 (9th Cir. 1978) (court's instructions are considered as a whole in determining whether
jury was correctly and clearly charged).
761. See also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674 (1975) ("'[A] single instruction to
the jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the
overall charge'.") (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973)).
762. United States v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 752 (9th Cir. 1978) (faithful performance by
the jurors of their duty must be presumed); United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th
Cir. 1978) (jury assumed to have followed the court's instructions); United States v. Strand,
574 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1978) ("We must presume that the jury followed the court's
instruction.").
763. United States v. Cassasa, 588 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1978) (suggestion by caretaking
judge on Friday afternoon that the deadlocked jury recess until Monday held not coercive);
Stoker v. United States, 587 F.2d 438,440 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (standard on review is
whether the instructions to the jury were misleading); United States v. Kostoff, 585 F.2d 378,
380 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (prejudicial error regarding jury instructions merits rever-
sal); United States v. Jones, 569 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2243 (1978)
(instructions on willfullness held not in error as they accurately explained the applicable
legal standard to the jury).
764. United States v. Kostoff, 585 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1978) (plain error in jury in-
structions merits reversal). See also United States v. King, 586 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1978) (No.
78-1230; unpublished opinion) (failure to instruct the jury on every element of the charged
offense is harmless error only if that element upon which the jury was not instructed is
undisputed).
765. United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896
(1978) (jury carefully instructed not to consider judge's statement to panel of prospective
jurors); United States v. Segovia, 576 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1978) (instruction on the lim-
ited purpose for which evidence could be used should have been given, absence thereof not
held to be reversible error in context of this case); United States v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 229
(9th Cir. 1978) (judge's instructions properly limit the effect of his own comments on evi-
dence); United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1978) (cautionary instruction
immediately following introduction of evidence limiting the purpose for which that evidence
could be admitted minimized any prejudice).
766. See, e.g., United States v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 752 (9th Cir. 1978) (admonishment
given to jury to avoid publicity pertaining to the trial).
767. United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199-200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978) (curtailment of cross-examination is within the judge's discretion); United States v.
Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 766 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978) (judge in
securities fraud case can control extent and scope of cross-examination to preclude repetitive
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guments to the jury,768 and the admissibility of evidence 769 are some of
the principal devices employed by the judge. The court has further
discretion to grant or deny continuances,770 control the court's calen-
dar,77 1 reveal the identity of an informant, 772 and exclude witnesses
from the courtroom. 773 The contempt power774 and the power to ex-
questioning and time-wasting exploration of collateral matters; judge will not be reversed
for curbing cross-examination unless by so doing he denies defendant's constitutional right
to confrontation). See also United States v. Lara-Hernandez, 588 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (sixth amendment does not give defendant a right to unlimited cross-
examination). But f United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1977)
(limit on cross-examination was too severe and amounted to a denial of defendant's sixth
amendment right of confrontation).
768. See United States v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1978) (judge's limitations on
counsel held as error only if it appears "that the conduct measured by the facts of the case
presented together with the results of the trial was clearly prejudicial"); United States v.
Sturgis, 578 F.2d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978) ("Not only should a
judge interfere with an attorney's closing argument when it is 'legally wrong,' but he should
also limit, for example, attorneys' remarks outside the record or unduly inflammatory.");
United States v. Kim, 577 F.2d 473, 484 (9th Cir. 1978) (when prosecutor read entire indict-
ment to jury, and judge properly instructed the jury that indictment was not evidence, there
was no error); United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (closing argument
beyond the evidence properly curtailed by the judge); United States v. Carreon, 572 F.2d
683, 686 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (judge who continually interrupted defense counsel's
arguments sua sponte and who sustained his own objections to defense counsel's questions,
deprived defendant of a fair trial).
769. See note 743 supra.
770. See United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1978) (trial court has broad
discretion in granting or denying continuances); United States v. Charnay, 577 F.2d 81, 83
(9th Cir. 1978) ("The decision whether to continue a trial to enable a party to procure an
absent witness rests in the sound discretion of the trial court . . . ."); United States v.
Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1978) (decision to grant or deny continuance to allow
defendant to obtain witness is within trial court's discretion); United States v. Hernandez-
Berceda, 572 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 1978) (trial court's discretion to grant or deny continu-
ance is not without limits); United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir.
1978) (trial court's grant or denial of continuance reversible only for abuse of discretion).
771. United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The court has control
of its own calendar .... "); United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978) (in response to exigencies created by court calen-
dar, judge may allow less than the 10-day maximum for defendant to file objections to mag-
istrate's recommendations).
772. United States v. Hernandez-Berceda, 572 F.2d 680, 682-83 (9th Cir. 1978) (revelation
of informant's identity is within trial court's discretion; court must carefully balance defend-
ant's interest in preparing defense against safety of informant).
773. United States v. Robbins, 579 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1978) (not a breach of
judge's discretion when witness present despite exclusion order allowed to testify); United
States v. Avila-Macias, 577 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1978) (judge has power to exclude
witnesses from courtroom) ("[A]ppropriate sanction for violation of witness exclusionary
rule is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court."). Cf United States
v. Torbert, 496 F.2d 154, 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 857 (1974) ("[I]t is ordinarily
an abuse of discretion to disqualify a witness unless the defendant or his counsel have some-
how cooperated in the violation of the order.").
774. See notes 779-84 infra and accompanying text.
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clude the defendant from the courtroom 775 are more extreme sanctions
available to the trial judge.
c. Limitations on discretion
The discretion of the trial court, however, is not without limitations.
The judge must specifically find waivers of constitutional rights prior to
trial,776 must ensure the defendant's right to counsel in deportation pro-
ceedings,777 and must honor state findings of historical fact in habeas
778corpus actions.
775. United States v. Kizer, 569 F.2d 504, 506-07 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1626
(1978) (judge properly acted within his discretion in ordering defendant, who continued to
argue with judge in front ofjury after being warned, removed from courtroom). See Illinois
v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (defendant can lose right to be present at trial by continu-
ing disruptive behavior) ("We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious,
stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances
of each case.").
776. United States v. Aponte, 591 F.2d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 1978) (court's allowing de-
fendant to represent self without a specific finding of waiver by defendant of right to counsel
before trial held to be error) ("Although a trial judge's failure to make a specific waiver
inquiry is not per se reversible error. . . [i]t will be only the rare case. . . in which an
adequate waiver will be found on the record in the absence of a specific inquiry by the trial
judge."). See United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978) (defendant in tax protest case cannot proceed in pro per unless
the court finds through interrogation of defendant that he "understands the charges and the
manner in which an attorney can be of assistance. The defendant must be aware that he or
she will be on his or her own in a complex area where experience and professional training
are greatly to be desired.").
777. Castro-Nuno v. INS, 577 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1978) (absent waiver of statutory
right to counsel in deportation hearing, judge sua sponte should have continued the hearing
until defendant was properly represented); United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 222
(9th Cir. 1978) (immigration judge must inform defendant of apparent grounds for relief
from deportation; this duty satisfied when judge told defendant that defendant could retain
counsel and present any evidence he wished against deportation). See also Cuevas-Ortega
v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1978) (once an alien has been adjudicated deportable,
voluntary departure is wholly within immigration judge's discretion).
778. See Taylor v. Cardwell, 579 F.2d 1380, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1978) (the district court
must accept state court findings of fact if made after a full and fair hearing and if they have
substantial support in the record). Cf. Chard v. United States, 578 F.2d 1317, 1318 (9th Cir.
1978) (district court's refusal to conduct full evidentiary hearing on whether defendant had
been properly informed of appeal rights not error when same issue had been raised previ-
ously and rejected as frivolous); Myers v. Rhay, 577 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978) (if state court has provided a constitutionally adequate
hearing, it is within trial court's discretion to hold evidentiary hearing on voluntariness of
defendant's waiver); Stone v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 1978) (state court find-
ings of fact are presumably correct but may be disturbed upon showing material facts not
adequately developed or factual determinations not fairly supported by the record); Pierce v.
Cardwell, 572 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1978) (district court must grant an evidentiary hear-
ing if the facts were not resolved at the state court level). See also Townsend v. Sain, 372
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In Hawk v. Cardoza77 9 the Ninth Circuit significantly limited the
criminal contempt power780 of the trial court judge. Adopting the Sev-
enth Circuit's position,7 81 the Ninth Circuit now requires that "some
sort of actual damaging effect on judicial order [be found] before one
may be held in criminal contempt. '782 The Hawk court concluded that
a reading of the fourteenth amendment in conjunction with the first
amendment allows a finding of contempt of court only if the offensive
conduct was intentionally contemptuous. The favored procedure in
these cases is not to mete out a summary sentence of criminal con-
tempt,78 3 but to give the contemner reasonable notice of the specific
charges against him and to give him a chance to be heard in his own
behalf.
7 8 4
d Discretion in post-trialproceedings
The trial judge's discretionary powers in most post-trial proceedings
mirror those he had during the trial.78 5 One area of this discretion in-
volves the declaration of mistrials. If, in the court's discretion, "there is
U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963) ("By 'issues of fact' we mean to refer to what are termed basic,
primary, or historical facts: facts 'in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibil-
ity of their narrators . . .'.") (citation omitted).
779. 575 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("[We infer that fourteenth amend-
ment due process, incorporating the first amendment, does demand some showing of intent
for conviction of criminal contempt.").
780. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1971) (criminal contempt
is the appropriate remedy for conduct not befitting an American courtroom).
781. Id See In Re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972).
782. 575 F.2d at 735.
783. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-66 (1971). If the contemner is the de-
fense counsel, the court must strike a balance among the competing constitutional interests.
575 F.2d at 735 (rights guaranteed by the first, sixth, and fourteenth amendments must be
balanced if the contemner is the defendant's attorney).
784. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (elementary due process must be ac-
corded the contemner although the full scale of trial rights would be inappropriate).
It is also the favored procedure to have the contempt proceedings before a judge different
from the one involved in the controversy. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
See also Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-02 (1974) (a different judge should try the
contempt proceeding if the original judge has become embroiled in a running controversy).
785. When sentencing the defendant, for example, the judge retains broad discretion. See
United States v. Lincoln, 581 F.2d 200, 201-02 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Sentencing is within the
discretion of the trial judge. . . where, as here, the sentence falls within the bounds pre-
scribed by statute, it is not reviewable [and] will not be reviewed absent some extraordinary
circumstance."). See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969) (sentencing
judge may consider evidence from the defendant's prior record, pre-sentencing report, as
well as from other sources); Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1344 & n.2 (9th Cir.
1978) (en banc) (trial judge has wide discretion in sentencing); In Re Garmon, 572 F.2d
1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978) (prisoner, already serving a criminal sentence, and later sentenced
for civil contempt, has former sentence tolled during period of civil contempt confinement).
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either (1) a 'manifest necessity' for the discharge of the original pro-
ceedings, or (2) 'the ends of public justice' would be defeated," the
judge may properly declare a mistrial.786
Judicial discretion in a motion to vacate a sentence under 28 U.S.C.
section 2255181 in which a defendant claims a Tucker violation788 has
been delineated clearly by the Ninth Circuit in Farrow v. United
States.7 89 The Ninth Circuit now holds that the original sentencing
judge should hear the motion790 and determine whether the sentence he
gave the defendant would have been different had the judge known of
the invalidity of the prior conviction. If this question is answered af-
firmatively, the judge must then hold an evidentiary hearing to deter-
786. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1386 (9th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted) (decla-
ration of mistrial held not an abuse of discretion because jurors could not reach a verdict).
See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1948) ("[A] trial can be discontinued when particu-
lar circumstances manifest a necessity for so doing, and when failing to discontinue would
defeat the ends of justice."); United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 298 (9th Cir. 1978)
(determination of manifest necessity is left to the sound discretion of the trial court).
The "particular circumstances" needed to declare a mistrial have been described as "un-
foreseeable circumstances that arise during a trial making its completion impossible." 336
U.S. at 689. An example of these unforeseeable circumstances is "the failure of the jury to
agree on a verdict." Id See also Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d at 1386 (manifest necessity
sufficient to permit the declaration of a mistrial occurs when the jury cannot reach a verdict).
The pivotal issue in this area is often whether the jury is deadlocked. The Arnold court
isolated several factors to be considered by the judge in making this determination:
(I) A timely objection by defendant, (2) the jury's collective opinion that it cannot
agree, (3) the length of the deliberations of the jury, (4) the length of the trial, (5) the
complexity of the issues presented to the jury, (6) any proper communications which the
judge has had with the jury and (7) the effects of possible exhaustion and the impact
which coercion of further deliberations might have on the verdict.
566 F. 2d at 1387. See also United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1974), cerl.
denied., 420 U.S. 992 (1975) (most critical factor in determining whether the jury is hope-
lessly deadlocked is its statement to that effect; once receiving such a statement, the judge
must independently determine whether further deliberations would overcome the deadlock
by questioning the jurors).
787. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) states in pertinent part:
A prisoner in custody.. . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States...
may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sen-
tence. . . .Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall.., grant a prompt hearing
788. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (sentence not imposed in the
informed discretion of the trial court may be reviewed). The Court in Tucker held that a
sentence based on specific considerations of prior convictions obtained in violation of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), is improper. 404 U.S. at 447-48.
789. 580 F.2d 1339, 1348 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e now carefully outline the procedure for
district courts to follow in § 2255 motions claiming Tucker violations . .
790. Id. at 1348-51.
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mine the actual validity of the prior conviction.7 9 1
2. Conduct of the prosecutor
a. Pre-trialproceedings
The United States Attorney in every case must make an initial deter-
mination whether to prosecute. A government attorney has a duty792 in
every trial to see that justice is done and, to this end, may exercise a
broad range of discretionary powers.7 93 A decision to prosecute will
not be found to be an abuse of discretion unless others similarly situ-
ated generally have not been prosecuted for similar conduct and the
791. Id. at 1353. If the judge finds, however, that at the time of the sentencing he mistak-
enly believed the prior conviction to be valid and increased the petitioner's sentence because
of it, an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine the validity of the prior conviction.
Id. at 1354.
At this evidentiary hearing, three issues must be examined: (I) petitioner's indigency at
the time of the prior trial; (2) petitioner's lack of representation at the prior trial; and (3)
absence of an effective waiver of petitioner's right to counsel. Id. at 1353-54. These issues
are determined based on the preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1355.
792. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), contains the seminal statement on the
duty of a United States Attorney:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
versy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . . He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.
Id. at 88. See United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's failure
to reveal the whereabouts of witness to defense "smack[ed] too much of a trial by ambush"
and was a violation of prosecutor's duty) (quoting United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26, 29 (2d
Cir. 1969)). See also Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor enjoys
immunity from civil rights action resulting from alleged misconduct at trial).
Although defense counsel is not under the same high duty as the prosecutor, he must still
meet a minimum standard of conduct.
Defense counsel, of course, must represent clients with zeal, but an attorney impedes
the administration of justice when he seeks to harass the judiciary by repeatedly press-
ing an obviously meritless argument solely for the purpose of trying to embarrass the
trial court or to display his personal pique at one of its rulings.
United States v. Edwards, 587 F.2d 29, 31 (9th Cir. 1978) (application for defense counsel's
investigator's fee denied).
793. See, e.g., United States v. Clinton, 574 F.2d 464, 465 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978) (action for failure to file tax return may be filed either at defend-
ant's place of residence or at the collection point where return should have been filed);
Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978) (if govern-
ment in good faith determines that extradition is warranted, prosecutor may pursue multiple
extradition requests irrespective of earlier lack of success at same); United States v. McCoy,
No. 78-1015, slip op. at 3906 (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 1978) (government was not under affirmative
obligation to prevent destruction of evidence in possession of third party).
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prosecutorial decision was based on an impermissible ground,"' or if
such prosecution was a vindictive act toward the defendant.795
All federal criminal prosecutions must proceed by way of a grand
jury indictment.796 When presenting evidence to the grand jury, the
prosecutor need not present all evidence favorable to the defendant,797
nor need he advise the grand jury of all matters bearing on the credibil-
ity of potential witnesses. 798 Although the prosecutor may present evi-
dence inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 799 deceptive
794. United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 436 U.S. 919
(1978), sets out the prima facie case for selective prosecution: "defendant must show: (1)
that others are generally not prosecuted for the same conduct; and (2) that the decision to
prosecute this defendant was based on such impermissible grounds as race, religion, or the
exercise of constitutional rights." Id Accord, United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d 545, 550
(9th Cir. 1978) (no evidence introduced to show improper criteria as basis for prosecution
for re-entering military reservation without permission); United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d
253, 255 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978) (defendant did not show that the treat-
ment accorded him differed from those similarly situated or that the prosecution was based
on an "invidious" criterion; perjury prosecutions do not unfairly single out those who take
the witness stand in their own defense). See also United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976) (adopting Second Circuit prima facie case
for selective prosecution) (citing United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir.
1974)).
795. See United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253, 255 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868
(1978) (defendant has the burden of proof to show vindictiveness in the sense of bad faith or
maliciousness, and a bare allegation is insufficient to do so). See also Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 26, 28 (1974) (prosecution of a more serious charge after defendant's successful
attack on his previous conviction held improper if determined to be vindictive). Cf United
States v. Thurnhuber, 572 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1977) (addition of two counts prior to
second trial after court's sua sponte declaration of mistrial held not vindictive) ("Without
that close temporal--or otherwise apparent-link between the exercise of the right and the
'penalty,' there can be no 'realistic likelihood of "vindictiveness".' ") (citations omitted);
United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1978) (manifest appearance of vindic-
tiveness, as well as vindictiveness in fact, is sufficient to invoke the Blackledge rule).
796. U.S. CONsT. amend. V states in pertinent part: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentation or indictment of a
Grand Jury. .. ."
797. See United States v. Romero, 585 F.2d 391, 399 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Contrary to the
obligation imposed upon the prosecution at trial, the Government is not required to present
all evidence that might be exculpatory to a grand jury."); United States v. Thompson, 576
F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978) (affidavit relating to a potential witness' credibility need not be
presented to the grand jury by the prosecutor) ("Dismissal of an indictment is required only
in flagrant cases in which the grand jury has been overreached or deceived in some signifi-
cant way, as where perjured testimony has knowingly been presented .... .
798. United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978).
799. See, e.g., United States v. Romero, 585 F.2d 391, 399 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[I]t is well
established that a grand jury may return an indictment based solely upon hearsay evi-
dence."). See generally Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) ("An indictment
returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the
prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The
Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.").
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evidence, such as perjured testimony, °00 may not be presented to the
grand jury.
In 1978, both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit closely ex-
amined plea bargain agreements. Following the Court's decision in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,"0 ' the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. All-
sup, °2 approved the practice whereby the prosecutor initially does not
file all possible charges against the accused but does so later if the de-
fendant does not accept the plea bargain agreement. Although the
Ninth Circuit found this practice not violative of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, as the defendant is free to accept or to
reject the prosecution's offer,803 due process does require that a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea be granted if the plea was not knowingly and
intelligently entered into or if the state failed to keep its part of the
bargain.80 4
800. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 944 (1978) ("[O]nly in a flagrant case, and perhaps only where knowing perjury, relat-
ing to a material matter, has been presented to the grand jury should the trial judge dismiss
an otherwise valid indictment. . .."). See also United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784,
786 (9th Cir. 1978) (dicta) ("Dismissal of an indictment is required ...where perjured
testimony has knowingly been presented.").
801. 434 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1978) (additional charge of being repeat offender properly
used as bargaining tool by prosecutor).
802. 573 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1978). See United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300,
1305-06 (9th Cir. 1974) (since during the plea bargaining process "a prosecutor may properly
indicate the risks in not pleading guilty, whether of a larger sentence or of a larger exposure
...we see no reason why the state should necessarily be precluded in all respects from
actualizing these risks when the plea is withdrawn.").
803. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) ("[T]he course of conduct engaged
in by the prosecutor.. . which no more than openly presented the defendant with the un-
pleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to
prosecution, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
804. Stone v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 1978). See Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) ("The [guilty] plea must. . . be voluntary and knowing and if it
was induced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be made known
... .When a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecu-
tor. . . such promise must be fulfilled.").
Promises made by individual government attorneys are binding on all attorneys within
the prosecutor's office. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (failure of
prosecuting assistant U.S. Attorney to disclose that prosecutor's key witness was offered a
plea bargain by another assistant U.S. Attorney violated defendant's due process rights).
The Court observed:
The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government.
A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Govern-
ment. . . .To the extent this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, proce-
dures and regulations can be established to carry that burden and to insure
communication of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with
it.
Id.; Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) ("The staff lawyers in a prosecutor's
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As part of their obligation to ensure justice, United States Attorneys
are under varying duties to reveal information to the defense. 805 In
United States v. Agurs °6 the Supreme Court distinguished cases in
which the prosecutor's obligation is to provide defense counsel with
specifically requested exculpatory information from cases in which
only a general request is made. In the former circumstance the test of
materiality is whether the requested information might affect the out-
come of the trial;8"7 in the latter, the requested evidence must "create
• . . a reasonable doubt [as to guilt] that would not otherwise exist." 808
In United States v. Goldberg,8 °9 the Ninth Circuit applied the harmless
error standard to a case in which information was specifically re-
quested.8 10 Reasoning that the notes at issue related to witness credi-
bility, rather than to the substantive issue of guilt or innocence, the
Goldberg court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that
use of the notes at trial would have had a material effect on the verdict.
The Government's failure to produce the notes, therefore, was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.8'I
The use of false testimony may also require a new trial.812 The
office have the burden of 'letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing' or has
done. That the breach of the agreement was inadvertent does not lessen its impact.").
805. See United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (prosecu-
tor's nondisclosure of the "true nature of dealings" with its witness required a new trial; the
government must disclose pertinent material evidence favorable to the defense, whether it
relates to matters of substance or credibility). See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
107-08 (1976) (prosecutor not volunteering exculpatory evidence was not denial of due proc-
ess; prosecutor has constitutional duty to volunteer exculpatory information to the defense if
not doing so would result in denial of defendant's right to fair trial); Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963) (suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to accused upon
request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of good or bad faith of prosecution).
806. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
807. Id. at 104.
808. Id. at 112.
809. 582 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1978).
810. Id. at 488-90. The Goldberg court analogized the standard of review for the denial
of a request for specific exculpatory materials to the standard of harmless error: "whether
the requested evidence might affect the outcome of the trial." This standard appears to be
synonomous with "a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict." Id. (quoting
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
Reasoning that the general request standard of Agurs is too difficult to apply, the Ninth
Circuit will avoid its application whenever possible. While in Goldberg it was doubtful that
the defendant's request for "any statements" and "any documents" described "specific evi-
dence" as contemplated by the Court in Agurs, the Ninth Circuit accepted arguendo defend-
ant's claim that the requests were sufficiently specific. 582 F.2d at 488-90.
811. Id. at 490.
812. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) ("[A] conviction obtained by the
knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair and must be set aside if there is
19791 CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY-" 1978
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Butler 13 defined its standards for
evaluating intentional and negligent nondisclosure by the prosecution
of the use of false testimony. Finding the standards developed by the
Supreme Court in Giglio v. United States814 too restrictive, 81 5 the Ninth
Circuit formulated a test for negligent nondisclosure that requires a
new trial whenever the nondisclosure "might reasonably have affected
the jury's judgment on some material point without necessarily requir-
ing a supplemental finding that it also would have changed its ver-
dict. ' 81 6 Since a finding of negligent nondisclosure is more probable
than a finding of intentional nondisclosure," 7 the prudent prosecutor
should err on the side of a more complete disclosure.
b. During the trial
The prosecutor may comment on the evidence in both his opening
8 18
statement and closing819 argument as well as dismiss counts of the in-
any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury."); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (if prosecutor allows into evidence infor-
mation he knows is false, defendant's right to fair trial has been violated). But see United
States v. Phillips, 575 F.2d 1265, 1267 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's nondisclosure of false
testimony by prosecution witness not misconduct as defendant fully exposed the falsity on
cross-examination); United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978)
(in trial for possession with intent to distribute, absence of evidence that testimony in ques-
tion was false prevented finding of prosecutorial misconduct).
813. 567 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (prosecution's concealing the "true
extent of dealings" with its own witness held to be misconduct).
814. 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) ("A new trial is required if 'the false testimony could. . . in
any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury'. ") (quoting Napue v. Illi-
nois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)).
815. 567 F.2d at 890 ("The thrust of Brady and Giglio, as well as of the proposed amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. . . seems to be in the direction of re-
quiring more complete disclosure of evidence essential for, or at least useful to, full
presentation of the defense.").
816. The Butler court observed that "Gigilo's 'effect on the judgment of the jury' language
seems to focus on the quality of the evidence rather than on the outcome of the case." Id.
817. Id. at 891. Butler, however, does not change the standard for review of admitted or
"virtually non-controverted" nondisclosures by the prosecutor. These result in the per se
granting of a motion for a new trial. Id.
818. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's
reference to inadmissible hearsay in opening statement in homicide prosecution did not re-
quire granting of mistrial motion as statement did not have material effect on jury). But see
id. at 687-88 (inadmissible hearsay in opening statement is damaging error which, when
coupled with individually harmless errors, warrants mistrial) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). See
generally United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 936 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935
(1978) ("[I]mproprieties in counsels' arguments to the jury do not require a new trial unless
they are so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant and the prejudice has not been
neutralized by the trial judge.").
819. See, e.g., United States v. Mikka, 586 F.2d 152, 155-56 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's
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dictment following the presentation of all the evidence.820 He may not,
however, limit the defendant's access to witnesses by his remarks to
those witnesses.
821
A closely scrutinized area of prosecutorial conduct embraces com-
ments on the defendant's assertion of his constitutional rights. In
United Stales v. Lopez,8"' for example, such a comment823 was allowed
assertions of personal beliefs in closing argument were "not so gross as probably to prejudice
the defendant" even though the prosecutor exceeded the bounds of propriety and ignored
the judge's warnings); United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 936 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 935 (1978) (prosecutor's expression of obvious opinion on witness' credibility held not
error when disclaimed as not evidence); United States v. Sturgis, 578 F.2d 1296, 1299-1300
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978) (prosecutor's remark in closing argument that
"birds of a feather flock together" strongly condemned, but held harmless in light of record
replete with evidence of defendant's involvement in the alleged crime); United States v.
Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1978) (under unusual circumstances of case, reference
to post-Miranda silence in closing statement constituted harmless error not warranting re-
versal); United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's comment
"[b]ut the point is, ladies and gentlemen, that he. . . unlike the defendants Baker and Sigal
came forward before the trial and admitted his guilt" held to be part of the prosecutor's
effort to bolster the credibility of a key witness and in context was "not of such character that
the jury would naturally and necessarily take them to be comments on the failure of the
accused to testify.") (citing United States v. Comfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1970));
United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1978) (although prosecutor's remark
was conceded to have been improper, as it was more probable than not that the remark did
not materially alter the verdict, it was not held as error).
820. See, eg., United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1978) (dismissing
two counts of four-count indictment at end of closing arguments held not to violate prosecu-
tor's duty of candor).
821. See, e.g., United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 934 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
935 (1978) (FBI agent's advice to witnesses that they need not confer with defense counsel
held not to have improperly influenced the witnesses since they were told they had opportu-
nity to so confer) ("[W]e recognize that the abuses can easily result when officials elect to
inform potential witnesses of their right not to speak with defense counsel . . . . [Ilt is
imperative that prosecutors and other officials maintain a posture of strict neutrality when
advising witnesses of their duties and rights.").
822. 575 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1978).
823. The prosecutor's comment was:
The remark made by the defendant, apparently to his mother when she said why did
-you do it and he said: I didn't mean to, he started it, or something along those lines. If
anything, perhaps this shows this was the beginning of some remorse. He killed his
brother by pointing the gun at him when all the brother had done was start to walk at
him. And then the gravity of this begins to sink in, although he didn't seem to be too
remorseful the next day when Agent Freking was driving here to Tucson when he was
laughing at jokes or whatever. So in any event, this is a likely or possible explanation
for this. And in view of the fact he never told any of the other agents that it was an
accident or that William was the cause of this, I submit to you it is pretty suspicious or it
is unlikely this is the real explanation here. If it really was an accident, why didn't he
protest his innocence, why didn't he protest and say: Wait a minute, this was an acci-
dent. Why didn't he stay home and say I had no reason to turn myself in. Those were
his words to Ken Freking. He realized he had to go turn himself in. Would he have felt
the same way if it was just an accident? I say no.
.d. at 684.
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as long as it was not "extensive, where an inference of guilt from si-
lence is stressed to the jury as a basis of conviction, and where there is
evidence that could have supported the acquittal." '24 Indirect remarks
also are carefully examined, but are permissible as long as the jury
would not naturally and necessarily construe the comment as one re-
flecting on defendant's failure to testify.
825
c. Relieffor abuse of discretion
Improper prosecutorial remarks usually can be remedied by a cura-
tive instruction given by the court.826 Absent timely objection at trial,
however, the Ninth Circuit normally will not consider the conduct un-
less it constitutes plain error.8 27 Comments adverse to the constitution-
ally protected rights of the accused are not necessarily plain error; even
if found to be plain error, however, such conduct may be harmless er-
ror not warranting reversal. 28
3. Conduct of the jury
The unique value of the jury "lies in the interposition between the
accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of
824. Id. at 685.
825. See, e.g., United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's
inadvertent and unintended comment on post-Miranda silence was plain error on face, but
held to be harmless).
826. See United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 936 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935
(1978) ("[I]mproprieties in counsel's arguments to the jury do not require a new trial unless
they are so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant, and the prejudice has not been
neutralized by the trial judge.") (citing United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1222 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977)).
827. See, e.g., United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 936 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
935 (1978) (plain error is the standard of review as defendant did not make a timely objec-
tion to prosecutor's remark); United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1978) (no
objection made to comment and no curative instruction requested; therefore, first inquiry on
appeal is whether conduct in question amounts to plain error).
The Ninth Circuit has held that an objection or motion for mistrial during closing argu-
ments need not be made until after the completion of the argument. United States v.
Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1978) (motion for mistrial at end of prosecutor's closing
argument held timely). A contrary rule prevails or is favored in the First, Second, Fourth
and Fifth Circuits. See id. at n.2 and cases cited therein.
828. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1978). The Lopez court
made this distinction:
It is crucial to keep in mind, however, that the standard of "plain error" only goes to the
issue of reviewability and not to the issue of whether a reversal is warranted. . . .Thus,
an error unobjected to at trial may be so plain as to be reviewable under Rule 52(b), yet
the error may be harmless and therefore not justify a reversal.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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laymen."8 29 This is jeopardized whenever an individual juror is ex-
posed to information about the trial from sources outside of the court-
room.83° Such information would compromise the jury's exclusive
function: to weigh the credibility of witnesses, to resolve evidentiary
conflicts and to draw reasonable inferences from proven facts. 3' Pro-
tection of the jury's "free and unfettered" discretion in these areas is
left to the trial court.
8 32
Once the jury has returned a verdict, it may not thereafter impeach
829. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (jury of less than 12 held constitutional).
See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (petit jury must be selected from
representative cross section of community). The Taylor court characterized the value and
the purpose of a jury as being "to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make
available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous
or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or
biased response of a judge." Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968)
(sixth amendment right to trial by jury applied to states via the fourteenth amendment)).
830. See, e.g., United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978) (juror-initiated conversation with bailiff held not prejudicial;
judge, therefore, did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial); United States v.
Avila-Macias, 577 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1978) (judge did not abuse discretion by
failing to disqualify juror who passed outside of bar wherein alleged drug buy took place);
United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818
(1978) (juror's statement prior to empaneling about predisposition to convict criminal de-
fendants did not sufficiently establish bias to require her exclusion from panel) ("If only one
juror is unduly biased or prejudiced or improperly influenced, the criminal defendant is
denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial panel.").
831. United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1978) (evidence in manslaugh-
ter trial was sufficient to allow jury finding of specific intent); United States v. Young, 573
F.2d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 1978) (evidence in conspiracy case was sufficient to allow jury
finding of conspiracy even though all evidence was circumstantial).
832. The judge has considerable discretion to deal with jury misconduct. See United
States v. Avila-Macias, 577 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978) ('The trial judge acted within
appropriate limits of his discretion in appraising the probability of prejudice and the nature
of any initiative he felt impelled to take in the matter."); United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d
1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1978). The Hendrix court observed:
An important part of the district judge's broad discretion centers on his response to
allegations ofjuror bias or misconduct. For example, it is within the trial court's discre-
tion to determine whether and when to hold an evidentiary hearing on such allegations.
If the judge orders an investigative hearing, it is within his discretion to determine its
extent and nature.
The judge also has considerable discretion in dealing with jury bias stemming from trial
publicity and from improper arguments by counsel. See United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d
1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978) (judge can protect juror from harassment by media after the trial
is completed if reasonably necessary).
Should bias affect the jury beyond the reach of these above remedies, declaration of a
mistrial may be necessary. See United States v. Love, 535 F.2d 152, 155 (9th Cir.), cer.
denied, 429 U.S. 847 (1976) (mistrial not required because conversation between juror and
defendant was entirely innocent).
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that verdict.833 In United States v. Weiner,834 thirty minutes after a ver-
dict had been returned and the jury polled and discharged, one juror
informed the judge that she had not voted guilty. Rather, she main-
tained, her vote had been guilty "with reservation. 8 35 The Weiner
court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, reasoning that a
legally sufficient verdict8 36 had been returned and, as such, could not be
impeached. Any juror uncertainty or misunderstanding regarding the
verdict must be expressed at the time of the poll, not after the jurors
have been excused and possibly subjected to "out-of-court cultiva-
tion." '837 Furthermore, any such uncertainty must be reflected in the
record.838
D. Evidence
1. Relevancy
All evidence must satisfy the threshold requirement of relevancy
before it can be admitted.8 39 The Ninth Circuit, in 1978, was con-
fronted with such a relevancy issue in a major securities fraud case
involving the now-defunct Equity Funding Corporation. The defend-
833. See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 764 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 981 (1978) (expression of reservation in out-of-court statement about verdict in
securities fraud case held to be insufficient grounds on which to challenge the verdict). The
philosophy behind not allowing a jury to impeach its verdict was set forth in McDonald v.
Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915), where the Court observed:
When the affidavit of a juror, as to the misconduct of himself or the other members of
the jury, is made the basis of a motion for a new trial the court must choose between
redressing the injury of the private litigant and inflicting the public injury which would
result if jurors were permitted to testify as to what had happened in the jury room.
238 U.S. at 267.
834. 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
835. Id. at 764.
836. Cf. Fox v. United States, 417 F.2d 84, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1969) (a legally sufficient ver-
dict was not returned when one juror did not respond when polled on verdict and other
jurors thought that a majority was sufficient to find defendant guilty).
837. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 764 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 981 (1978). The Weiner court clarified the Ninth Circuit's statement in United States v.
Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 746 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1977), that defendant
"would have a valid objection if one or more jury members expressed some uncertainty as to
the verdict." This language, reasoned the Weiner court, referred to expressions of uncer-
tainty occurring at the time of polling, not after. 578 F.2d at 764 n.2.
838. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 746 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045
(1977) (record must reflect the uncertainty about or disagreement with the verdict expressed
by the juror in order to be a basis on which to challenge the verdict) ("Where no dissent or
uncertainty is demonstrated in court, testimony will not be received from juror or others
regarding the verdict itself.").
839. FED. R. EVID. 402 states, in part: "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
See, e.g., United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 962 (9th Cir. 1978) (recorded conversations
held relevant to nature of conspiracy that may have ended at least three months before talks
took place).
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ants in United States v. Weiner84 ° appealed their convictions for securi-
ties fraud stemming from their employment as independent
accountants for Equity Funding. The appellants challenged a jury in-
struction that had allowed the jury to measure the defendants' intent
and good faith according to their compliance with generally accepted
auditing standards (GAAS) and generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (GAAP). 4 ' Ruling for the first time on this issue, the Ninth Cir-
cuit approved the lower court's instruction that evidence regarding
compliance with GAAS and GAAP is relevant to, but not conclusive
of, the issues of knowledge and willfulness.84 In so ruling, the Weiner
court observed that the defendant's "consistent failure to apply GAAS
and GAAP after they knew some kind of major fraud was afoot pro-
vided a basis from which the jury could reasonably infer defendants'
knowing and willful participation in the fraud. '843
Federal Rule of Evidence 402 recognizes that relevant evidence must
be suppressed if obtained in violation of the United States Constitu-
tion.8" Although rule 402 makes no specific mention of evidence ob-
tained in violation of state constitutions, the Ninth Circuit, prior to the
adoption of rule 402, required that procedures used to obtain evidence
comply with both federal and state standards. 4 After the adoption of
rule 402, however, the Ninth Circuit retreated from this position. In
United States v. Grajeda,46 the Ninth Circuit viewed the Federal Rules
of Evidence as a comprehensive and exclusive code governing admissi-
bility standards in federal courts.8 47 Evidence in Grajeda, obtained in
violation of California law, was therefore admissible in federal court
because it did not fall within any exception specified in rule 402.848
840. 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
841. GAAS and GAAP are basic standards established by the accounting profession gov-
erning accounting methods.
842. 578 F.2d at 786.
843. Id. at 785.
844. FED. R. EvID. 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as other-
wise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible." See id., Adv. Comm. Notes.
845. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 528 F.2d 88, 90 (9th Cir. 1978).
846. 570 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1978).
847. Id. at 874.
848. Id. In Graeda, appellant contended that both her arrest and subsequent search of
her car by state police officers violated California law. The court indicated that, even if a
determination of the propriety of the arrest and search was necessary, it would hold that no
violation of California law had occurred. Id. n.2.
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2. Legal relevancy
If relevant evidence is more prejudicial than probative, it can be ex-
cluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.849 In United States v.
Shields,850 the defendant attended a pre-indictment conference with
the Internal Revenue Service at which his accountant did not reveal
any non-taxable sources of funds, even in response to direct questions
from IRS investigators. However, at Shields' trial for income tax eva-
sion, the accountant testified that he personally had observed a large
"cash hoard" in Shields' possession. The prosecutor sought to impeach
the accountant during cross-examination by questioning him about his
failure to mention such a cash hoard at the IRS conference. Shields
himself was not cross-examined about the pre-indictment conference.
The prosecutor, however, referred broadly in closing argument to the
failure of both Shields and his accountant to raise the cash hoard de-
fense at the conference.
8 5 1
Shields argued on appeal that his privilege against self-incrimination
had been violated by the cross-examination of the accountant. The
849. FED. R. EvID. 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
The Ninth Circuit in 1978 did not reverse any district court rulings in the face of a rule
403 objection. See, e.g., United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1978) (evidence of
prior rape allegedly committed by defendant on same night as charged rape admitted);
United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1978) (photographs of decedent's bat-
tered face admissible in murder trial when principal issue was cause of death and photos
were not of such gruesome and horrifying nature as to inflame jury); United States v. Oax-
aca, 569 F.2d 518, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926 (1978) (impeachment evidence of
prior conviction identical to charged offense not per se more prejudicial than probative);
United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1978) (previous statement made by
defendant, accused of raping and murdering a woman, that he would beat a woman who
refused his sexual advances, held admissible).
The Ninth Circuit in 1978 twice evaluated jury comparisons of an accused's clothes. See
United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 689-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978)
(judge carefully limited the number of times jury would see appellant wearing mask for
purposes of comparison with bank photos and recognition ability of witnesses); United
States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 524-25 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926 (1978) (when FBI
agent photographed in appellant's clothes so that jury could compare with black-and-white
bank photos, fact that one item of clothing worn by agent only circumstantially connected
with appellant not grounds for reversal).
850. 571 F.2d 1115 (9th Cir. 1978).
851. The prosecutor stated in closing argument: "The defense which is raised here, and
the one that where the evidence is produced for the first time in court, never occurred
outside of the court before, before we started on the Tuesday a week ago, the government
was never offered these explanations which-." At this point defense counsel made a mo-
tion for mistrial that was denied. Id. at 1118.
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Ninth Circuit refused to discuss this issue because Shields had not been
questioned about his own silence at the conference.8 - 2 Although the
Ninth Circuit recognized that the accountant's testimony on cross-ex-
amination circumstantially suggested that Shields himself had been si-
lent, the court held that rule 403, rather than the fifth amendment, is
the standard for determining the admissibility of such circumstantial
evidence. Because the accountant's testimony was more probative than
prejudicial, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 53
3. Prosecutor's rule
Specific acts are never admissible to prove conduct.8  However,
such evidence is admissible under the so-called "prosecutor's rule" for
other purposes, such as proving motive, intent or knowledge.8 5 In nar-
cotics cases, defendants often insist that evidence of acts involving
drugs different from those involved in the charged offense be declared
inadmissible. It is the type of activity that is important, however, not
852. Id.
853. See id. at 1118-19.
854. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) provides:
Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character
is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of
a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor,
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in rules
607, 608, and 609.
855. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
See United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1978) (rape victim's testimony
that she heard defendant say he was "going over to the other girl" admissible to show oppor-
tunity, plan and intent to rape other girl); United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225, 229 (9th
Cir. 1978) (evidence that defendant asked for drugs several days before beginning of the
drug manufacturing conspiracy charged in indictment admissible to show knowledge);
United States v. Espinoza, 578 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 849 (1978)
(prior incident in which appellant was detained on suspicion of transporting illegal aliens
admissible in trial for such transportation to show knowledge and intent); United States v.
Graham, 575 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir. 1978) (evidence of prior conviction as illegal alien and
use of alias admissible to prove identity); United States v. Young, 573 F.2d 1137, 1140 (9th
Cir. 1978) (testimony regarding prior drug transactions admissible to show knowledge and
intent); United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1978) (prior drug transactions
admissible to show knowledge and intent).
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the identity of the drugs involved.8 56 For example, the Ninth Circuit
has held that evidence of defendant's prior purchase of large quantities
of marijuana is admissible to show a predisposition to sell cocaine.
85 7
Each item of proffered evidence allowed by the prosecutor's rule
must be analyzed individually. In United States v. Powell,858 for exam-
ple, the defendant denied that he was the source of large quantities of
marijuana found in a co-defendant's garage. The Government sought
to introduce evidence that Powell had been convicted of selling small
quantities of marijuana to undercover agents in 1969 and evidence of a
1973 conviction arising from the discovery of huge amounts of mari-
juana in Powell's own garage and basement. The trial judge refused to
admit the 1969 conviction on the grounds that it was too remote and
did not tend to prove intent, common plan or motive. The trial court
did, however, admit the 1973 conviction as probative of motive, ac-
cepting the Government's argument that defendant's past experience,
in having drugs discovered in his own house, motivated him to hide the
marijuana in someone else's house.859
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling that
neither conviction was probative of intent 860 or common plan.861 The
court, however, reversed the trial court's ruling that Powell's 1973 con-
856. United States v. Batts, 573 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 178 (1978).
857. United States v. Segovia, 576 F.2d 251, 252 (9th Cir. 1978). See also United States v.
Uriarte, 575 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 963 (1978) (arrest for possession
of large amounts of heroin admissible at trial for conspiracy to import and possess mari-
juana for distribution).
858. 587 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1978).
859. Id. at 445.
860. The court observed:
The basic criterion is that the evidence of other crimes must be relevant to prove an
issue in the case. The only factual issue in this case was identity of the source of the
marihuana stored in [the co-defendant's] garage. Powell did not purport to controvert
intent, knowledge, or motive of the person who supplied the marihuana. He sought
only to show that the source was not he. When a defendant denies participation in the
act or acts which constitute the crime, intent is not a material issue for the purpose of
applying Rule 404(b).
Id. at 448.
861. The court reasoned:
The Government produced no evidence which tended to connect Powell's prior crimi-
nal conduct with the marihuana in [the co-defendant's] garage. The probative value of
evidence or other crimes where the issue is identity depends upon the extent to which it
raises an inference that the perpetrator of the prior offenses was the perpetrator of the
offense in issue. . . . Thus, if the characteristics of both the prior offense and the
charged offense are not in any way distinctive, but are similar to numerous other crimes
committed by persons other than the defendant, no inference of identity can arise. ....
- The 1973 marihuana offense resembled the offense charged only in that large quanti-
ties of marihuana were stored in a house, but nothing sets thatprior offense apart from
any other marihuana trafficking that involves large quantities of marihuana.
Id. (emphasis added).
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viction was probative of motive. Rejecting the Government's reason-
ing, the court noted: "We are unable to follow the Government's
peculiar inversion of logic, whereby dissimilarities in a succession of
criminal acts becomes [sic] marks of identity of the perpetrator."
8 62
4. Impeachment
63
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 provides that prior felony convictions
and convictions involving dishonesty are admissible for purposes of
impeachment if they are less than ten years old and have not been set
aside.864 In United States v. Trejo-Zambrano,65 the defendant's prior
Federal Youth Corrections Act 66 conviction had been set aside after a
probationary period. His attorney, however, misread the clerk's docket
sheet and failed to notice that the conviction had been set aside. At a
862. Id. at 449. Thus, similarities between crimes are relevant to show common plan, but
dissimilarities are not relevant to show motive.
863. The treatment given to impeachment in federal court is set forth in FED. R. EVID.
607-610 and 613. See generally United States v. Cassasa, 588 F.2d 282, 284-85 (9th Cir.
1978) (composite pictures, made by assembling slides of various features, that witnesses
selected as most resembling roobers, are not relevant to impeach witnesses unless witnesses
adopt composites as accurate representations of defendant); United States v. Powell, 587
F.2d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 1978) (evidence that defendant had previously smoked marijuana not
admissible to impeach unless defendant denied smoking).
864. FED. R. EVID. 609 provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and
the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regard-
less of the punishment.
(b). . .Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the wit-
ness from the confinement imposed for that conviction ....
Even though a conviction is within ten years of trial, it is within the trial court's discretion to
hold that it is too remote to have probative value and is therefore inadmissible. See United
States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1978) (1969 offense too remote for 1977 trial).
Unconvicted bad acts are not admissible unless probative of truthfulness. FED. R. EViD.
608(b) provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting
his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of
the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) con-
cerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which
character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
See United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1314, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978) (testimony re-
garding unconvicted rape of another woman immediately prior to charged rape admissible
for impeachment purposes).
865. 582 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1978).
866. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
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pre-trial hearing on the admissibility of the conviction, the prosecutor,
correctly and in good faith, stated that his copy of the FBI "rap" sheet
indicated the conviction was still in force. Defense counsel then stated
he would ask the defendant about the conviction on direct examina-
tion, apparently to avoid the sting of disclosure of the conviction on
cross-examination. After the defendant was convicted, his counsel
again looked at the docket sheet and noticed his mistake.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(B) requires the prose-
cutor to supply the defendant with any copy of his prior record in the
prosecutor's possession.867 In Trejo-Zambrano, the Ninth Circuit held
that production of the FBI rap sheet was sufficient to comply with rule
16(a)(1)(B), refusing to impose a duty on prosecutors to investigate be-
yond the rap sheet to determine whether prior convictions have been
set aside.868 The court stated that too great a danger of manufactured
error would be created if reversal was required whenever defense coun-
sel misread the record.
869
5. Authentication and identification
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b) indicates various means of authen-
tication and identification. Under rule 901(b)(1), for example, the testi-
mony of witnesses with knowledge is sufficient.87 Rule 901(b)(3)
allows the trier of fact to compare evidence with authenticated speci-
mens.87' Under rule 901(b)(5), voice identifications can be made by
proper opinion testimony based upon hearing the voice under circum-
867. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B) provides:
Upon request of the defendant, the government shall furnish to the defendant such
copy of his prior criminal record, if any, as is within the possession, custody, or control
of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence
may become known, to the attorney for the government.
868. 582 F.2d at 465.
869. Id.
870. See United States v. Ballesteros-Cordova, 586 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1978) (admissible
in-court identification of defendant based on driver's license photograph and testimony of
agents who had detained suspect and viewed license); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757,
772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978) (identification of work papers in securities
fraud case by witness who had used them or knew handwriting); United States v. Dreitzler,
577 F.2d 539, 553 n.24 (9th Cir. 1978) (lay opinion on handwriting, based upon familiarity
not acquired for purposes of litigation, admissible under rule 901(b)(2), which is merely a
specific case of rule 901(b)(1)).
871. See, e.g., United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 936 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
935 (1978) (prosecutor's invitation that jury compare for itself the handwriting on two exhib-
its already before it not plain error); United States v. Antill, 579 F.2d 1135, 1136 (9th Cir.
1978) (if exemplar used only for comparison purposes, fact that defendant is compelled to
write sentences containing information about personal history does not violate privilege
against self-incrimination).
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stances connecting it with the alleged speaker.872
In United States v. King8 73 the Ninth Circuit rejected a rigid set of
requirements governing the admissibility of recorded conversations.
Although a list of requirements had been developed by the Second Cir-
cuit and adopted by the Eighth Circuit, 74 the King court opted for
flexibility, leaving the determination of the trustworthiness of the re-
cording to the trial judge's discretion. The court placed the burden on
the proponent to produce clear and convincing evidence of the record-
ing's authenticity.
8 75
6. Scientific evidence and expert opinion
Scientific evidence cannot be admitted unless the principles on which
it is based have gained general acceptance in the scientific commu-
nity.876 In United States v. Kigus,877 a prosecution witness claimed to
be able to identify unique objects using the Forward Looking Infrared
(FLIR) tracking system. The witness admitted that he was not a quali-
fied operator of the system and was not familiar with its technical as-
pects. Although defense cross-examination was limited by the military
secrecy surrounding the FLIR system, evidence was introduced by the
defense that demonstrated that the system's performance differs in re-
sponse to atmospheric changes. Experts presented uncontradicted testi-
872. The identifications, however, cannot be made under unconstitutionally suggestive
circumstances. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 836 (1978).
873. 587 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1978).
874. United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
916 (1975); United States v. McKeever, 169 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'don other
grounds, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959). The McKeever court required that the following facts
be shown before a sound recording may be admitted properly into evidence:
(1) That the recording device was capable of taking the conversation now offered in
evidence.
(2) That the operator of the device was competent to operate the device.
(3) That the recording is authentic and correct.
(4) That changes, additions or deletions have not been made in the recording.
(5) That the recording has been preserved in a manner that is shown to the court.
(6) That the speakers are identified.
(7) That the conversation elicited was made voluntarily and in good faith, without any
kind of inducement.
169 F. Supp. at 430.
875. 587 F.2d at 561. Application of this flexible approach is exemplified in United States
v. Thomas, 586 F.2d 123, 133 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Rinn, 586 F.2d 113, 117-18
(9th Cir. 1978).
876. United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978). See United States v.
Radlick, 581 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant's use of polygraph properly disallowed by
trial court because of many variable factors affecting reliability of test).
877. 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978).
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mony that the FLIR can be used only for generic identifications and
not specific ones. Unrebutted defense testimony further established
that the FLIR is not a generally accepted scientific technique for the
unique identification of remote objects.878 Under these circumstances,
the Ninth Circuit held that the FLIR evidence was inadmissible. The
court noted, however, that if a proper foundation were laid for the reli-
ability of the FLIR system and the expertise of its operator, FLIR evi-
dence of generic identifications could be admissible in future cases.879
In United States v. Adams,88 ° the Ninth Circuit, for the first time in a
criminal case, considered whether testimony based on memory re-
freshed by hypnosis is admissible. Adopting the rule applicable in civil
cases, the Ninth Circuit held that hypnosis affects only the credibility
and not the admissibility of such evidence. 881 The court rejected de-
fendant's contention that hypnotized witnesses are incompetent to tes-
tify as a matter of law. 82 To prevent dangerous abuse of hypnosis in
criminal cases, however, the court required that complete stenographic
records be made of hypnosis sessions883 and that the sessions should be
conducted by certified hypnotists.88 4
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that qualified experts may
testify on scientific, technical, or other specialized matters if their opin-
ions will assist the fact finder in understanding the evidence and arriv-
ing at a decision. 85 In the absence of timely objections, however,
allowing testimony of persons who are not qualified experts does not
necessarily constitute plain error.
8 86
878. Id. at 510.
879. Id. at 510 n.2.
880. 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
881. Id. at 198-99.
882. Id. at 199.
883. Id. n.12.
884. Id. n.13. These foundation requirements were not satisfied in the hypnosis session
under review in Adams. The court, however, based its affirmance of the trial court's ruling
on the defendant's failure to make any lack-of-foundation objections. Id.
885. FED. R. EvID. 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." See United States v. Robbins, 579 F.2d
1151 (9th Cir. 1978) (testimony of qualified expert that gun was manufactured in a certain
state admissible to show gun was transported in interstate commerce).
886. See United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 526 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926
(1978) (unobjected-to inconsistent and imprecise testimony of criminologist regarding hair
identification not plain error).
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7. Privilege
The marital privilege8 87 of a party to a lawsuit prevents that party's
spouse from testifying against him. The Ninth Circuit, unlike other
circuits,888 considers out-of-court statements by spouses to be within
this marital privilege.8 89 In United States v. Price,890 however, the court
adopted the rule that the privilege does not apply to vicarious admis-
sion made by a co-conspirator spouse.891 While recognizing the marital
privilege's value in preserving family peace,8 92 the Ninth Circuit held
that the relationship between husband and wife is not impaired when
(1) no adverse testimony is given in court by a spouse, and (2) the out-
of-court statements are made in furtherance of a conspiracy in which
both spouses are involved.893
In Beckler v. Superior Court,8 94 the Ninth Circuit suggested possible
constitutional facets of the attorney-client privilege.895 An attorney in
Beckler refused to comply with a California subpoena ordering him to
appear before the grand jury and to produce his client's accounting
records. He was found in contempt and sentenced by the state court.
Affirming the district court's denial of the attorney's petition for writ of
habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit held that (1) the client's own privilege
against self-incrimination was not violated by a subpoena directed at
887. FED. R. EvID. 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
See, e.g., United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (1978) (common law attorney-client privi-
lege applied in bank embezzlement case); Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 662 (9th
Cir. 1978) (state law applicable in action regarding attorney-client privilege; denial of peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus proper).
888. See, e.g., United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 923 (1968).
889. United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1978).
890. Id.
891. See notes 914-22 infra and accompanying text.
892. 577 F.2d at 1365.
893. Id.
894. 568 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1978).
895. See Seidelson, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Cient'r Constitutional Rights, 6
HOFSTRA L. REV. 693 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Seidelson]; Note, TheAttorney-Clent Privi-
lege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REv. 464 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Fixed Rules].
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his attorney, and (2) the applicability of the attorney-client privilege in
this case was a matter of state law and not a matter of fifth amendment
constitutional law.896
Although no sixth amendment claim was raised in Beckler, the
Ninth Circuit observed:
We note that certain basic elements of the attorney-client privilege which
involves private consultation by a criminal defendant with his attorney
could be so vital to the effective assistance of counsel as to be protected by
the Sixth Amendment as made applicable to state proceedings by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 97
The court recognized, however, that the Supreme Court has never iden-
tified this as a constitutional basis for the attorney-client privilege.
898
Until tested in the courts, the constitutional contours of the attorney-
client privilege will remain unclear.
8. Hearsay
When testimony is given in court, the trier of fact can evaluate the
sincerity, perception, memory, and narrative ability of a witness. The
conditions of testimony in court--oath, personal presence, and cross-
examination-tend to encourage truth and expose falsehood. 9 9 These
are not, however, the only possible indicia of reliability. The excep-
tions to the hearsay rule are based in part on the recognition that many
out-of-court statements may be more reliable than in-court testi-
mony.900 Adherence to the hearsay rule in all cases would, moreover,
force the factfinder to go without relevant and reliable evidence neces-
sary for a just and correct decision on the merits.9"' The federal hear-
say exceptions reflect this balance between the practical need for
896. 568 F.2d at 662. See also FED. R. EvID. 501.
897. 568 F.2d at 663 n.3. The Ninth Circuit in Beckler noted that the Supreme Court had
formulated a test for the proper assertion of the attorney-client privilege by an attorney in
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The Ninth Circuit stated:
[The Fisher] test involves an evaluation of whether the client would have a Fifth
Amendment privilege were the documents still in his hands. Although the Court thus
made reference to a Fifth Amendment Constitutional standard to determine the extent
of the attorney-client privilege under the Federal evidentiary rules, this differs from
stating that such an interpretation of the attorney-client privilege is Constitutionally
compelled by the Fifth Amendment.
568 F.2d at 662 n.2. But see Seidelson, supra note 895, at 707-10; Fixed Rules, supra note
895, at 485-86, 486 n.96. Both Professor Seidelson and the student author contend that the
fifth and sixth amendments together may form a constitutional basis for the attorney-client
privilege.
898. 568 F.2d at 663.
899. FED. R. EvID. 801 Adv. Comm. Note; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S Evi-
DENCE, 800[01], at 800-10 (1978) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN].
900. FED. R. EvID. 801 Adv. Comm. Note.
901. Id.
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trustworthy evidence and the ideal of testimony given in court under
the scrutiny of the trier of fact.
a. Testimony constituting hearsay
The federal definition of hearsay contains three elements: 902 first, the
declarant must make the statement out of court;903 second, the prof-
fered evidence must be a "statement"-a verbal assertion or nonverbal
conduct intended as an assertion; 9° finally, the statement must be of-
fered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. If offered for another
purpose, the statements are not hearsay.90 5
i. prior consistent and inconsistent statements
The Federal Rules exclude certain prior consistent and inconsistent
statements from the definition of hearsay and allow their admission as
substantive evidence.90 6 Because these statements are not admissible
902. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
903. United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 937 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978)
(in-court statement about witness' own personal knowledge not hearsay).
904. United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 525 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926
(1978) (comparison photos of bankrobber's clothing not assertive or testimonial in character,
and, hence, not hearsay). See United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 937 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978) (absence of entry in records of regularly conducted activity "prob-
ably not hearsay" according to authors of Adv. Comm. Note to FED. R. EvID. 803(7) but
treated specifically as exception to resolve doubts definitively in favor of admissibility; basis
of this rationale is probably that absence of records is not assertive).
905. Many statements are relevant simply because they are made and not necessarily be-
cause the matter asserted is true. Such statements are frequently referred to as "verbal acts"
or as part of the "res gestae," and they are not hearsay within the definition of FED. R. EVID.
801. See United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 1978) (offer of proof must be
made before court can decide if statements were part of res gestae); United States v. Phillips,
577 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) (completed portions of state-
ments already in evidence are part of res gestae only if relevant); United States v. James, 576
F.2d 223, 229 n.10 (9th Cir. 1978) (statement by FBI agent over radio that extortionist's
telephone call had begun held not a verbal act).
If statements are offered for purposes other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
they are not hearsay even if they do not fit within the definition of verbal acts. See United
States v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 229 (FBI agent's statement admissible for non-hearsay pur-
pose of proving that radio messages received by witness were those sent by agent).
Prior inconsistent and consistent statements, when offered solely for impeachment or re-
habilitative purposes, are not hearsay. United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir.
1978) (declarant's acceptance of witness' offer to procure drugs offered to prove motive,
intent and knowledge); United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1129 (out-of-court statements
offered for impeachment only); United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 793 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978) (out-of-court statements not offered for their truth).
906. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) states:
A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
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unless the declarant is available for cross-examination under oath and
in the presence of the fact finder, there is less reason to treat them as
hearsay. The ideal conditions of testimony in court, though not avail-
able at the time the statements are made, will have been met subse-
quently.
90 7
ii. admissions generally
Admissions by a party opponent are not considered hearsay in fed-
eral court. 90 8 Such statements are not admissible unless made volunta-
rily. In United States v. Brown,909 a defendant contested the use of an
admission allegedly made while he was intoxicated. The trial court
failed to find formally that the statement was voluntary. On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court must make an
affirmative finding on the voluntariness issue.910
The use of tacit admissions, or admissions by silence, is authorized
by the Federal Rules of Evidence.91' In United States v. Lorenzo,912 for
example, the defendant made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. He
then failed to respond to the questions of a Secret Service agent con-
cerning the presence of large numbers of small bills in defendant's pos-
session, which suggested that defendant had changed large counterfeit
bills. The court held that defendant's silence was a tacit admission and
not an assertion of his previously waived Miranda rights.91 3
concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and
was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut
an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him....
See United States v. Rinn, 586 F.2d 113, 119-20 (9th Cir. 1978) (statements regarding true
source of drugs offered to rehabilitate); United States v. Allen, 579 F.2d 531, 532 (9th Cir.
1978) (prior consistent statement can be used by government to rehabilitate after govern-
ment itself has introduced prior inconsistent statement); United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d
993, 996 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978) (because defendant had not yet testified, statements were not
admissible as prior consistent statements under rule 801(d)(1)). See also United States v.
Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978) (failure to advise grand jury of prior inconsis-
tent statement not such a flagrant concealment as to justify dismissal of the indictment).
907. See note 899 supra and accompanying text.
908. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
909. 575 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1978).
910. Id. at 748.
911. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(2) provides that: "A 'statement' is.. .nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by him as an assertion." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(B) provides that:
"A statement is not hearsay if. . .[it] is offered against a party and is. .. a statement of
which [a party] has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth. . ....
912. 570 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1978).
913. Id. at 298. Cf. Adv. Comm. Note to rule 801(d)(2)(B) which provides: "In criminal
cases, however, troublesome questions have been raised by decisions holding that failure to
1979]
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iii. vicarious admissions by co-conspirators
Vicarious admissions of co-conspirators914 are admissible even
though a conspiracy has not been charged 915 and the co-conspirators
are not co-defendants.9 16 A substantial foundation, however, is re-
quired: the statements must be made "during the course and in fur-
therance of the conspiracy," 917 and evidence of the conspiracy,
independent of the statements themselves, must be introduced. 918 Al-
though the conspiracy must be established by substantial evidence,
only slight evidence of defendant's connection need be presented.919
In United States v. Rosales,92° the Ninth Circuit established that a
determination of the prima facie existence of a conspiracy is a conclu-
sion of law rather than a finding of fact. By characterizing this deter-
mination as legal, rather than factual, the Rosales court was not bound
to apply the "clearly erroneous" standard of review92' and was able to
act independently in reversing the trial court's finding that the Govern-
deny is an admission . . . . However, recent decisions of the Supreme Court relating to
custodial interrogation and the right to counsel appear to resolve these difficulties."
914. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides that: "[a] statement is not hearsay if. . . [it] is
offered against a party and is. . . a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." For discussion of the effect of the marital
privilege on the co-conspirator's admissions exception, see notes 887-93 supra and accompa-
nying text.
915. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981
(1978) (securities fraud); United States v. Avila-Macias, 577 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)
(narcotics violations); United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 793 n.6 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 895 (1978) (transporting stolen property in interstate commerce).
916. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981
(1978) (securities fraud).
917. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). For a discussion of when a conspiracy ends, see Krule-
witch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1949).
918. United States v. Weiner, 587 F.2d 757, 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981
(1978) (securities fraud); United States v. Rosales, 584 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1978) (evi-
dence sufficient to establish prima facie case of conspiracy must be independent of proffered
statements); United States v. Avila-Macias, 577 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978) (contacts
with co-conspirators sufficient); United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978) (independent evidence of conspiracy to transport stolen deben-
tures interstate required to allow admission of co-conspirator's statement).
919. United States v. Rosales, 584 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1978) (conspiracy to distribute co-
caine); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768-69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981
(1978) (conspiracy concerning securities fraud).
920. 584 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1978).
921. Id. at 875-76. Judge Hug, arguing in dissent, contended that the majority view was
contrary to precedent, and that the district court's ruling, whether characterized as a finding
of fact or a conclusion of law, was not the type for which the appellate court should substi-
tute its own judgment unless the trial court was clearly erroneous. Id. at 875-76, 875 n. 1
(Hug, J., dissenting).
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ment had not established a conspiracy. 922
b. Hearsay excefltions923
i. exceptions applicable to writings
In United States v. Arias,924 an official trial transcript was offered in a
perjury proceeding. The Ninth Circuit held that the reporter's standard
recital in the transcript, that defendant was duly sworn, was admissible
hearsay under the public records exception of rule 803(8).925 The court
distinguished the situation presented in Arias from those in which tran-
scripts are used to prove the truth of their contents.
926
The defendant in United States v. OrOZco927 objected to the district
court's admission into evidence of computer cards on the basis of the
business records exception. 928 The cards were prepared by customs of-
ficials on the Mexican border, who had observed defendant's vehicle
passing through the border and entered the license plate number into a
computer. Although the Ninth Circuit held admission of the computer
cards to be proper, the court relied on the public records exception
rather than the business records exception.
929
The Orozco court noted that the language of the public records ex-
ception excludes "in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel. ' 930 If read literally, this lan-
guage would have excluded the proffered computer records. The court,
however, held that the purpose of this language was to exclude obser-
vations of law enforcement personnel made during confrontations of
922. Id. at 875-76.
923. In addition to recognizing the two classes of exceptions set forth in FED. R. EVID.
803-804, the federal courts allow, under certain conditions, other exceptions having
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
See United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 1978) (equivalency exception
not allowed when declaration against interest exception also denied because no
corroborating circumstances indicating trustworthiness).
In United States v. James, 576 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1978), an FBI agent's statement over the
radio that an extortionist's phone call had begun was held admissible. The defendant's
objections to the admission of this evidence were overruled on the ground that the evidence
was not hearsay.
924. 575 F.2d 253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978) (transcript admissible busi-
ness record, at least when no timely objection made).
925. Id. at 254-55; FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
926. 575 F.2d at 254 & n.1.
927. 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049 (1979).
928. Id. at 793. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
929. 590 F.2d at 793-94, 794 n.2.
930. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B).
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an adversary nature with suspected criminals.93 Since the routine re-
cording of license numbers was not an adversary confrontation, the lit-
eral language of the public records exception did not apply, and the
computer cards were admissible.
In United States v. Rich,932 the Ninth Circuit made further compari-
sons between the business records and public records exceptions. The
exceptions involved in Rich, however, involved the exception pertain-
ing to the absence, rather than the presence, of records of regularly
conducted activities.933 An FBI agent testified, without further founda-
tion, that a search of various police records, credit records, and city
directories disclosed no trace of the person who appellant claimed
had borrowed his car.934 Although the appellant objected that the
statements constituted "negative hearsay," the district court admitted
the evidence.
The absence of public records hearsay exception has an express
foundation requirement.935 The public records exception itself has no
such foundation requirement.936 In contrast, the business records ex-
ception requires that the custodian of records or other qualified witness
lay the necessary foundation, whereas the absence of business records
exception has no express foundation requirement.937
The Ninth Circuit in Rich assumed, without deciding, that such a
foundation is a prerequisite to the admission of evidence of the absence
of entries.938 The FBI agent's testimony about the absence of entries in
both business and public records was therefore admitted without ade-
931. The Senate Committee Report to rule 803(8) explains:
Ostensibly, the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the
scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observa-
tions by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confron-
tation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.
S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEWS 7051, 7064.
932. 580 F.2d 929 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978).
933. Id. at 937-38. See FED. R. EVID. 803(7) (absence of business records) and 803(10)
(absence of public records).
934. 580 F.2d at 937.
935. FED. R. EVID. 803(10). This rule requires "evidence in the form of a certification in
accordance with rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record."
936. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
937. FED. R. EvID. 803(6), the business records exception, requires that the "custodian"
of records "or other qualified witness" lay the necessary foundation. In contrast, rule 803(7),
the absence of business records exception, does not expressly require the testimony of a
custodian or other qualified witness.
938. 580 F.2d at 937-38. Such an assumption is logical in light of the language in rule
803(7) that such evidence is admissible "unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate lack of trustworthiness." FED. R. EvID. 803(7).
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quate foundation. The Rich court, however, affirmed the district
court's admission of the agent's testimony because of appellant's failure
to make a lack-of-foundation objection. Appellant objected to the ad-
mission of the testimony only on the grounds of "negative hearsay." '93 9
Furthermore, the court refused to invoke the plain error doctrine be-
cause appellant did not present evidence suggesting the unreliability of
the records underlying the improperly-introduced evidence.
940
ii. declarations against interest
941
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Satterfield,942 discussed
whether the trustworthiness of the witness, as well as that of the declar-
ant, is a proper area of inquiry in evaluating the applicability of the
declaration against interest exceptioxi. 4 Appellant sought to introduce
exculpatory statements of a co-defendant who refused to testify at trial.
The Government offered evidence which, among other things, showed
that the witnesses who claimed to have heard the statements were not
present at the time the alleged statements were made.
939. 580 F.2d at 938-39. The "negative hearsay" objection itself was improper in light of
FED. R. EvID. 803(7) and 803(10), which specifically allow such evidence under controlled
circumstances.
940. 580 F.2d at 939. The court's reasoning seems to ignore the purpose of the proffered
evidence. It was offered to prove that a person, who appellant claimed had borrowed his
car, did not exist. Any set of records would seem inherently unreliable for such a purpose.
Since appellant had failed, however, to attack the evidence properly at three different
stages-objection, cross-examination, and appeal-the court apparently decided, in light of
the existence of other strong evidence, that it would not be unfair to apply the waiver rules
in a highly technical manner.
941. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate
the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.
See also United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1978) (although exception not
limited to direct confessions of criminal responsibility, the statements must, in a real and
tangible way, subject declarant to criminal responsibility; statements consisting principally
of material exculpating a co-defendant are suspect absent the presence of solidly inculpatory
statements).
942. 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
943. Id. at 691-92. The circuits differ on this issue. Compare United States v. Atkins, 558
F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978) (trustworthiness of witness
irrelevant) with United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 1075 (1977) (trustworthiness of witness relevant).
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The Satte.qeld court discussed two arguments against considering
witness trustworthiness.9 " First, the court noted that the purpose of
the hearsay rule is to test the reliability of statements made under con-
ditions different from those under which testimony is given at trial.94-
The credibility of witnesses testifying to out-of-court statements can be
evaluated in court by the factfinder. Second, the court observed that
the denial of access to such evidence might be an unconstitutional in-
fringement of a defendant's fundamental right to call witnesses in his
own defense.946
The Ninth Circuit, however, also recognized some factors suggesting
that witness trustworthiness is a proper ground for inquiry.94 7 First, the
court pointed out that the declaration against interest exception itself
refers to the trustworthiness of the statement, not that of the declar-
ant.948 Second, the court noted that the exception's legislative history
suggests that the rule was intended to be more than purely a hearsay
rule. The drafters were suspicious of fabrication of both the existence
and the contents of the declarations. Evidence showing that the wit-
nesses could not have heard the statements when they were made is
therefore highly relevant to the issue of fabrication.
9 49
The Sautfteld court, however, found it unnecessary to decide
whether witness trustworthiness should be considered because the trial
judge based his decision solely on the trustworthiness of the declarant's
statements rather than the trustworthiness of the witnesses. 950
c. Constitutional dimensions of hearsay problems
The admission of hearsay statements arguably conflicts with a de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses. In Dutton v. Evans,95' however, the Supreme Court held that
such statements may be admissible if they are surrounded by sufficient
944. 572 F.2d at 691-92.
945. Id. at 691.
946. Id. at 692.
947. Id.
948. However, because the statements are against the defendant's penal interest, it ap-
pears that such declarants are untrustworthy. The trustworthiness requirement was added to
keep declarants, who have escaped arrest or are outside the jurisdiction of the court, from
giving gifts of exculpatory statements to their partners in crime. Language referring specifi-
cally to declarant reliability, therefore, would be anomalous.
949. 572 F.2d at 692.
950. Id. at 692-93. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Sneed indicated that witness
trustworthiness is a proper area for inquiry. Id. at 694 (Sneed, J., concurring).
951. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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indicia of reliability.95 z In United States v. Weiner,953 the Ninth Circuit
employed the Dutton analysis and admitted the vicarious admissions of
a co-conspirator who had asserted his fifth amendment rights.
9 5 4
Sustaining hearsay objections to statements proffered by a defendant,
however, may violate the fundamental right of an accused to call wit-
nesses on his own behalf when the circumstances involved are grossly
unfair.95 5 Refusal to admit hearsay statements under a hearsay excep-
tion, because of doubts as to a witness' credibility, may raise such an
issue.
956
9. Scope of examination
The scope and extent of the examination of witnesses is within the
discretion of the trial court. The exercise of such discretion will not be
disturbed unless a defendant's constitutional right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses is denied.957  Furthermore, improper limita-
tion of examination is harmless error if the information sought is ex-
plored fully at other points during the trial.958
The defendant in United States v. Lopez,9 59 charged with second-
degree murder, claimed self-defense. On cross-examination, defendant
952. The Court considered four factors to be important: (1) the statement included no
express assertion of past fact; (2) the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and
role of participants in the crime; (3) the possibility was remote that the declarant was relying
on faulty recollection; and (4) the circumstances under which the statement was made gave
no reason to believe that the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in
the crime. Id. at 88-89.
953. 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
954. Id. at 771-72.
955. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-302 (1973) (testimony "critical" to
defense and bearing assurances of trustworthiness excluded on basis of hearsay objection).
956. See United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
840 (1978); United States v. Basile, 569 F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
920 (1978) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (allowing use of exculpatory statements only for im-
peachment purposes rather than as substantive evidence under hearsay exception raised
Chambers issue).
957. United States v. Whitson, 587 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1978) (after defendant denied
possessing a bomb, cross-examination regarding his knowledge of explosives was properly
allowed); United States v. Sturgis, 578 F.2d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970
(1978) (not abuse of discretion for trial judge to allow prosecution to elicit from defense
witness that those found guilty of crime with which defendant was charged are not incarcer-
ated); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 766 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978)
(defendants in securities fraud case allowed to cross-examine witness about extramarital
relationships and fraud not charged in the indictment).
958. United States v. Price, 577 F. 2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978) (denial of cross-examina-
tion regarding relationship between witness and law enforcement officers harmless error
when witness testified as to her dealings with law enforcement officers at later point in trial).
959. 575 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1978).
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testified that he saw the decedent carrying a knife on the day of the
murder. On redirect, defense counsel attempted to explore this testi-
mony more fully; she was interrupted, however, by the trial judge who
stated before the jury that he could not remember any references in
defendant's testimony to a knife. The court reporter mistakenly
agreed. The Ninth Circuit refused to reverse because, after the remarks
of the judge and court reporter, defense counsel made no objection and
did not ask the judge for permission to open a line of questioning re-
garding the knife as if on direct.96 0
10. Presumptions
In United States v. King,961 defendant was charged with conspiracy
to distribute cocaine. Defendant, a physician, raised the medical ex-
ception to the statute, which makes it a crime to distribute or dispense
controlled substances. 962 The medical exception expressly places on
the physician the burden of going forward with evidence of authoriza-
tion to distribute or dispense such substances.
In certain situations, however, the burden of proof shifts to the gov-
ernment to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the medical excep-
tion does not apply. As noted by the court in King, one such situation
is that found in United States v. Black.963 In Black, the Government
introduced evidence showing (1) that Black was a medical practitioner,
(2) that Black was duly registered with the Attorney General to dis-
pense controlled substances, and (3) that the transfers made by Black
were to his own patients by prescription.964 Even though Black did not
attempt to introduce any evidence on his behalf regarding the excep-
tion, and thus did not meet the burden expressly imposed on him by
statute, the Ninth Circuit held that the express statutory presumption
was rendered irrational and unconstitutional when the required evi-
dence was introduced by the Government.
965
In King, it was undisputed that the defendant was a doctor, and evi-
dence of his controlled substances registration was improperly sup-
pressed by the trial judge. However, unlike Black, no evidence that the
960. Id. at 686. Judge Hufstedler, in dissent, argued that the defendant was deprived of
his primary defense and that any attempt by defense counsel to pursue the questioning after
the comments of the court reporter and judge would have been counterproductive. d. at
687 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
961. 587 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1978).
962. 21 U.S.C. §§ 822(b), 841(a)(1) (1976).
963. 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975).
964. Id. at 870-71.
965. Id. at 871.
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subject transfers were made to patients by prescription was introduced.
In fact, circumstantial evidence suggested the contrary.96 6 Neverthe-
less, the Ninth Circuit held that the facts brought forth in Black did not
reach the minimum threshold that defendant doctors had to meet
before the burden of proof regarding the medical exception was shifted
to the Government. 967 The statutory presumption was still irrational
once evidence was brought forth showing that defendant was a physi-
cian registered to dispense controlled substances, regardless of evidence
showing the manner of transfer.
968
E. Defenses
1. Insanity
The defense of insanity is intended to prevent the criminal convic-
tion of a defendant who lacks responsibility for his acts. 969 A defend-
ant is presumed legally sane until he presents some evidence of his
insanity.970 Only after the defendant comes forward with such evi-
dence does the prosecutor bear the burden of demonstrating the de-
fendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.971
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a portion of the American Law Insti-
tute (ALL) test for insanity.972 In this circuit, a "person is not responsi-
ble for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreci-
ate the. . .[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirement of law."973
966. 587 F.2d at 964-65.
967. Id.
968. Id. Judge Choy argued in a separate opinion that proof that the subject transfers
were made to patients by prescription was necessary to show that the presumption was irra-
tional because, by statute, doctors are not allowed to dispense controlled substances without
prescriptions unless confronted with an emergency. Id. at 967 (Choy, J., concurring and
dissenting).
969. United States v. Collins, 433 F.2d 550, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
970. See, e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 572 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir. 1978) (expert testi-
mony that defendant was suffering from "schizophrenia of the chronically recurrent para-
noid type" overcame presumption of sanity).
971. See United States v. Winn, 577 F.2d 86, 89 (9th Cir. 1978) (government did not have
burden of proving defendant's sanity where defendant failed to give timely notice of inten-
tion to rely on insanity defense); United States v. Ingman, 426 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1970)
(" 'The nature and quantum of evidence of sanity which the Government must produce to
sustain its burden and take the case to the jury will vary in different cases'.") (quoting Brown
v. United States, 351 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir. 1965)).
972. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-74 (9th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (defendant's
armed robbery conviction reversed).
973. Id at 71 (bracket in original). This remains the standard instruction in the Ninth
1979]
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The word "wrongfulness" was substituted for "criminality 974 and
denotes moral, rather than criminal, wrongfulness. 975 This insanity
rule has been interpreted to mean that "a defendant lacks substantial
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct if he knows his
act to be criminal but commits it because of a delusion that it is morally
justified. 976
In United States v. Collom 9 7 7 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defend-
ant's robbery conviction, rejecting his contention that, because evi-
dence of delusionary behavior was presented at his trial, the court
should have supplemented the standard jury instructions on the in-
sanity defense.9 73  The instructions that were given consisted of the
Ninth Circuit's adaptation of the ALI test and an explanation of
wrongfulness; they did not include the further instruction that a person
lacks substantial capacity if he knows that his act is criminal but never-
theless acts under a delusion that it is morally justified. The Ninth Cir-
cuit found it unnecessary to supplement the instructions, explaining
that "a delusion that [a criminal act] is morally justified" is subsumed
in the instruction that attributes lack of substantial capacity to mental
defect or disease.
979
In United States v. Winn98° the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defend-
ant's conviction for making a false statement in a passport application.
Winn contended that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the de-
Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Collom, No. 77-1040 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978) (defendant's
robbery conviction affirmed where insanity instructions consisted solely of ALI test and ex-
planation of wrongfulness). Cf. Myers v. Rhay, 577 F.2d 504, 510-11 (9th Cir.), cer. denied,
439 U.S. 986 (1978) (petitioner's habeas corpus contention, that the state court's use of the
M'Naghten test to determine his sanity was unconstitutional, rejected, "[n]otwithstanding
the fact that the law of this Circuit is the American Law Institute 'substantial capacity' test,
the use of the M'Naghten test by the states has been upheld as constitutional.") (citations
omitted).
974. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
975. United States v. Collom, No. 77-1040, slip op. at 1871 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978);
United States v. Sullivan, 544 F.2d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1976).
976. United States v. McGraw, 515 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1975). See United States v.
Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977) (jury reasonable in
concluding that defendant's belief, that selling cocaine was morally justifiable, resulted not
from any mental defect or disease, but rather from his belief that the drug was not danger-
ous).
977. No. 77-1040 (9th Cir. June 15, 1978).
978. Id, slip op. at 1871.
979. Id, slip op. at 1872 (brackets in original). See also United States v. Sullivan, 544
F.2d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The word [delusion] adds no additional element to those
which must be established before an individual is entitled to any instruction on legal in-
sanity; it is a word of clarification, not of limitation.") (footnote omitted).
980. 577 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1978).
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fense of insanity despite his failure to comply with a procedural rule
requiring notice of an intention to raise the defense.981 Winn argued
that his procedural noncompliance with the rule should not bar his sub-
stantive right to insanity instructions. The Winn court rejected this
contention, reasoning that the rule is not merely "formalistic," rather, it
is "designed to insure that both the defendant and the government have
ample opportunity to investigate the fact of an issue critical to the de-
termination of guilt or innocence.
982
Winn also claimed that the trial court had erred in refusing to in-
struct the jury that evidence of his mental state, even if insufficient to
establish insanity, was still relevant to decide whether he had the spe-
cific intent to commit the crime with which he was charged.98 3 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that, although a defendant is entitled to
an instruction on his theory of the case if it is supported by the law and
evidence, the "evidence at trial concerned. .. [defendant's] irresponsi-
bility and drinking-not mental disease or defect." 984 Therefore, the
failure to instruct was not reversible error.
The Ninth Circuit will not disturb a jury's finding of a defendant's
sanity if the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the government,
is sufficient to permit a rational conclusion that the defendant was sane
beyond a reasonable doubt.
985
2. Due process
In United States v. Russell,986 the Supreme Court held that the es-
sence of the entrapment defense was the defendant's predisposition to
commit the crime of which he is accused rather than the Government's
conduct.9 87 The Court stated, however, that it "may some day be
presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement
agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar
981. Defendant had failed to comply with FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(a), which provides in
pertinent part: "If a defendant intends to rely upon the defense of insanity... he shall
[make known] such intention. . . .If there is a failure to comply. . . insanity may not be
raised as a defense. The court may for cause shown allow late filing .
982. 577 F.2d at 89.
983. Id
984. Id at 90.
985. United States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972
(1977) (jury rationally could have concluded that defendant's belief in moral justification of
criminal act did not result from mental defect or disease); United States v. Ortiz, 488 F.2d
175, 178 (9th Cir. 1973) (Ninth Circuit rejected insanity defense in aircraft piracy case, con-
cluding that sufficient evidence had existed to support jury finding of sanity).
986. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
987. Id. at 433-36.
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the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a convic-
tion."
98
In Hampton v. United States,98 9 a plurality of the Court indicated
that due process principles would not prevent a predisposed defend-
ant's conviction. 990 The Ninth Circuit, however, has seized upon the
lack of majority concurrence to avoid foreclosing the possibility of a
due process defense when the government's conduct is sufficiently of-
fensive.991 This defense exists not as an exception to entrapment law
but, rather, as an independent protection afforded by the due process
clause regardless of a defendant's predisposition. 992
In United States v. Prairie,993 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defend-
ant's conviction for distribution of cocaine. The defendant had at-
tempted to invoke the due process defense by contending that the
Government's employment of a particular informant was unconstitu-
tional. The defendant argued that the use of the informant, a prosti-
tute, was intended improperly to seduce him emotionally and sexually
and thereby to persuade him to deal in cocaine. The Ninth Circuit
found this assertion meritless. The Government had neither paid nor
asked the informant to persuade the defendant to deal in drugs; rather
it had paid her living expenses in return for information given in past
cases. The Prairie court held that this use of a paid informant, al-
though it may have constituted a violation of state criminal prostitution
laws, was not, without more, a violation of the defendant's due process
988. Id. at 431-32. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (conduct of gov-
ernment agents in extracting evidence from defendant's stomach by use of emetic solution
held to violate due process).
989. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
990. Id. at 495 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). The concurring opinion interpreted
the plurality as saying that "the concept of fundamental fairness inherent in the guarantee of
due process would never prevent the conviction of a predisposed defendant, regardless of the
outrageousness of police behavior." Id. at 492. Justice Rehnquist stated that the remedy for
outrageous police conduct "lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in prose-
cuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law." Id. at 490 (plural-
ity opinion, Stevens, J., taking no part in decision).
991. See, e.g., United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316, 1319 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978) (defend-
ant's conviction affirmed where entrapment not shown by evidence); United States v. Rey-
noso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978) (same).
992. United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974)
(government's deception not violative of due process where government did not "implant"
the criminal design in defendant's mind). See also United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356,
1367 (9th Cir. 1978). In Price, the Ninth Circuit held that, because the crime of conspiracy
was complete before there was any government participation, both the entrapment and due
process defenses were barred.
993. 572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978).
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rights.994
The defendant in Prairie also argued that the trial court erred in fail-
ing to submit his due process defense to the jury. The Ninth Circuit
found no error, however, holding that the question of whether govern-
ment conduct is so outrageous as to constitute a violation of due proc-
ess is one of law for the court to decide.995
3. Competency to stand trial
A defendant's conviction, when he has been required to stand trial
while legally incompetent, will be reversed as violative of due proc-
ess.9 9 6 A defendant is competent to stand trial if he is able to under-
stand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, consult
with his attorney, and assist his attorney in the preparation of his de-
fense.99 7 In Drofpe v. Missouri,998 the Supreme Court held that it is the
responsibility of the trial judge to prevent the trial of a defendant who
is not competent to stand trial. This responsibility continues through-
out the trial.999 A hearing on the issue of the defendant's competency is
required sua sponte whenever a comprehensive evaluation of all avail-
able evidence leads the trial judge to doubt the defendant's compe-
tency." ' The doubt sufficient to require a hearing may be raised by
any relevant evidence.l °°l
994. Id. at 1319 n.4. Cf. United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923 (1976) (no due process violation where government agents
provided the contraband).
995. 572 F.2d at 1319 (following United States v. Gonzales, 539 F.2d 1238, 1240 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1976)).
996. See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) ("[T]he failure to observe pro-
cedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompe-
tent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial."); Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) ("the conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompe-
tent violates due process").
997. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402,
402 (1960) (per curiam).
998. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
999. Id. at 181. "Even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial,
a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change" in his competency.
Id.
1000. United States v. Ives, 574 F.2d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1978). See Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966) (where evidence raises bona fide doubt as to defendant's compe-
tency, court must provide a hearing to determine competency notwithstanding defendant's
failure to request one); de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 979-81 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977) (competency hearing required where record as a whole, includ-
ing testimony and events at trial, raises genuine doubt in mind of trial judge as to defend-
ant's competency to stand trial).
1001. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975) (relevant evidence includes defendant's
irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and medical opinion). See United States v. Ives,
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In state court, the trial judge's obligation to hold a competency hear-
ing derives solely from the requirements of due process.10 0 2 In the fed-
eral courts, the competency issue is raised by a motion made pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. section 4244.1003 The Ninth Circuit has held that an initial
section 4244 motion gives the moving party the right to a mandatory
psychiatric examination of the defendant. 10 The trial court may not
use its discretion to deny the motion on the ground that there exists no
reason to doubt the defendant's competency. 005 However, upon a sub-
sequent section 4244 motion, the trial judge, after considering "all
574 F.2d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1978) ("defendant's bizarre actions or statements, or counsel's
statement that the defendant is incapable of cooperating in his own defense, or even psychi-
atric testimony neednot alone raise sufficient doubt."). See also Tillery v. Eyman, 492 F.2d
1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1974) (trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing when substantial
evidence before the court, including defendant's outbursts in the courtroom and bizarre,
irrational behavior in confinement, indicated that he "may have been mentally incompetent
to stand trial").
1002. United States v. Ives, 574 F.2d 1002, 1004 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit
will not disturb a state court's finding of a defendant's competency if the state court has
provided a constitutionally adequate hearing on the competency issue. See, e.g., Myers v.
Rhay, 577 F.2d 504, 509-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978). In Myers, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to grant a habeas corpus petitioner an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of his competency and refused to independently examine the psychiatric
record in the case. In an extensive evidentiary hearing, the state court trial judge had found
Myers competent to stand trial. There was no procedural defect in the hearing process, and
the determination of Myers' competency had been affirmed by the state court of appeal.
Because the procedure observed by the state court was constitutionally adequate, comport-
ing with the standards set forth in Drope, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to conduct a new hearing on the issue of Myers' competency.
When a constitutionally adequate hearing has been held, the Ninth Circuit will overturn a
district court's determination of competency only when the finding was clearly erroneous.
See, e.g., United States v. Aponte, 591 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1978). In Aponte, the Ninth
Circuit found no error in the trial court's determination of the defendant's competency. Al-
though at trial the government's psychiatrist had stated that Aponte possessed a paranoid
personality and the court appointed psychiatrist had testified that Aponte was "acutely
psychotic and incompetent," the Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]he district court's determi-
nation of Aponte's competency to stand trial is a finding of fact which may be set aside only
if it is clearly erroneous. We cannot say that the judge's competence determination was
clearly erroneous in this case." Id. at 1249.
1003. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976) provides in part:
Whenever . . . the United States Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a
person . . . may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be
unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own de-
fense, he shall file a motion for a judicial determination of such mental competency
:.... Upon such a motion or upon a similar motion in behalf of the accused, or upon
its own motion, the court shall cause the accused. . . to be examined as to his mental
condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the court. . . . If the
report . . . indicates a state of present insanity or such mental incompetency in the
accused, the court shall hold a hearing. . . and make a finding with respect thereto.
1004. United States v. Ives, 574 F.2d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1978).
1005. Id See Meador v. United States, 332 F.2d 935, 937-38 (9th Cir. 1964).
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available pertinent information,"' 6 may determine that there is insuf-
ficient doubt as to the defendant's competency to require a hearing.
100 7
While "appellate review of a failure to provide any hearing on a de-
fendant's competence to stand trial is 'comprehensive and not limited
by either the abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous standard',"""0° the
trial judge's decision to deny a subsequent section 4244 motion will not
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.1009
In United States v. Ies,l' 0 the Ninth Circuit reversed the defend-
ant's murder conviction, concluding that under the circumstances the
trial court had abused its discretion in denying a subsequent section
4244 motion. Although four different determinations on the issue of
the defendant's competency had been made in less than one year, 10 11
the trial court refused to consider the testimony of two psychiatrists and
a deputy U.S. marshall that was offered to prove a change in Ives' com-
petency in the five months since his last psychiatric examination. This
refusal was held to violate Ives' due process rights, which require "eval-
uation of all available pertinent information as a basis for establishing
whether doubt of the defendant's competency is sufficient to warrant a
hearing. . . . [G]iven the frequent fluctuations in Ives' competency to
stand trial, the court's refusal to consider evidence of another possible
change constituted an abuse of that discretion."' 1 12 Because Ives' com-
petency at the time of trial could not be established in a new hear-
ing, 10 13 the Ninth Circuit granted a new trial.
1006. 574 F.2d at 1006.
1007. Id. at 1005. See United States v. Cook, 418 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1969).
1008. 574 F.2d at 1005 n.3 (emphasis added) (quoting de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d
975, 983 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977)).
1009. Id. at 1005.
1010. 574 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1978).
1011. Ives was indicted for murder in March 1971, but following a court ordered exami-
nation he was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed. In a second hearing the
court found him competent, and his trial began. Thereafter, a mistrial was declared and,
following a third hearing, he was adjudged incompetent and recommitted. Once again the
district court found Ives to be competent and a second jury trial, the subject of the current
appeal, began. Id. at 1004.
1012. Id. at 1006-07.
1013. Six years had elapsed since trial, the judges in both previous trials were dead, and
no psychiatric testimony existed of Ives' competency at the time the error had occurred. Id.
at 1007. See also Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 849
(1977). The Bassett court discussed the difficulties involved in ruling on an appellant's claim
that he was improperly denied a competency hearing at the trial court level. While claims
based on the issue of competency are likely to arise in cases where it is apparent that the
defendant is mentally impaired to some extent, the appellate court must "sift the record of
abnormal behavior for evidence which might, at a hearing on the issue of competence, be
found to be relevant and material to competency." The trial record, however, is one "in
19791
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4. Entrapment
The affirmative defense 0 14 of entrapment requires that the defend-
ant present evidence of his nonpredisposition to violate the law and of
government inducement to commit the charged offense.10 15 The de-
fense will be unsuccessful if the court finds either the defendant predis-
posed to commit the crime or government inducement lacking.
0 16
"Entrapment as a matter of law exists only when there is undisputed
testimony making it patently clear that an otherwise innocent person
was induced to commit the act complained of by the trickery, persua-
sion or fraud of a government agent.' 0 17 Entrapment is a defense, not
in the sense that the defendant goes free though guilty but, rather, that
the government "cannot be permitted to contend that he is guilty of a
crime where the government officials are the instigators of his con-
duct."10 1 8
The proper inquiry for the jury is whether or not the defendant was
an unwilling participant in the criminal act. 10 19 An "unwilling" de-
fendant denotes one who is not predisposed to violate the law on any
which the parties presumably did not address the issue of the defendant's competency, and
from which the evidence of petitioner's demeanor and attitude and of his understanding and
cooperation may therefore be largely missing." Id. at 618-19.
1014. In United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc), the Ninth
Circuit reversed the rule that entrapment constituted a confession-and-avoidance defense
requiring the defendant to admit all elements of the crime. A defendant may now claim
entrapment without conceding that he committed the crime or any of its elements.
1015. United States v. Hermosillo-Nanez, 545 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977) (defendant's conviction for possession of heroin
affirmed). See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973) (primary focus of entrap-
ment defense is on defendant's lack of intent or predisposition to commit crime); United
States v. Donoho, 575 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("That defense [entrap-
ment] has two elements: a government official must have induced the defendant to commit
the crime; and the defendant must not have been predisposed to commit the crime.").
1016. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-36 (1973) (evidence showed that prior to
government involvement, defendant had been involved in criminal drug ring).
1017. United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854
(1976) (emphasis added) (affirming defendant's conviction for possession of heroin). See
United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1978) (in light of defendant's previ-
ous experience in drug trafficking, entrapment could not be found to exist as matter of law,
and issue of entrapment was properly submitted to jury).
1018. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932). In United States v. Price, 577
F.2d 1356, 1367 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction for
conspiracy to transport women in interstate commerce for purposes of prostitution. The
circuit court found that the trial court had not erred in refusing to give instructions on the
entrapment defense to the jury, because the crime of conspiracy was complete when the
defendant first discussed the venture. This overt act, completing the conspiracy, occurred at
a time when no government agent had yet become involved.
1019. United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1334-36 (9th Cir. 1977), cerl. de.
nied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978) (affirming defendant's conviction for distribution of heroin, hold-
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propitious opportunity." 2O Predisposition is a question of fact,' 2 ' and
a conviction will not be overturned unless the jury rationally could not
have concluded that predisposition existed.' 22 The Ninth Circuit has
cited several factors as relevant in determining whether the defendant
was predisposed. A proper inquiry may include consideration of the
defendant's prior criminal record, 10 23 whether the suggestion of the
criminal activity was first made by the government, whether the de-
fendant engaged in the criminal activity for profit, and whether the de-
fendant evidenced reluctance to commit the offense that was overcome
only by repeated government inducement or persuasion.0 24
In United States v. Donoho,1°2 5 the Ninth Circuit refused to reverse
the defendant's conviction for possession of unregistered firearms. This
decision rested in part on the Ninth Circuit's nonacceptance of the de-
fendant's theory of entrapment. To support his theory, the defendant
offered evidence of specific instances of conduct reflecting favorably on
his character. The trial court, however, held the evidence to be inad-missible. The Ninth Circuit explained that, although instances of con-
duct are admissible when character is an essential element of a
defense, 10 26 the defense of entrapment consists solely of government
ing that evidence of mere solicitation by government agent was insufficient to prove
entrapment).
1020. United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
941 (1974) (defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine affirmed where evidence of en-
trapment was insufficient to submit that issue to jury).
1021. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 331 (1966) (determination of defendant's
predisposition is within province of jury).
1022. United States v. Donoho, 575 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
1023. See, e.g., United States v. Segovia, 576 F.2d 251,252-53 (9th Cir. 1978). In Segovia,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine. Although
the defendant contended that the trial court had improperly admitted evidence of his previ-
ous dealings in marijuana, the circuit court held that evidence of a defendant's prior illegal
conduct is relevant to the issue of his predisposition when it tends to prove that the defend-
ant was engaged in illegal operations similar to those charged. In this case, the defendant's
distribution of marijuana was found to be sufficiently similar to the current charges to be
relevant to the issue of his predisposition. It was further determined that the probative value
of such evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice and was therefore admissible.
1024. United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 926 (1978). See Pulido v. United States, 425 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1970)
(reasonable to conclude that where defendant was not an addict, government's emotional
appeal to a physical need for narcotics did not become coercive, and, therefore, predisposi-
tion existed).
1025. 575 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
1026. FED. R. EVID. 405(b) provides that "[i]n cases in which character or a trait of char-
acter of a person is an essential element of a. . . defense, proof may. . . be made of specific
instances of. . . conduct."
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inducement and nonpredisposition; it does not include character.10 2 7
Once the defendant has introduced evidence of his nonpredisposition
and of government inducement, the government has the burden of
showing that entrapment did not occur.102 8 The trial court may, how-
wer, determine that the defendant's evidence is insufficient to warrant
submission of the entrapment issue to the jury.0 29 In such cases, the
defendant may still attempt to prove a violation of his due process
rights.
10 30
VI. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
A4. Sentencing
1. Review
The broad discretion granted a sentencing judge is subject to limited
review when the duration of the sentence falls within statutorily pre-
scribed limits.' 0 3 1 When a court imposes a sentence in excess of the
maximum term authorized under the statute, however, the sentence is
illegal and may be corrected under rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.0 32 A defendant may argue on appeal that his
1027. United States v. Donoho, 575 F.2d 718, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). The
Donoho court explained:
The inducement concerns actions taken by persons other than the defendant, and the
predisposition concerns the defendant's state of mind prior to the inducement.
We recognize that proof of character may be relevant to the entrapment defense be-
cause it may make more probable than not that a defendant possessed a certain state of
mind. It is the state of mind itself, however, and not the method of proving the state of
mind, which operates as an essential element of the defense. . . . [P]redisposition may
be shown by methods other than proof of character. . .. Because proof can be made
by several methods, character is not even an essential method of proof, much less an
essential element of the defense itself.
1028. Pulido v. United States, 425 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1970).
1029. United States v. Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483, 487-88 (9th Cir. 1977) (mere fact that gov-
ernment agents made initial contact with defendant is evidence only that government fur-
nished opportunity and will not, alone, support submission of entrapment issue to jury).
1030. See notes 986-97 supra and accompanying text.
1031. United States v. Washington, 578 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1978) (imposition of maxi-
mum prison term for failure to appear for sentencing within discretion of sentencing judge);
United States v. Taxe, 572 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978) (no abuse of
discretion in refusing to merge numerous violations into single course of conduct for sen-
tencing purposes); United States v. Moreno, 569 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 435 U.S.
972 (1978) (imposition of 70-year sentence for distributing and dispensing heroin within
discretion of sentencing judge).
1032. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 provides in part: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at
any time and may correct an illegal sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time
provided . . . for the reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 120
days after the sentence is imposed. .. ."
Rule 35 provides two forms of relief. reduction of sentence and correction of an illegal
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sentence, although within statutory limits, is unduly harsh. Absent
some showing of abuse of discretion or illegality, the Ninth Circuit will
summarily affirm such sentences as beyond review.13 3 In United States
V. Moreno,10 3 4 for example, the defendants challenged the length of
their sentences, alleging improper judicial motivation. The Ninth Cir-
cuit expressly withheld review of this claim, reasoning that the
sentences were within the bounds prescribed by statute and, therefore,
within the trial judge's discretion.
0 35
2. Information that may be considered
The trial judge may consider a range of information, largely unlim-
ited as to its nature or source. 10 36 Although the court may consider
hearsay evidence of unproven criminal conduct contained in the pre-
sentence report, 10 37 due process requires that unwarranted weight not
be given to such information in formulating the sentence. 0 38 In United
States v. Weston, 0 39 the Ninth Circuit recognized the difference be-
tween reviewing a sentence and deciding that certain types of informa-
sentence. The motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea to the sentencing court
for leniency and therefore falls squarely within the discretion of the sentencing judge.
1033. United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1369 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant chal-
lenged length of sentence as disproportionate to involvement in criminal conspiracy); United
States v. Ramirez-Aguilar, 455 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1972) (sentence for being in United States
illegally not reviewable when within bounds prescribed by statute).
1034. 569 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972 (1978).
1035. Id. at 1053. See also United States v. Washington, 578 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1978)
(court's inquiry is whether penalty imposed is so out of proportion to crime committed as to
shock a balanced sense of justice).
1036. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). In Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949) the Court observed:
Highly relevant-if not essential-to. . . [the sentencing judge's] selection of an ap-
propriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning de-
fendant's life and characteristics. And modern concepts have made it all the more
necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent in-
formation by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly
applicable to the trial.
Id. at 247.
1037. United States v. Wondrack, 578 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1978) (sentencing judge ex-
pressly relied on probation officer's conclusion that defendant's miscellaneous income was
derived from illegal narcotics trafficking); Gelfuso v. Bell, 590 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1978) (sen-
tencing judge made reference to defendant's possible involvement with organized crime).
Furthermore, this position seems to be congressionally mandated. See 18 U.S.C. § 3577
(1976), which states: "No limitation shall be placed on information concerning the back-
ground, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sen-
tence."
1038. Gelfuso v. Bell, 590 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1978).
1039. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972).
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tion should not be considered in formulating that sentence. This
distinction allows a sentence to be reviewed and vacated when it is
premised on unverified allegations of serious criminal conduct.' °
The defendant in United States v. Wondrack,1°4' for example, was
convicted of tax evasion. After expressly relying on a probation of-
ficer's conclusion that the "probable source" of the defendant's miscel-
laneous income was from trafficking in narcotics, the district judge
increased the sentence that otherwise would have been imposed. The
defendant's miscellaneous income amounted to $125,000. Alleging that
this hearsay evidence was not sufficiently supported to pass the Weston
standard, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence. The
court noted that for several years prior to the year in question the de-
fendant's income had not exceeded $13,000 annually and that the de-
fendant had worked as a cargo handler for an international airline.
The court's finding that Wondrack's miscellaneous income probably
was acquired through drug dealings or some other illegal activity was
not "entirely without support" and, therefore, properly considered by
the sentencing judge.l°4
2
Consideration of improper information in formulating sentence is al-
leged frequently on appeal. Such attacks, however, are disposed of
generally on the basis of the trial court's disavowal of any reliance on
the challenged information.' 3
The Supreme Court in Gardner v. Florida'" concluded that a de-
fendant was denied due process of law when the death sentence was
imposed at least in part on the basis of information contained in a pre-
sentence report that he had had no opportunity to deny or explain.
While recognizing that fundamental fairness requires that a defendant
be told the substance of all derogatory information that adversely af-
1040. Convicted of receiving, concealing and facilitating transportation of heroin, Weston
was initially sentenced to five years imprisonment. The prosecution demurred and asked
that a pre-sentence report be obtained. The pre-sentence report asserted, on belief, that
Weston was one of the large distributors of narcotics in the area. After considering this pre-
sentence report, the judge imposed a maximum 20-year sentence. Reasoning that the in-
crease in sentence was "[biased on unsworn evidence detailing otherwise unverified state-
ments of a faceless informer," the appellate court found that the sentencing judge had relied
improperly on the information contained in the pre-sentence report. Id. at 631.
1041. 578 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1978).
1042. 578 F.2d at 810.
1043. See Chard v. United States, 578 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1978) (no error in district
judge's refusal to order hearing on alleged inaccuracies in pre-sentence memorandum);
United States v. Stevenson, 573 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1978) (no due process violation as there
was no indication judge materially relied upon speculative and unsupported information in
pre-sentence report).
1044. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
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fects his interests and has not been disclosed in open court,1°45 the
Ninth Circuit continues to allow nondisclosure in noncapital cases
when the sentence determination has been made in only partial reli-
ance on the withheld information.
10
46
3. Consecutive sentences
A court normally may impose consecutive sentences on a defendant
for each offense. The propriety of consecutive sentences turns on
whether the legislature defined several distinct offenses that could be
committed during the course of a single transaction, or instead defined
a single offense with progressively greater sanctions for aggravating cir-
cumstances.' °47 The Ninth Circuit has not favored separating essen-
tially unitary transactions into their component parts in order to exact
consecutive sentences in excess of the authorized maximum penalty for
a single offense.' °48
4. Increase in sentence
A court may not impose a greater sentence upon retrial following a
successful appeal in retaliation for the defendant's assertion of proce-
dural rights.' 9 To ensure the absence of such motivation, a more se-
1045. United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting United
States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1975)) (maintaining secrecy of government inves-
tigation held a proper basis for nondisclosure when sentencing judge did not rely exclusively
on confidential memorandum).
1046. See Pavao v. Cardwell, 583 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978) (maintaining integrity
of ongoing police investigation justified excising portion of pre-sentence report when consid-
eration of excised portion in no way influenced sentence determination).
1047. See United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1978) (consecutive
sentencing within court's discretion when importation and distribution each comprised a
distinct crime); United States v. Taxe, 572 F.2d 216, 217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918
(1978) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to merge numerous discrete violations into a single
course of conduct for sentencing purposes, when merger would retard statute's deterrent
effect).
1048. In United States v. Clements, 471 F.2d 1253, 1254 (9th Cir. 1972), the court stated:
"Unless we can find from the face of the Act or from its legislative history a clear indication
that Congress intended to authorize multiple punishments for a single transaction, we are
obliged to construe the Act against the harsher penalties that result from cumulative punish-
ments."
1049. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-25 (1968) (imposition of greater sen-
tence improper when no reason "based upon objective information concerning identifiable
conduct. . . of defendant. . .after. . . the original sentencing" appears in record to justify
increase); United States v. Lincoln, 581 F.2d 200,201 (9th Cir. 1978) (subsequent increase in
sentence proper when based on presentence report showing only negative information);
United States v. Young, 573 F.2d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 1978) (greater sentence proper when
imposed in reliance on subsequent indictment alleging narcotics trafficking occurring subse-
quent to original sentencing).
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vere sentence after retrial must be justified by actions of the defendant
occurring after the original sentencing and affirmatively appearing as
part of the record. 0 50 Tried twice previously for the same offense, the
defendant in United States v. Young,10 51 for example, was convicted of
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. The court im-
posed a six-year sentence and the defendant appealed, contending that
the sentence should not have exceeded the three-year sentence imposed
at the first trial. The Ninth Circuit, however, found the increase to be
properly based upon an indictment alleging narcotics trafficking that
occurred concurrently with the offense for which the defendant was
convicted but which was not revealed until after the second trial. Ad-
ding to the trial judge's understanding of the defendant's personal char-
acteristics, this information was properly considered in formulating the
ultimate sentence.
0 52
If the court imposes sentence in an illegal manner, the same court
may resentence the defendant even though the correction may increase
the punishment initially pronounced. 0 53 When service of the legal
portion of a sentence has commenced, however, the court may not in-
crease or make more severe the valid portion of the sentence originally
imposed.
10 54
In United States v. Best,1 55 for example, the court disapproved an
attempt to impose in a lawful manner that portion of the prior sentence
that, as originally imposed, was excessive. The defendant had been
convicted on all three counts of an information charging him with aid-
ing and abetting aliens to elude examination and inspection and was
sentenced to six-months imprisonment on each count, sentences to run
concurrently. The court further imposed a three-year probationary
term to run consecutively with the prison term. As the maximum sen-
tence allowed by statute on each count was six months in prison, the
probationary term was excessive and, therefore, illegal. The court,
upon the defendant's motion to correct the excessive sentence, resen-
tenced the defendant to six months in prison on count one and concur-
1050. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1968).
1051. 573 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978). The guilty verdict in the first trial was vacated and a
mistrial declared in the second. Id. at 1139.
1052. Id. at 1140-41.
1053. United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975
(1977) (proper to increase sentence to conform to that specifically required by law).
1054. Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26, 27 (9th Cir. 1964) (where statute fixed maxi-
mum penalty at five years, ten-year concurrent sentences for breaking and entering were
void only as to excessive five years).
1055. 571 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978).
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rent probation terms of three years on counts two and three.
Reasoning that this sentence amounted to an increase of the valid por-
tion of the defendant's original sentence, the Ninth Circuit held it to be
precluded by double jeopardy.
10 5 6
5. Computation of time served
A defendant in the Ninth Circuit has no constitutional right to credit
for time served prior to sentencing unless the sentence received was the
statutory maximum and the pre-sentence incarceration was the result
of indigency. 05 7 A sentence shorter than the statutory maximum is
presumed to include credit for pre-sentence time served.1
0 58
Sentencing under the Federal Youth Corrections Act 0 59 is designed
to provide treatment and rehabilitation, rather than retribution, for
youthful offenders under twenty-two years of age.10 60 The Act provides
that the youth shall be released conditionally within four years from
the date of conviction.10 6' The Ninth Circuit, in Ogg v. Klein, 0 62 was
asked to decide whether an escape tolled a youth offender's sentence.
Shortly after incarceration, Ogg walked away from the facility without
permission and remained on escape status for nearly five years. Even-
tually surrendering, he was released on his own recognizance pending
an appearance to initiate proceedings on the escape charge. The
United States Bureau of Prisons, contending that Ogg had yet to serve
the remainder of his sentence, directed the United States Marshall to
take Ogg into custody. Ogg then filed a habeas corpus action request-
ing release. He argued that he must be released after the expiration of
four years from the date of conviction and that those four years had
passed. Reasoning that an escape does and should toll the youth of-
fender's sentence, the court denied Ogg's petition for habeas corpus re-
lief.
0 63
6. Cruel and unusual punishment
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment ° 64 to preclude penalties "'so
1056. Id. at 486.
1057. Hook v. Arizona, 496 F.2d 1172, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 1974).
1058. Id.
1059. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
1060. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974).
1061. 18 U.S.C. § 5017(c) (1976).
1062. 572 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978).
1063. Id. at 1382.
1064. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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out of proportion to the crime committed that it shocks a balanced
sense of justice'."'" 65 The defendant in United States v. Washington
10 66
was charged in a one-count indictment with aiding and abetting mail
theft, a felony, but was allowed to plead guilty to obstruction of the
mail, a misdemeanor. A date was set for sentencing, but the defendant
did not appear. He was later convicted of failure to appear and sen-
tenced to five-years imprisonment. Reasoning that the sentence, when
considered in light of the defendant's direct affront to the authority of
the court, did not reveal the required gross disparity, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 10
67
B. Appeals
1. Finality
Section 1291 of the Judicial Code 0 68 vests the federal courts of ap-
peals with jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States, the Canal Zone, Guam and the Virgin Is-
lands. Appellate review is not a constitutional right; it is purely statu-
tory and arises only after the trial court has rendered a final decision in
the case. 1069
The imposition of sentence is the final judgment in a criminal
case.10 70 In United States v. Richardson,1 7' however, the Ninth Circuit
recognized an exception to the final judgment rule for collateral orders
that would not be subject to effective post-judgment review. The Rich-
ardson court found jurisdiction to review a pre-trial denial of a motion
to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds. 1072
The Ninth Circuit traditionally had held that such an order was not
within the collateral order exception 10 73 developed by the Supreme
1065. United States v. Holman, 436 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 913
(1970) (eight-year prison sentence for narcotics violations not cruel and unusual punish-
ment) (quoting Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 1960)).
1066. 578 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1978).
1067. Id. at 258. See also Territory of Guam v. Sabl6n, 584 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1978)
(statute mandating life imprisonment for first-degree murder upheld against cruel and unu-
sual punishment challenge).
1068. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
1069. Id.
1070. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937) (imposition, rather than execu-
tion, of sentence effects finality).
1071. 580 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1978).
1072. Id. at 947.
1073. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 544 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
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Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 10 74 The Supreme
Court, however, in Abney v. United States °75 expressly held that
"[a]lthough ... a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss an indict-
ment on double jeopardy grounds lacks the finality traditionally con-
sidered indispensable to appellate review, we conclude that such orders
fall within the 'small class of cases' that Cohen has placed beyond the
confines of the final-judgment rule.'
10 76
2. Jurisdiction
Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure fixes the time
for all appeals in criminal cases as "within 10 days after the entry of the
judgment or order appealed from."' 10 77 Failure to satisfy this require-
ment deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.10 7
In Hayward v. Britt,10 79 the defendant filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion of judgment after his appeal time had expired. Aware that his
appeal period had run, the appellant also asked that, if this motion was
denied, the court vacate the original judgment and reenter it, thereby
permitting a timely appeal to be made. Denying the motion for recon-
sideration, the trial court vacated and reentered the judgment and from
this, the defendant then made a timely appeal. Observing that "[t]he
1024 (1976) (claim of double jeopardy does not concern a purely collateral matter and re-
view should be postponed until final judgment).
1074. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In a stockholder's derivative action, the district court denied
the defendant's motion to require the plaintiff to give security for costs and expenses, pursu-
ant to a New Jersey statute. The Supreme Court held that the order of denial was final and
appealable. Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, observed:
[T]his order of the District Court did not make any step toward final disposition of the
merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment. When that time comes, it
will be too late effectively to review the present order, and the rights conferred by the
statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably ....
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consider-
ation be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated ...
We hold this order appealable because it is a final disposition of a claimed right
which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration
with it.
Id. at 546-47.
1075. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
1076. Id. at 659. See also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951) ("[I]t is a final decision
that Congress has made reviewable. . . .While a final judgment is always a final decision,
there are instances in which a final decision is not a final judgment.") (separate opinion of
Jackson, J.) (citations omitted).
1077. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b).
1078. Smith v. United States, 425 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1970) (oral declaration did not
constitute compliance with the notice of appeal filing requirements).
1079. 572 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1978).
19791
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
vacation and reinstatement of the judgment are an attempt to circum-
vent the time requirements for the filing of an appeal,"'' 0 8 0 the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the motion to reconsider was insufficient to con-
fer appellate jurisdiction.
10 8 '
Except when further prosecution would place the accused in double
jeopardy, the government is given the right of appeal from an order
dismissing all or part of an indictment or information.10 82 In a state
criminal prosecution removed to federal court, the state has a similar
right of appeal under 18 U.S.C. section 373 1.1083
3. Standard of review
Underlying the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is the philoso-
phy that it is wise to leave the details of procedure to the informed
discretion of the trial court.10 8 4 The appellate courts, therefore, will
review trial proceedings only to determine whether the trial court has
abused its discretion. 08 5 In United States v. Gay,0 8 6 for example, a
defendant moved for severance upon the claim that the testimony of a
co-defendant would exculpate him. The co-defendant stated that he
would testify, but only if tried first. The trial court rejected the condi-
tional offer to testify and denied the motion to sever. Following a joint
trial, all defendants were convicted as charged. The defendant ap-
pealed, claiming that his motion for a separate trial was improperly
denied. The Ninth Circuit recognized that "the decision to grant the
severance [was] within the discretion of the court"'' 0 8 7 and held that
"review on appeal is limited to whether. . . the joint trial. . . [was] so
prejudicial. . . as to require the exercise of that discretion in only one
way, by ordering a separate trial."'
'0 8 8
1080. Id. at 1325.
1081. Id.
1082. Arizona v. Manypenny, No. 77-3453 (9th Cir. July 31, 1978).
1083. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
1084. The Ninth Circuit in 1978 continued to recognize several matters as peculiarly
within the discretion of the trial judge. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235
(9th Cir. 1978) (motion to depose proposed witness); United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356
(9th Cir. 1978) (scope of voir dire examination); United States v. Shields, 571 F.2d 1115 (9th
Cir. 1978) (admission into evidence of potentially prejudicial information).
1085. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1978) (scope of voir dire is
directed to the sound discretion of the trial court); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d
1350 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978) (refusal to grant motion for severance will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion).
1086. 567 F.2d 916 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978).
1087. Id. at 919 (quoting Davt v. United States, 405 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971)).
1088. 567 F.2d at 919 (quoting United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir.
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Although the trial court's findings of fact are not conclusive on ap-
peal, there is a heavy burden on the party seeking to disturb them. A
finding of fact must be "clearly erroneous" to warrant reversal on ap-
peal.108 9 Although supporting evidence may be available, a finding is
clearly erroneous when the reviewing court, on the entire record, is
"left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted.' 10 90 This standard, however, does not apply to the district
court's conclusions of law.'0 91 In United States v. Rosales,10 92 for ex-
ample, the prosecution appealed a ruling by the district court sup-
pressing the declaration of an alleged co-conspirator.10 93 Following an
offer of proof by the Government, the trial judge ruled that a prima
facie case of conspiracy had not been established and that the state-
ments must be suppressed. Reasoning that whether facts presented by
the Government were sufficient to create a jury question on the exist-
ence of a conspiracy was a question of law, rather than a finding of fact,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was not confined to the "clearly
erroneous or some other restricted standard of review" but could exer-
cise independent judgment. 1
0 94
Reflecting the reality that jurors may not always be capable of
strictly applying the instructions of the court or of basing their verdict
exclusively upon the evidence developed at trial, rule 29 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 10 95 provides relief to the victim of an im-
proper or irrational verdict. If the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction, the defendant, by moving for acquittal, has the opportunity
to take the case from the jury and have it determined by the trial judge.
Although the Ninth Circuit has not considered the applicability of rule
29 to bench trials, it seems clear that, because the plea of "not guilty"
asks the court for a judgment of acquittal, the rule is inapplicable. 096
1975)). Accord, United States v. Uriarte, 575 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 963
(1978) (defendant not unduly prejudiced by trial court's denial of motion for severance).
1089. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2585 (2d ed.
1971).
1090. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
1091. See 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.0312], at 2662 (2d ed. 1975).
1092. 584 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1978).
1093. An undercover agent was prepared to testify to the alleged co-conspirator's declara-
tion naming the defendant as his source of drugs. Id. at 872.
1094. Id. at 873. The Ninth Circuit reversed the order of the district court, stating, "[W]e
think it manifest that a jury could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a
conspiracy existed." .d.
1095. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 provides in pertinent part: "The court on motion of a defend-
ant or of its own motion shall order the entry ofjudgment of acquittal. . . if the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses."
1096. See generally United States v. Pitts, 428 F.2d 534, 535 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
1979]
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If the reviewing court finds legal error in the proceedings below, it
must determine the degree to which the error is prejudicial. 0 97 As a
general rule, an error of constitutional dimensions is more likely to be
found prejudicial than errors of nonconstitutional import.10 98 Yet, the
Supreme Court, in Chapman v. Caifornia,10 99 held that such constitu-
tional error was not prejudicial per se and can be held harmless if the
Government shows the error to be "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." 10 0  In United States v. Price, 0' the trial court improperly re-
fused to permit a defendant to cross-examine a witness about her rela-
tionship with law enforcement officers. While recognizing that in most
denial of effective cross-examination cases it would be rare to find the
denial harmless, 0 2 the court determined the error in Price to be harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.1
0 3
The Ninth Circuit will reverse under the "plain error" rule' "on only
in those "very exceptional circumstances where reversal is necessary in
order to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and
U.S. 910 (1970) (as a result of a not guilty plea, sufficiency question properly before court of
appeals); United States v. Besase, 373 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1967) (in nonjury trial, on not guilty
plea, sufficiency of evidence should be reviewed).
1097. There are three levels of error, (I) harmless error, (2) reversible error, and (3) plain
error. Harmless error does not lead to reversal although properly objected to and raised on
appeal. United States v. Price 577 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978). Reversible error will
result in reversal of the conviction when properly objected to and raised on appeal. Cooper
v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978). If plain error is present, the conviction will be
reversed even though there was no objection and the issue was not raised on appeal. United
States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 938-39 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978).
1098. See United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1977) (constitu-
tional errors distinguished from nonconstitutional errors: the Government must demon-
strate that a constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the
defendant must demonstrate that a non-constitutional error was harmful).
1099. 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (prosecutor's comments to jury and court's instruction concern-
ing petitioner's failure to testify not harmless error).
1100. Id. at 23-24.
1101. 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1978).
1102. Id. at 1362-64.
1103. Id. at 1362. Although defendant's cross-examination of the witness was limited, her
relationship with the police was fully explored on cross-examination by counsel for the co-
defendants. The witness testified she had been arrested for possession of marijuana and was
cooperating with the county drug enforcement officers, that following a hearing the charge
was dropped, and that she had been friendly with the narcotics officer, had worked for him,
and had received expense reimbursement of $34. In addition, the evidence against the de-
fendant, consisting of documentary evidence, several taped conversations, and the testimony
of many corroborating witnesses, was overwhelming. While not relating directly to the ef-
fectiveness of defendant's right of cross-examination, these facts did bear upon whether any
damage was suffered by him. Id. Cf. Bittaker v. Enomoto, 587 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1978)
(refusal to apply the harmless error doctrine to denial of right of self-representation).
1104. FED. R. CiuM. P. 52(b).
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reputation of the judicial process."1105 When the evidence against a
defendant is so strong that the absence of error would not have
changed the jury's verdict, plain error seldom will be found. In United
States v. Giese,'10 6 for example, the appellant contended that the prose-
cution committed blatant acts of misconduct during closing argu-
ment.1107 At the trial, the defendant neither objected to the
prosecution's statements nor asked for curative instructions. When
considered in light of the large amount of evidence unaffected by any-
thing the prosecution did during its final arguments, the court held that
any impropriety did not amount to plain error.
°10 8
Some constitutional errors, particularly those prejudicing rights es-
sential to a fair trial, are reversible without regard to the presence or
absence of prejudice. 10 9 The Ninth Circuit has also reversed automat-
ically on the basis of nonconstitutional errors so inherently prejudicial
as to obviate the need for inquiry into actual harm.
1110
4. Concurrent sentence doctrine
If the judge chooses concurrent sentences for convictions on multiple
counts of an indictment, the "concurrent sentence doctrine" may apply
on appeal. Under this rule, a federal appellate court may decline to
decide an issue as to a conviction under one count of an indictment if
the defendant has been validly convicted under another count and con-
current sentences were imposed.""I In United States v. Raborn," l z the
1105. United States v. Uriarte, 575 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 963 (1978)
(admission of rebuttal evidence given in connection with testimony concerning defendant's
prior arrest did not constitute plain error so as to require reversal in absence of objection at
trial); United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's erroneous state-
ments shifted burden of proof to defendant, thus denying him of benefits of reasonable
doubt standard and amounting to plain error).
1106. 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1979).
1107. The trial transcript showed the prosecution had offered personal characterizations
of the appellant, calling him "sick," "a wolf in sheep's clothing," and "a very dangerous
individual." The prosecution had further asked the jury to place faith in the government's
credibility and repeatedly commented on the defendant's failure to produce evidence. Id. at
1199.
1108. Id.
1109. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced
confession); Tunney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge)).
I 110. United States v. Park, 521 F.2d 1381, 1383 n.l (9th Cir. 1975) (trial judge's reading
of defendant's presentence report before determination of guilt was reversible per se).
1111. United States v. Diaz-Alvarado, 587 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1978) (in exercise of discre-
tion, court would not examine assertion that trial court erred in failing to give proposed jury
instruction on conspiracy charge where defendants were validly convicted under distribution
charge and concurrent sentences were imposed for convictions).
1112. 575 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1978).
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defendant received a five-year sentence for conviction of bribery, false
claims and tax evasion, a two-year sentence for accepting a gratuity,
and a three-year sentence for filing a false income tax return, all
sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, Raborn made several
challenges to his bribery conviction after the court upheld the tax eva-
sion conviction. Observing that the sentences imposed on the bribery
and tax counts were to run concurrently, the court refused to consider
the issues relating to the bribery conviction.' 113
5. New trial
Upon a motion by the defendant, the trial court may grant a new
trial "if required in the interest of justice."' 1 4 Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 33 implicitly denies the trial court the power to order a
new trial sua sponte."
l 15
A motion for new trial may be joined in the alternative with a mo-
tion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict under rule
29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1 6 In all cases in
which the verdict or finding of guilt occurs after June 1, 1978, the de-
fendant will be required to have made a timely motion in district court
.for a new trial under rule 33 to preserve that possibility should the
granted motion of acquittal under rule 29(c) be reversed on appeal. 117
To prevail in a rule 33 motion, the defense must demonstrate that a
new trial would probably produce an acquittal."1' 8 In cases involving
prosecutorial misconduct, however, the Ninth Circuit applies a more
liberal standard of materiality." '9 In United Slates v. Butler,"I2 ° for
example, the appellants contended that the prosecution failed to dis-
close a promise to a key government witness that charges pending
against him would be dismissed if he testified against the defendant.
Reasoning that the newly discovered evidence would not have altered
the jury's verdict, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a
new trial. The Ninth Circuit reversed, however, holding that the
1113. Id. at 690.
1114. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
1115. Id. ("The court on the motion ofthe defendant may grant a new trial .... ") (em-
phasis added).
1116. United States v. Rojas, 574 F.2d 476, 476 (9th Cir. 1978) (supplemental order).
1117. Id.
1118. United States v. Cervantes, 542 F.2d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 1976) (availability of in-
formant not sufficient to probably produce an acquittal).
1119. United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 1978) (new trial required if
witness' false testimony might have affected the jury's assessment of credibility).
1120. 567 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1978).
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proper standard of materiality in nondisclosure cases is whether the
newly discovered evidence might reasonably have affected the jury's
judgment.1 21 A supplemental finding that the jury probably would
have changed its verdict was unnecessary."
22
C. Habeas Corpus
1. Jurisdiction
The federal writ of habeas corpus embraces all claims by a petitioner
that he was "denied rights secured to him under the federal Constitu-
tion or other federal law" in pre-conviction proceedings." 123 The writ is
available only to "in custody""124 petitioners in cases in which the justi-
fying circumstances have not become moot" 2 and may be granted by
any justice of the Supreme Court, or by any circuit or district court
judge within their respective jurisdictions." 26  In Cervantes v.
Walker," 27 a state prisoner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief
challenging the conditions of his probation." 28 Observing that the pro-
bation period had expired prior to oral arguments, the Ninth Circuit
held the challenge to be moot."
29
2. Relief for federal prisoners
Often employed in lieu of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. section 2255 cre-
ates a post-conviction procedure on behalf of a prisoner in custody
under sentence of a federal court." 30 If this remedy fails or is not ap-
1121. Id. at 890.
1122. Id. Additionally, the court held that a motion for new trial should have been
granted due to the prejudicial effect of the nondisclosure of the defense's ability to fully and
fairly present its case. By casting doubt on the prosecution's case and by increasing the
scope of their closing argument, the defense could seriously have affected the jury's assess-
ment of the witness' credibility. Id. at 891. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
(prosecution's failure to tender victim's criminal record to defense did not justify new trial).
1123. 7B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2202, at 903 (2d ed. 1971).
1124. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1)-(4), 2254(a), 2255 (1976). For purposes of a federal habeas
corpus petition by a state prisoner, custody will be determined under state law. See
Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978) (state probationer "in custody" under
California law for purposes of federal habeas corpus petition).
1125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 425 (9th Cir.
1978) (claim of unconstitutional conditions of probation moot where petitioner's three-year
probationary period had expired).
1126. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1976).
1127. 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978).
1128. As a condition of probation, Cervantes was to submit to a search of his person and
property at any time without notice. Id. at 425.
1129. Id. at 426.
1130. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "A prisoner in custody under
1979]
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plicable, the propriety of the detention may be questioned under the
traditional habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. section 2241. On appeal in
Elliot v. United States," 3 the prisoner alleged in a section 2255 motion
to vacate or correct sentence that both the sentencing judge and the
parole board relied upon false information that the prisoner had been
convicted of rape. He further contended that the parole board was not
giving serious consideration to his application for parole. The Ninth
Circuit held that a motion under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 was not the
appropriate vehicle to attack the parole board's actions, but that he
should make his claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.'
32
Section 2255 grants subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts
to consider motions for post-conviction relief on four grounds: (1) the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 33 A
sentence attacked collaterally because of a nonconstitutional error of
federal law does not, however, automatically warrant relief.' 34 The
appropriate inquiry in such cases is whether the claimed error of law is
a fundamental defect that "inherently results in a complete miscarriage
of justice" presenting an "exceptional circumstance" in which the need
for the remedy afforded by writ of habeas corpus is apparent. 135 In
Marshall v. United States,1 36 for example, the petitioner, under section
2255, collaterally challenged the government's failure to satisfy the pre-
trial notice requirement to proceed against him as a dangerous special
offender.' 137 Despite petitioner's attempt to frame the notice require-
sentence of a court established by Act of Congress... may move the court which imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
1131. 572 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1978).
1132. Id. at 239.
1133. See, e.g., Portillo v. United States, 588 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1978) (§ 2255 petition
alleging sentence had been improperly enhanced upon reliance on invalid conviction);
Hitchcock v. United States, 580 F.2d 964, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1978) (§ 2255 proceeding to deter-
mine whether conviction violated the laws of the United States); Marshall v. United States,
576 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1978) (remedy for sixth amendment right of confrontation violation
under § 2255).
1134. See, e.g., United States v. Hitchcock, 580 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1978) (not every as-
serted error of law can be raised on a § 2255 motion); Marshall v. United States, 576 F.2d
160 (9th Cir. 1978) (nonconstitutional issues may be collaterally attacked only when some
type of extraordinary discrepancy is alleged).
1135. Lepera v. United States, 587 F.2d 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting Davis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)).
1136. 576 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1978).
1137. Pre-trial notice required by 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a)(2) (1976) must identify with partic-
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ment in constitutional terms, the court held that the notice requirement
was clearly statutory in nature, and that this nonconstitutional claim
did not present an "exceptional circumstance" constituting a funda-
mental defect leading to a complete miscarriage of justice.'1
38
The availability of section 2255 relief for a nonconstitutional error
depends upon the degree of error and the injuries alleged. In Yothers v.
United States," 139 for example, the defendant pleaded guilty to conspir-
acy to import hashish and was sentenced to five-years imprisonment
and a special parole term of two years. Yothers, alleging that he had
failed to understand that the special parole term was a mandatory min-
imum rather than a maximum, filed a section 2255 motion to vacate the
conviction and sentence so as to allow him to replead. The court found
that the sentencing judge had failed to explain the unique nature and
consequences of a special parole term. Such manifest noncompliance
with rule 1 l(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required
that the conviction be set aside." 40 In Lepera v. United States,'14 1 how-
ever, the district court, under similar circumstances, denied the defend-
ant's section 2255 petition for relief. Lepera had pled guilty in
consideration of judicial and prosecutorial representations that he
would receive concurrent sentences for convictions of conspiracy to dis-
tribute cocaine and parole violation. The court, however, had no au-
thority to make such a promise because the parole board had exclusive
jurisdiction to execute the parole violation warrant. The parole board
eventually cooperated with the court, executing the parole violation
warrant to allow the sentences to run concurrently. Concluding that
Lepera had received the sentence bargained for, the Ninth Circuit
found no prejudice with respect to total time served.
1 42
The Ninth Circuit, in 1978,1 43 delineated the procedure to be fol-
lowed by the district courts when a convict files a section 2255 motion
claiming a Tucker violation. A Tucker-type challenge alleges enhance-
ment of the petitioner's sentence because of reliance on an invalid prior
conviction. 44 Section 2255 Tucker petitions ordinarily should be de-
ularity the reasons why the prosecuting attorney believes the defendant to be a dangerous
special offender.
1138. 576 F.2d at 162.
1139. 572 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1978).
1140. Id. at 1328.
1141. 587 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1978).
1142. Lepera asked the court to terminate his case rather than allow him an opportunity
to replead. This buttressed the court's conclusion but was not itself pivotal. Id. at 436.
1143. Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
1144. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). The Supreme Court stated:
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cided by the original sentencing judge. The court recognized that a
trial judge's familiarity with the case may lead him to give only pro
forma consideration to the petition but concluded that such a danger is
not unique to Tucker-type cases and that it is necessary to "trust that
our judges will rise above such influences."
' 114 5
Section 2255 requires that an evidentiary hearing be held "[u]nless
the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief."I 46 In a case in which the judge's
own recollection enables him to determine whether the original sen-
tence might have been different had he then known that the prior con-
victions were invalid, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary)
147
Furthermore, a hearing into the validity of the prior convictions is not
required if the judge determines from the record that a new sentence,
formulated without reliance on the challenged convictions, would
nonetheless be the same. 148 It is only when the sentencing judge has
found that the original sentence would be inappropriate that the peti-
tioner must be afforded an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the
prior convictions.1149
Upon reviewing a Townsend claim"150 pursuant to a section 2255 mo-
"[To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, [372 U.S. 335
(1963)], to be used against a person either to support guilt or to enhance punishment for
another offense. . . is to erode the principle of that case." 404 U.S. at 449. The Court went
on to proscribe reliance on such invalid convictions to enhance punishment.
1145. Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1350 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (under sen-
tence for jumping bail and failing to pay a special tax on 119 pounds of marijuana, defend-
ant moved to vacate, alleging sentencing court had considered four invalid prior
convictions). This same practice is followed with motions to correct or reduce sentence pur-
suant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
1146. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
1147. In Portillo v. United States, 588 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1978), the defendant moved on
due process grounds to vacate his sentence, contending that the sentencing judge had relied
on an invalid prior conviction. Denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court concluded:
This Judge was, and still is, of the opinion that regardless of the invalidity surrounding
( . . [the prior convictions]. . . the facts and circumstances surrounding this particular
case dictate fifteen years to be the appropriate sentence for this particular conviction.
Thus, no singular prior conviction or materially false assumption, enhanced this peti-
tioner's sentence.
.d. at 715-16.
1148. Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1978).
1149. See United States v. Chard, 578 F.2d 1317, 1318 (9th Cir. 1978) (refusal to grant
evidentiary hearing proper where record clearly indicated that allegedly inaccurate memo-
randum was not relied on in imposing sentence).
1150. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). The Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion of a defendant who was sentenced on the basis of materially untrue assumptions con-
cerning his criminal record. The Court held that the pronouncement of sentence on a
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tion, a sentence will be vacated-on appeal only if the challenged infor-
mation is false and unreliable and, demonstrably, was the basis for the
sentence.1 51 It must appear affirmatively in the record that the court
based its sentence on improper information.
152
Absent a showing of cause and prejudice, failure to comply with rule
32(a)(1) by presenting "any information in mitigation of punishment"
at the time of sentencing may operate as a waiver of a subsequent sec-
tion 2255 challenge." 53
3. Relief for state prisoners
A state prisoner may petition a federal district court for habeas
corpus relief by alleging that he is being held in violation of the Consti-
tution, laws or treaties of the United States." 54 In 1978, state prisoners
filed habeas corpus petitions challenging the conditions of proba-
tion,' 115 the basis of a guilty plea,' 1 56 the adequacy of counsel at
trial,' '57 the revocation of parole absent a hearing,"1 58 and the length of
delay prior to trial."5 9 The defendant in Bittaker v. Enomoto,1160 for
example, sought a writ challenging the state's earlier denial of his right
of self-representation." 6' The court held that such state action was a
constitutional defect automatically prejudicing the defendant's interest
materially false foundation that the petitioner had no opportunity to correct because he was
without counsel lacked due process of law. Id. at 740-41.
1151. Farrow v. United States, 380 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978).
1152. Id.
1153. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (right to review admission of inculpatory
statements by habeas corpus waived by failure to object).
1154. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1976). When a state contains more than one federal judi-
cial district, venue is proper either in the district in which petitioner was convicted and
sentenced or in the district in which he is being held. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1976).
1155. Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978) (as condition of probation, peti-
tioner was subject to search at any time without notice).
1156. Stone v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1978) (petitioner, charged with lewd and
lascivious acts, pleaded guilty to child molestation pursuant to a plea bargain but received a
penalty nearly four times that which he would have received had he pleaded not guilty and
been convicted on the original charge).
1157. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (petitioner cited counsel's re-
.peated failures to move to suppress evidence).
1158. Heinz v. McNutt, 582 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1978) (petitioner's parole revoked without
final revocation hearing pursuant to Washington statute which permitted automatic revoca-
tion of parole for persons convicted of a felony or misdemeanor while on parole).
1159. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978) (petitioner contended that nine-
month delay between arrest and trial resulted in speedy trial violation).
1160. 587 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1978).
1161. See Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1021 (1970). See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant in state
criminal trial has constitutional right of self-representation).
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and requiring that the state conviction be set aside.1 62
The district court, in a habeas corpus proceeding, will accept state
court findings of fact if made after a full and fair hearing and if sub-
stantially supported by the record.' 163 In Taylor v. Cardwell,,1 64 a key
prosecution witness stated after trial that his testimony had been false
and that the government was aware of the fabrication. The district
court appropriately accepted this finding of historical fact.
165
Findings of fact need not be accepted by the federal court absent a
full and fair evidentiary hearing at the state level. In Stone v. Card-
well, 166 for example, the petitioner contended that the lengthy sen-
tence imposed was not in accordance with the plea bargain upon which
his guilty plea had been based. Stone had suffered a sentence nearly
four times as great as that which he would have received had he
pleaded not guilty, stood trial, been convicted on all four charges
against him, and been given the maximum sentence on all counts with
the sentences to run consecutively. Despite this seemingly blatant ir-
regularity,' 1 67 the state court found that the petitioner had failed to es-
tablish that his sentence was contrary to the plea bargain. To enable
the district court to determine whether this finding was the product of a
full and fair hearing, fairly supported by the record, the Ninth Circuit
remanded the case to allow the petitioner to supplement the record
with transcripts of the state proceedings.16 8
D. Double Jeopardy
1. Separate offenses
The fifth amendment provides that no person shall be "twice put in
jeopardy [for the same offense.]" ' 1 69 Courts frequently have limited the
scope of this protection by adopting a narrow concept of an "offense."
The plea of former jeopardy is held inapplicable in a second prosecu-
tion for an offense that, although committed within the same act or as
1162. 587 F.2d at 402.
1163. See Gardner v. Pogue, 568 F.2d 648, 649 (9th Cir. 1978) (adherence to state court's
findings of fact).
1164. 579 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1978).
1165. If the state court does not make findings of fact, the district court may make its own
findings from the record. The court should conduct an evidentiary hearing for this purpose,
Id. at 1382-83.
1166. 575 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1978).
1167. The Ninth Circuit noted: "If this was indeed pursuant to plea bargain it was a
strange bargain." Id. at 726.
1168. Id. at 726-27.
1169. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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part of the same transaction, is technically separate from the offense
forming the basis of the first prosecution. 1170 In United States v. Rich-
ardson,'171 for example, the court imposed consecutive sentences upon
convictions of conspiracy to smuggle laetrile and conspiracy to receive
and distribute smuggled goods. On appeal, the defendants contended
that they were placed in double jeopardy because the conspiracy, while
involving two discrete substantive offenses, was but a single agreement.
Reasoning that the existence of two conspiracies was a factual question
and that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court finding,
the Ninth Circuit held that the imposition of consecutive sentences did
not subject the defendants to double jeopardy.'
172
To determine whether two offenses are distinct, the federal courts
generally compare the statutory definitions to determine whether each
requires proof of some element not required by the other."1 73 In United
States v. Robbins, 1 74 for example, the defendant argued that two con-
victions, one for possession of a gun and the other for receipt of the
same gun, were essentially identical and violated the double jeopardy
clause. The Ninth Circuit found this argument to be without merit and
held that the receipt of the gun was a new and separate offense from
possession of the gun, as it required proof of different facts.
117
2. Attachment of jeopardy
"Jeopardy does not attach. . . until a defendant is put to trial before
the trier of the facts."' 1 7 6 In a jury trial, the defendant is first exposed
to jeopardy when the jury is impaneled."177 In a nonjury trial, jeopardy
attaches when the court begins to hear evidence! 178
1170. See Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 572 (1958) (each of four murders, although
apparently taking place at same time, prosecuted singly at separate trials).
1171. 588 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1978).
1172. Id. at 1241.
1173. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19 (1959) (although evidentiary facts
necessary to support a conviction for purchasing heroin and a conviction for receiving and
concealing the same heroin were the same, ultimate facts were different); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (consecutive sentences imposed for three counts of selling narcot-
ics affirmed, even though convictions were all based on same sale).
1174. 579 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1978).
1175. Id. at 1154.
1176. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388-89 (1975) (jeopardy had not attached
when district court dismissed indictment because petitioner had not been put to trial).
1177. Id.; Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 466-71 (1973) (trial court declared mistrial
after jury had been selected and sworn).
1178. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975) (jeopardy had not attached when
district court had before it only a motion for dismissal of indictment). See United States v.
Choate, 527 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) (government
1979]
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There are some circumstances in which the first trial may be termi-
nated after jeopardy has attached, but, short of final judgment, will not
sustain the claim of double jeopardy. These circumstances include a
mistrial if a "manifest necessity" for declaring a mistrial existed or "the
ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated" by allowing the
trial to proceed.' 179 In United States v. Hooper,lI8 ° the Ninth Circuit
held that principles of double jeopardy did not prevent the defendant's
retrial after the trial court had declared a mistrial. After hearing the
government's opening statement and the testimony of two witnesses,
the district judge noted that he had mistakenly impaneled less than the
required twelve jurors and that, unless the parties stipulated to six ju-
rors, he must declare a mistrial. When the defendant declined to waive
his right to a twelve-member jury, the court declared a mistrial, dis-
missed the panel, and reset the case. The defendant's subsequent mo-
tion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was denied, and the newly
impaneled jury convicted him. Reasoning that continuance would
have been an obvious procedural error requiring reversal, the Ninth
Circuit held that the declaration of mistrial was of "manifest necessity"
and in conformity with the ends of public justice, thus precluding the
defendant's double jeopardy claim.
118'
3. Collateral estoppel
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied in the fifth amend-
ment's double jeopardy prohibition. Accordingly, an acquittal based
on a factual issue, also presented as an essential element of a second
charge, necessarily bars trial on that charge." 8 2 Charged initially with
overbilling the government for legal services provided to minority busi-
nessmen, the defendant in United States v. Hernandez"13 testified at
trial to the number of hours spent giving legal advice to a partner in a
certain business. Subsequent to a judgment of acquittal entered by the
court, this partner was located and asserted that he had never had any
could appeal from a dismissal of indictment charging income tax evasion as jeopardy had
not yet attached because motions alleging improper counsel occurred prior to trial).
1179. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (jury discharge for failure
to agree to verdict without consent of prisoner does not bar a subsequent trial for same
offense).
1180. 576 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1978).
1181. Id. at 1383.
1182. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-45 (1970) (since jury in first trial had deter-
mined by its verdict that petitioner was not one of the robbers, the State was constitutionally
foreclosed from relitigating that issue in another trial).
1183. 572 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1978).
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such meetings with the defendant. A perjury indictment was then re-
turned against the defendant, charging that he had lied regarding his
meetings with the partner, and he was convicted.
The Ninth Circuit found the issue in both trials to be the number of
hours that the defendant had spent with the partner giving legal advice.
Reasoning that the acquittal in the first case meant that the judge had
necessarily decided that the defendant's relevant testimony was true,
the court held that collateral estoppel foreclosed the Government from
prosecuting the defendant for perjury.
18 4
4. Government appeals
The double jeopardy clause was designed to protect defendants
against the possibility of a second trial with its attendant embarass-
ment, expense and ordeal. The doctrine, therefore, normally prevents a
direct attack by the prosecutor upon a verdict of acquittal.'1 8 5
If a successful government appeal will not result in the defendant's
subjection to a second trial but will merely reinstate the jury's guilty
verdict, the defendant's double jeopardy interests are not impli-
cated."186 In United States v. Dreitzler,187 for example, the defendant
was convicted by a jury on twenty-three counts of willfully misapplying
bank funds. Thereafter, the district court granted the defendant's mo-
tion for judgment of acquittal on all counts. The defendant asserted
that the Government's subsequent appeal violated double jeopardy.
Reasoning that reinstatement of the verdicts, should the Government
prevail on appeal, would not subject the defendant to multiple prosecu-
tions, the Ninth Circuit held that double jeopardy did not preclude the
appeal.
188
The defense of double jeopardy is available only when the defendant
is twice placed in jeopardy by the same government for the same of-
1184. Id. at 222. Cf United States v. Dipp, 581 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 841 (1979), in which a perury conviction arising out of false testimony did not directly
relate to the conspiracy for which the defendant was being tried. Therefore, the jury verdict
of acquittal on the charged conspiracy did not necessarily determine whether the jury be-
lieved the defendant's testimony and collateral estoppel was not applied.
1185. See United States v. Rojas, 554 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1977) (no double jeopardy
when government appeals court's post-trial grant of motion to set aside jury verdict of
guilty).
1186. Forman v. Wolff, 590 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1978) (remand to custody subsequent to
order of release did not violate double jeopardy when prior resolution of guilt could be
reinstated).
1187. 577 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1978).
1188. Id. at 433.
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
fense."18 9 A single act, however, may offend the peace and dignity of
both federal and state sovereigns and therefore may be punished by
both. 1190
Mindful of the potential for abuse in a rule permitting duplicate
prosecutions, the Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he greatest self-re-
straint is necessary when that federal system yields results with which a
court is in little sympathy."1 191 In response to the fairness implications
of the multiple prosecution power, the Department of Justice adopted a
policy of refusing to bring a federal prosecution following a state prose-
cution, except when necessary to advance compelling federal law en-
forcement interests. 1192 In United States v. Mikka,1193 however, the
defendant was acquitted in state court in July 1977 on charges of armed
robbery. In January 1978, he was indicted by a federal grand jury on
three counts of possession of a firearm by a felon stemming from the
same armed robbery. Following a jury verdict of guilty on all three
counts, the defendant appealed, arguing that the federal prosecution
contravened the Department of Justice policy. The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed, reasoning that the identity of charges necessary to invoke the
policy was lacking.'
194
VII. JUVENILE OFFENDERS
Federal criminal sentencing laws afford juvenile offenders different
treatment than that provided to adults by statute." 195 Thus, a defend-
ant under eighteen years of age is eligible for sentencing pursuant to
1189. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 188-89 (1959) (federal prosecution for con-
spiracy to destroy federal communications facilities not barred under double jeopardy by
state prosecution for conspiracy to destroy property of another). Cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 132, 136 (1959) (prosecution for violation of state robbery statute, after a prior
acquittal for federal offense on substantially the same evidence, did not violate fourteenth
amendment due process).
1190. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (federal government counts for
processing a still were not barred by prior state court judgment).
1191. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138 (1959) (prosecution for violation of state rob-
bery statute, after a prior acquittal for a federal offense on substantially the same evidence).
1192. United States Attorney's Manual, § 9-2.142.
1193. 586 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1978).
1194. Id. at 154.
1195. Underlying the use of special treatment for youthful offenders is the failure of tradi-
tional methods to curb juvenile recidivism. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424,
432-33 (1974) (nineteen-year old pleaded guilty to knowing and intentional possession of
approximately 1,000 LSD tablets and was sentenced pursuant to the Federal Youth Correc-
tions Act). See also H. R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3, reprinted in [1950] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3983, 3985.
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the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act,' 196 and a court may impose sen-
tence upon a defendant between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two
under provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act. 1197 A "young
adult offender""1 98 being tried as an adult may also be sentenced pursu-
ant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act if "the court finds that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant wil benefit from
treatment provided under [that Act]." 1199
Regulations promulgated during 1976 provide that a youth of-
fender's sentence runs continuously from the date of his conviction. It
is only when the juvenile is on bail pending appeal, in escape status,
hiding from parole supervision, or serving time for civil contempt that
the sentence period is tolled. l 0 In 1978, the Ninth Circuit applied this
same rule to juveniles sentenced before the 1976 regulations took ef-
fect. 12
0'
Since 1976, when the Federal Youth Corrections Act became appli-
cable to youth offenders, 12 0 2 the Parole Commission120  has had to de-
1196. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1976). See United States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072, 1074 (9th
Cir. 1976) (seventeen-year old convicted of bank robbery sentenced pursuant to the Juvenile
Delinquency Act) (purpose of Act is "to be helpful and rehabilitative rather than punitive,
and to reduce. . . the stigma of criminal conviction"). A juvenile not surrendered to state
authorities must be proceeded against under the federal juvenile delinquency statutes, unless
he has requested in writing, on advice of counsel, to be proceeded against as an adult. 18
U.S.C. § 5032 (1976).
1197. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976). The Act gives the sentencing trial judges four op-
tions: (1) suspending imposition or execution of sentence by placing the offender on proba-
tion; (2) sentencing the offender to treatment and supervision at a special youth facility, to be
discharged in no more than six years; (3) committing the offender to a youth institution for a
term exceeding six years, up to the maximum period authorized by law for the offense; or (4)
sentencing the offender as an adult. Id. § 5010(a)-(d).
1198. A person between the ages of 22 and 26 is referred to as a "young adult" offender.
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (1974).
1199. 18 U.S.C. § 4216 (1976).
1200. Parole, Release, Supervision and Recommitment of Prisoners, Youth Offenders,
and Juvenile Delinquents, 28 C.F.R. § 2.10(c) (1978).
1201. Ogg v. Klein, 572 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978) (youth who had been at large for five
years had his youth offender status tolled by his escape). See Suggs v. Daggett, 522 F.2d
396, 397 (10th Cir. 1975) (youth sentenced under Youth Corrections Act at large for 82 days)
("It would be a mockery. . . to allow the escapee to employ time spent in an escape status
in tabulating the. . . period of treatment. . . ."); Hartwell v. Jackson, 403 F. Supp. 1229,
1230 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd mem. 546 F.2d 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (youth sentenced under
Youth Corrections Act at large for one period of 44 days and a second period of 777 days)
("It is unrealistic to suggest that Congress intended to repeal this general rule [that an escape
tolls the running of a sentence] by implication.").
1202. De Peralta v. Garrison, 575 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (Act did not apply to
defendant sentenced under provisions of Youth Corrections Act in 1973 and up for parole in
1976). See 18 U.S.C. § 5017(a) (1976).
1203. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976).
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termine: (1) whether or not release would "depreciate the seriousness of
.. . [the] offense or promote disrespect for the law," 1214 and (2)
whether or not release would "jeopardize the public welfare." 120 5 Be-
cause the Act may not be applied retroactively, 20 6 the law in effect at
the time of sentencing determines which factors the Parole Commission
should consider.
20 7
A juvenile processed pursuant to the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act may have neither his fingerprints lifted nor his photograph taken
without the written consent of the court. 20 1 In United Sates v.
Duncan,120 9 however, a juvenile defendant allowed his fingerprints to
be taken pursuant to a grand jury subpoena without such written con-
sent. Although refusing to decide whether the Act had been violated,
the Ninth Circuit justified admission of the fingerprints into evidence
by reasoning that the "illegality, if any, was not egregious, and. . . the
giving of the statement. . .[was] sufficiently the product of an exercise
of free will. . . to purge any taint resulting from the extra-judicial or-
der to furnish fingerprints."'
12 10
A conviction under the Federal Youth Corrections Act will be set
aside automatically when the offender is unconditionally discharged
before the expiration of either the maximum sentence imposed or the
maximum period of probation initially fixed by the court.' 1 'I Under
such circumstances, the conviction may not be used subsequently for
impeachment purposes. 12 12 In United States v. Trejo-Zambrano,'' 3
however, a vacated juvenile conviction was found to be properly admit-
ted into evidence. The defendant in Trejo-Zambrano was charged with
both conspiracy and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
Although the prosecution furnished the defense with the record of a
1204. Id. § 4206(a)(1).
1205. Id. § 4206(a)(2).
1206. White v. Warden, 566 F.2d 57 (9th Cir. 1977) (appellant convicted of bank robbery
and perjury not entitled to credit for 776 days spent on parole prior to effective date of Act).
See De Peralta v. Garrison, 575 F.2d 749, 752 (9th Cir. 1978).
1207. De Peralta v. Garrison, 575 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1978). In De Perala, the Ninth
Circuit held that under the law in effect at the time De Peralta was sentenced, the Parole
Commission should have considered whether he was rehabilitated in deciding whether to
release him on parole. Id. at 751-52.
1208. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(d)(1) (1976).
1209. 570 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
1210. Id. at 293.
1211. 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1976).
1212. FED. R. EvID. 609(c). Rule 609(c) reads in pertinent part: "Evidence of a convic-
tion is not admissible. . . if. . .the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annul-
ment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure. .....
1213. 582 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1978).
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previous Youth Corrections Act conviction and the accompanying FBI
rap sheet, defense counsel overlooked the clerk's docket sheet ejatry
showing that the prior conviction had been vacated. The conviction
record was consequently admitted into evidence without defense objec-
tion. Reasoning that the defense counsel's misreading of the docket
entry "did not shift [to the prosecution] the responsibility of discovering
that the Youth Corrections Act conviction had been vacated," 2 4 the
Ninth Circuit found the admission to be proper. The Government had
discharged its duty of discovery and disclosure by supplying the de-
fense with the relevant documents.
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